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SUMMARY.
T o date, most applied econometric work analysing the effects of British trade unions has 
concentrated on their effect on relative wages. However, a considerable body o f U.S. evidence 
suggests that unions significantly influence other economic variables. This thesis attempts to 
explore some o f these issues using British data and uses econometric techniques to consider the 
effects o f unions on productivity, profitability and the relationship between unionism and 
schemes which link workers' pay to performance. As the tendency in recent years has been for 
collective bargaining to take place at the level of the plant or Arm in Britain the study prefers to 
use micro-economic data and several such data sources are accessed. The main finding is that 
trade unions certainly exert a significant influence on the behaviour of plants and firms in Britain 
in the early 1980's. Unions are found to reduce productivity in larger firms but have no impact in 
small firms in a sample of engineering firms. Using data on large British firms the union impact 
on profitability is observed to be negative but more marked in situations of market power so that 
unions effectively re-channel excess profits from capital to labour. The union impact on the 
financial performance of two large cross-sections of British establishments is also found to be 
negative and again more marked where these plants are able to exert some degree of product 
market power. Finally, union presence is positively related to the incidence of share ownership 
and profit sharing schemes unless strong unions are present when such schemes are no more 
likely to be present than in non-union workplaces. These results are of considerable interest and. 
despite the underlying macroeconomic and political climate, union activity is observed to have 
important economic effects in Britain in the early 1980's.

CHAPTER 1.
Introduction.
The question of how the presence of trade unions influences the economic performance of 
firms and industries is one that has generated interest among labour economists and industrial 
relations specialists for some time. It is however only recently that the impact o f trade unions on 
economic variables has been rigorously examined using econometric methods. For instance, it is 
now fairly well established that unionised workers are on average paid more than their non-union 
counterparts. What is less clear is how this wage effect and other non-wage union effects feed 
through to affect economic performance. Given the considerable upheaval in British manufactur­
ing industry in the early 1980*s and that some commentators have pinpointed trade unions as one 
of the main causes o f British industrial decline a study of the impact of British trade unions on 
economic performance is an important one to be undertaken. It is this broad issue which is to be 
addressed in this thesis.
The approach to be adopted is to empirically examine the influence that trade unions have 
on a number of indicators of performance. The reason for the empirical stance is effectively two­
fold. Firstly, as will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 2, existing economic theory is very 
much couched in terms of the effects that unions have on wages and employment and, whilst 
some predictions regarding union effects on performance can be generated from formal models, 
the effects that unions may exert are likely to depend on the characteristics possessed by the firms 
and industries in which they are located. This can only be adequately considered using a detailed 
empirical approach. Secondly, a number of British data sources are available to address these 
issues, although to date they have yet to be accessed for this purpose.
A further methodological point that needs to be stressed is that all the work presented in this 
thesis is based on microeconomic data. That is. the data seu  used are either at the level of the 
plant or firm. This is not a trivial point as it seems vital that to adequately consider the effects 
trade unions may have it is necessary to go to the level at which the union operates. The recent
trend. following industrial relations reform after the Donovan Commission(1968). has been 
towards plant and company level bargaining in Britain. As a consequence, the preferred level of 
disaggregation is either plant or firm level data. There are also econometric reasons for preferring 
micro-data : Geroski and Stewart(1986) identify a number of problems associated with the use of 
aggregate industry level data to analyse union wage mark-ups. In particular they find a great deal 
of variation in the mark-up conditional on various specification changes in their econometric 
model.
It is also worth remarking that almost all the data used in this thesis refers to the early 
1980*s. A number o f characteristics of the overall economy at this time may also be an influence 
(directly or indirectly) on the impact that trade unions have on economic performance. The first is 
the high unemployment prevailing in Britain in the early 1980's. In times o f high unemployment 
the priorities o f trade unions in the collective bargaining process are likely to differ from those in 
times of full em ploym ent Thus there may be some moderation in the wage bargain as unions are 
to some extent m ore concerned with employment levels. Alternatively there is the argument that 
as the individual quit threat becomes less credible in situations of high unemployment union 
non-union wage differentials can increase, thus giving a trade-off regarding the way in which 
unemployment impacts on the union influence on wages (see Holt(1970)). However, it is evident 
that, insofar as aggregate characteristics impinge on the microeconomic circumstances in which 
unions operate, high unemployment Is likely to have an effect on factors such as the share of 
profits that unions are able to extract, the power unions hold in the control of the workplace and 
the credibility o f the strike threat. A second characteristic of the economic environment o f the 
1980's has been the introduction of legislation aimed at curbing and restraining union power : 
recent legislation has been directed at. amongst other things, ballots regarding strike action, 
secondary picketing, political funds and the extent of the closed shop (see Batstone(1988)). Obvi­
ous economic consequences have emerged, most notably the reduction in industrial stoppages in 
the early 1980's in Britain. Thirdly, recent years have seen conscious efforts, both on the part of 
government and managers, to increase employee involvement in the operations of the Arm. In this 
sense there is the emergence of a new style of industrial relations in which the likes of profit
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sharing, quality circles, briefing groups and more consultation emphasise cooperation and com­
pliance in production operations. W hether or not these are attempts at genuine 'power-sharing' or 
purely cosmetic methods to wrest power from unions in a situation where they are weakened by 
the economic and legislative climate is no t clear. Thus, despite the fact that for econometric rea­
sons and due to the problems of aggregation bias associated with macroeconomic data this thesis 
prefers to present work using micro-data, aggregate economy-wide factors need to be borne in 
m ind as part o f the broader setting in which the economic effects o f trade unions are located.
Another point that has to made clear at the outset is what is meant by economic perfor­
mance. In this context it refers to the performance of microeconomic production units, be they 
establishments or Arms. The two indicators chosen for analysis are productivity and profitability, 
w here productivity is taken to indicate the output produced by each input into production and 
profitability is the difference between unit revenue and unit co s t Both are important indicators of 
the way in which a firm in a given m arket is operating and are obviously interlinked. Indeed it is 
o f  some importance to empirically evaluate whether or not they are higher or lower in the pres­
ence of trade unions.
The econometric methodology to be adopted and how it defines a union effect on perfor­
m ance is also an issue. The use of statistical techniques to analyse trade union effects essentially 
involves the construction of a hypothetical experiment where economic variables are compared in 
firms which are the same except for their union status. The preferred indicator of union status 
w hich is used where possible in this thesis is whether or not trade unions are recognised for bar­
gaining purposes. Hence, the experiment compares performance levels between firms which have 
recognised unions with those which do not and. as in practice firms are not identical except for 
their union status, the use of multivariate techniques controls for those factors which differentiate 
between Arms. Hence, union effects can be thought of throughout this thesis as ceteris paribus 
union non-union effects so that the analysis attempts to best approximate what performance 
would be in a given firm if unions are present to what it would be in their absence.
Having clarified a number of general points it is now possible to turn to the various com-
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ponents of this thesis. The next Chapter is a survey o f relevant existing work. Initially it consid­
ers the traditional monopoly model o f trade unions which depicts a union's only role as pushing 
up wages in excess o f  competitive levels. The effects that unions may exert on profitability and 
on productivity are then evaluated from this viewpoint. The effects generated when unions and 
firms bargain over wages and employment are considered next. However, as already alluded 
to, it Is considered that formal models yield some insight but are not sufficient to adequately 
examine the influence unions may have on performance. Thus the relevance of institutional and 
economic characteristics of firms and their operating market are discussed in the next section. 
The next step is to survey the existing empirical work which focuses mainly on the few British 
studies but where considered appropriate addresses the U.S. results. Finally, a recently fashion­
able question to ask is whether linking the pay of workers to the performance of their firm can 
improve the workings o f such firms. Thus the last section of Chapter 2 looks at the work on alter­
native compensation arrangements and asks what the relationship between them and union pres­
ence may be.
Chapter 3 considers the impact that trade unions have on productivity in a sample o f British 
engineering firms o v er the period 1978-82. The study adopts the production function approach 
first introduced in the context of union effects by Brown and Medoff(1978) and attempts to evalu­
ate whether some o f  the strong results found in the U.S. work cross over to the British situation. 
Most existing studies only present estimates of an average union effect on productivity and as a 
result this analysis argues that the extent of variation around the average is of vital importance 
and is what should be considered in more detail. The analysis then goes on to identify what are 
the characteristics o f  Arms and unions for which statistically significant union productivity effects 
are observed.
The two following Chapters address the issue of how trade unions influence the financial 
performance of firms and plants in which they are located. Chapter 4 uses profitability data from 
the company accounts o f a number of large British companies in 1984 and 1983 and augments it 
with union data from a postal survey conducted in the middle o f  1987. This merging of data 
sources allows an exploration of the union impact on profit margins. As for the analysis o f the
union impact on productivity, the variation in the union impact on profitability is deemed impor­
tant and tests of whether unions affect profitability to a greater or lesser extent if their firms have 
some degree of product market power (and hence a greater potential ability to pay) are conducted. 
Chapter 3 uses plant level data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys o f 1980 and 
1984 to see how unions affect the financial performance o f these plants. Again tests are con­
ducted to see how these effects vary with union strength and with characteristics of the establish­
ments and their operating markets.
Chapter 6 presents some estimates o f  the relationship between trade union presence and  the 
incidence of performance linked payment schemes in British workplaces. The data source used is 
the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. The issues to be addressed in this C hapter are 
whether managers in unionised concerns are more likely to be attracted to these schemes and}if 
union opposition exists, whether stronger unions are more able to  resist their implementation at 
their workplace. This is explored for three different types of sharing schemes operating in British 
establishments in 1984.
Although the work undertaken in this thesis focuses on a number of issues, they are inter­
linked in potentially important although often complex ways. Thus, having examined the effects 
of unions on productivity, profitability and on whether alternative pay systems are located in 
unionised situations the final Chapter attempts to draw together the results from the preceding 
analysis. Chapter 7 therefore offers some conclusions and highlights the main contributions of 
this thesis. Finally some remarks on a number of potentially friiitful routes that future research on 
the economics of trade unions could follow are offered.
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CHAPTER 2.
Unions and  Economic Perform ance : a Review o f  the Literature.
Trade union activity has been modelled by economists in a number of ways. Some have 
portrayed a trade union as an economic organisation attempting to maximise an objective func­
tion (for instance a number of objectives have been identified, some of the more popular ones 
being the wage bill, the average wage, utility of the membership and the rent accruing to its 
members). Others, often o f an industrial relations or institutionalist persuasion, have been uncom­
fortable with the notions o f a union maximising something and as such have shied away from 
defining a trade union maximand. These authors prefer to emphasise the institutional characteris­
tics of unions and their role in the workplace. This Chapter is a review of the relevant literature, 
paying particular attention to the implications o f these particular modelling strategies for the 
impact of unions on various indicators of economic performance. As such it is proposed to  ini­
tially consider the traditional view of unionism where the union is depicted as a monopolistic 
supplier o f labour pushing wages above competitive levels and to  examine the predictions this 
generates for the union effect on productivity and profitability. More recently some economists 
have continued to use the notions of a union objective function but have recognised that bargain­
ing may take place between unions and management and the next issue to be addressed is 
whether the predictions o f these bargaining models differ from those generated by the monopoly 
model : these ideas are also considered in the section analysing formal economic models and how 
they relate to union effects on performance. After outlining the formal economic models con­
sideration of the notion that unions have certain Institutional features seems important and this Is 
the subject to be considered next. The implications of this less restrictive stance for the union 
impact on economic performance are then evaluated and contrasted with those emanating from 
the monopoly and bargaining views. Having contemplated the theoretical predictions, a review 
o f the empirical work, concentrating on the few existing British studies but also where considered 
relevant describing the U.S. evidence is offered. Finally, recent interest has focused on whether 
economic performance can be improved by introducing alternative more flexible compensation
-7  -
methods at the workplace and thus the last section of this survey considers the nature of these 
payment schemes and whether or not they are likely to be introduced in the presence o f  unions in 
order to foster greater cooperation and as such improve performance.
2.1 Formal Economic Models of Union Behaviour.
In formal economic models unions have generally been described as an economic organisa­
tion analogous to the firm with some form of wage and employment considerations replacing 
profits as the variable o f interest For instance, the union monopoly model typifies a  trade union 
as an organisation whose sole purpose is to obtain wage rates for its members which maximise 
the surplus above the competitive wage. This model1 pictures the union as unilaterally setting 
wages and the firm then adjusts employment to find the profit maximising wage-employment 
combination. This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 2.1 where a firm's dem and for labour 
schedule can be represented u  L *  and Wh - L h as the wage-employment combination prevailing 
in the absence of unions. However, if unions exist and aim to maximise utility (defined in some 
way over W and L and represented by the convex indifference curves U i>Ui>Uo) subject to L *  
then the union wage rate is raised to a higher wage like Wu and the corresponding employment 
level is then set by the firm as Lu  . According to the Marshallian laws of derived demand, wu 
will be higher relative to WN the more inelastic is L d since higher wage gains will have less of an 
employment reducing effect In this context the rents accruing to the union are represented by the 
rectangle Wv abWM and this may be interpreted as a redistribution of income from  capital to 
labour. What is also o f interest from the neoclassical viewpoint is the dead-weight loss triangle 
abc which may be viewed as 'the social costs of unionism' and implies that unions induce alloca­
tive inefficiency by distorting price mechanisms.2
Whilst this model has usually been used to analyse union wage and employment effects it is 
able to generate some predictions regarding the effects of unions on economic performance.
1 Sm . for cam p le . Dunlopt 1944) or Reynold« 1911)
3 Although it should be noted that estimates of this social cost have generally been low : the usually c ited  
example being R ees '(l963) calculation of about 0 .3 «  o f  U S. national income.
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Under imperfect competition, consider a firm maximising the profit function defined simply in 
terms o f the single labour input as n -A (L ) - M X , where n  is profits and A is sales revenue 
defined as price (A) times output ((?(£)). Since dn/dM' m - L  <  0  it  is evident that a union induced 
wage increase reduces profits. Accepting a positive union mark-up so that WV-WM > 0 then the 
profit reduction is
Wu
A n -  -  /  L dW  (2.1.1)
WM
which is the area Wv acWN in Figure 2.1.3 Therefore, higher union wages come at the expense of 
higher firm profits.4 Hence, profit margins defined as n/A will fall as long as the proportionate 
reduction in sales revenue is less than the proportionate reduction in profits. Considering the pric­
ing policies of firms makes it clear that, unless a firm is able to increase its prices to entirely 
offset the union wage effect, profit margins are likely to fall as a consequence of union activity. 
For the case of a profit-maximising oligopolist with a constant returns to scale production tech­
nology the profit rate can be shown to be equal to the price-cost margin (or degree of monopoly 
p) s o  that, for the above profit function. Il/A -  p  -  (A-W  y p  (see Cowling(1982) or Dixon(1987>). 
Evidently an increase in H' will reduce p unless prices rise by a sufficient amount Hence, unless 
the wage increase is matched by the price increase, profit margins are likely to fall in the union 
monopoly model.
Still in the realms of the monopoly model, where the only union effect is to raise wages 
above competitive levels, union effects on productivity are likely to come about via a number of 
employer responses to higher wages. Fintly , the shift up the labour demand curve will generate a 
substitution away from labour to other inputs. For instance, if  the production function is defined 
in terms of labour and capital union firms will be more capital-intensive. Second, the marginal
* This is what Kancrf IM S) refen  to s i  ihe union s share of the em p loyer'l surplus.
4 It Is obvious here that Imperfect competition in the product market is assumed. The consequence of 
negative union profit effects In a perfectly competitive market would be (In the absence of any favourable 
productivity effect) to force unionised businesses to e s il  the market.
-10-
product of labour will be higher in unionised firms : the familiar first order condition from the 
profit function given above is
I r - " '  <2.1.2)
and since Wu > wN this implies that (d R /d L)v  > (dR/dL)N. Thus unionised employers will hire 
workers of higher quality, namely those with higher marginal products. Hence, via these two 
routes unionised firms can have higher productivity than non-union firms (see Freeman and Med- 
off(1984) for further discussion). A third effect comes about due to the price increase that may 
follow an increase in wages : thus, because of higher union wages both output and employment 
will fall. The net effect on labour productivity, defined as output per employee, depends on a 
number of variables such as the nature o f the firm's production technology, product and labour 
demand elasticities, the factor input mix and the ease with which the firm can substitute between 
factor inputs.9 The net effect this implies must then be taken in conjunction with the other routes 
suggested by the monopoly model to ascertain the overall union impact on productivity.
In the traditional union monopoly model a negative union impact on profitability seems 
likely. It proves harder to gauge the direction of the union productivity effect which depends on a 
number o f factors, even in the simple monopoly model. By adopting certain assumptions it is 
possible to generate firmer predictions (see Clark(1984)). The discussion here prefers to remain 
general to give an indicative idea of the possible effects. O f course the two effects are very much 
interlinked and the relationship between union wage, productivity and profit effects is a complex 
one. even in the confines of the monopoly model. However, from a neoclassical viewpoint, 
despite the fact that unions may raise productivity in individual firms, the efficiency implications 
of unionism are negative since unions distort the price mechanisms in the aggregate economy and 
induce allocative inefficiency.
5 For example, Clark(1984) assume* a CES production technology with constant returns for a monopolist 
facing a demand curve which has a  constant price elasticity r . A (positive) union wage mark-up of D%  
causes a fall In output o f  XtD % (where X Is labour's share) which, in the absence of any capital labour sub­
stitution. will be exactly offset by a fall In employment (through the Hicksian formula relating labour and 
product demand elasocides) so that productivity is unchanged. This is a very specific example : more typical­
ly the effect could go either way depending on the assumptions made.
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More recently the prediction that wage-employment combinations are 'on the labour 
demand curve’ has been questioned by certain authors who feel that the union setting the wage 
and employers responding to choose employment is unrealistic. Whilst still in the realms of for­
mal models these authors have suggested that bargaining between the (urn and union over both 
wage and employment levels is more likely (see McDonald and Solow's(1981) efficient bargain­
ing model) or that bargaining occurs over the wage and employment is then set by the employer 
(see the right to manage model of Nickell and Andrews(1982) or Dowrick( 1985,1987) who claim 
this to be more representative of what actually happens in the collective bargaining process, espe­
cially in Britain). Compared to the union monopoly model these bargaining models suggest dif­
ferent outcomes for wages and employment and consequently different implications for the 
impact o f unions on economic performance.
Bargaining over the wage and employment suggests that the outcome on the labour demand 
curve as described in the union monopoly model is Pareto inefficient That is to say. there exists 
some achievable wage and employment combination which is preferable to both the firm and the 
union. The various possible scenarios derived from bargaining models are illustrated diagram- 
matically in Figure 2.2. The diagram indicates the firm's iso-profit curves as the dotted lines IT, 
where n«><r!|<ri2 and union utility as Ut where U*<U\<Ui. The tangency between U \, rio and the 
labour demand curve yields the union monopoly outcome at point A. However, the firm is better 
off at point B for the same union utility and the union is better off at point for the same firm 
profits. Thus one can isolate a number of points off the labour demand curve on a contract curve 
C C ’  which render the union monopoly outcome as sub-optimal.
The efficient bargaining model predicts an outcome somewhere on this contract curve, the 
slope o f which depends on the relative importance of wages and employment in the union utility 
function. The right to manage model only allows the bargain to take place over wages and con­
strains the Nash bargaining solution to the labour demand curve (at a point like E in Figure 2.2).6
* 0»waJd( 1987a) a lio  derive, a

What U of most relevance here is that the bargaining models predict an outcome involving higher 
employment than does the union monopoly model.
Formally, the efficient bargain can be viewed as an unconstrained asymmetric Nash bargain 
between Arms and unions with the relevant objective function being
t m t y f  UU(WX)tV U.yW L] '^  ( « * ! ! ]  (2 .1 J)
In  the Nash bargain y  is  taken aa the union’s strength in the bargain and the resultant wage- 
employment outcome is the best that could be achieved given the behaviour o f the other party in 
the bargain. The relevant first order condition (after differentiating with respect to wages and 
employment) can be written
<*■>*>
What needs to be noticed is that in the efficient bargaining case the marginal product of labour no 
longer equals the wage but is lower due to the extra term defined as the product o f employment 
and the marginal rate of substitution between wages and employment in the union utility function 
(see Brown and Ashenfelter(1986)): that is. the extent to which the marginal product of
labour deviates from the wage depends on the importance of wages and employment in the union 
utility function and it is this which determines the slope o f the contract-curve.7 Hence, the 
efficient contract predicts an employment level higher than that in the labour demand curve 
models, a result which holds as long as L  ¿ f j j j f r  > 0. which is true if the union cares about 
employment as well as wages.
A variety of contract curves tracing out optimal wage-employment combinations are possi­
ble. Some examples are given in Figure 2.3. If the Nash settlement is on a vertical contract curve
7 Tbs rlght-to-manage m odel maxim!*« equation (2.1.3) but subject to the labour demand curve (l.e. con­
dition (2.1.2) is imposed). It generates a wage-employment combination on the labour demand curve with 
higher employment but lower wages than the monopoly model. Although note that the overall context of the 
bargain is of some importance here : Ntckcll and Wadhwani( 1917) make ihe point that in the partial equilibri-
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like CjC then employment is unchanged tram  the non-union case. For the one factor production 
function considered here this suggests, subject to  fairly stringent assumptions like identical pro­
duction technologies and all workers being o f the same productive quality for union and non­
union firms, that (Q(Z.VD(/ - ( Q (L )!L )N so that productivity is unchanged. Considering wage- 
employment outcomes on non-vertical contract curves or on the labour demand curve compli­
cates matters further. In this situation to gauge the direction of the union effect requires certain 
assumptions to be imposed on the parameters o f  the production function.8 Obviously, considering 
a production function defined over several factor inputs makes things even more complicated. 
This discussion, taken in conjunction with the earlier points raised in the context of the monopoly 
model, indicates the difficulty in isolating a firm prediction regarding the union impact on pro­
ductivity in formal models. It adequately illustrates that one needs to impose a number of a priori 
restrictions on a number of parameters to isolate an unambiguous union productivity effect
Turning to profitability, the Nash bargaining framework generates the prediction that, 
ceteris paribus, the bargaining strength of unions enables them to gain pay premiums for their 
members : that is to say, unions are able to capture a share of the profits earned by the firm. Take 
the specific example o f a vertical contract curve. Here price-cost margins (Tl/A) will be reduced 
because profits fall and R ( L )  is unchanged between union and non-union firms. In general, union 
presence is seen to bring about a reduction in profits and therefore, unless the firm’s price 
response or a positive productivity effect offsets the union wage effect, a reduction in 
profitability. Hence, the prediction is qualitatively the same as for the monopoly model : this is 
made clear by looking at Figure 2.2 where a union non-union comparison indicates that unionised 
firms are situated on iso-profit contours corresponding to lower profits than otherwise comparable 
non-union firms.9 Whether or not the union impact on profitability suggested by a bargaining 
framework is more or less marked than that suggested by the monopoly model depends on several
* To illustrate this, define the production function i t  Q  ( L )  -  L a where a  is the parameter indicating re­
turns to scale. If 0t * 1 IO there arc constant returns then (,Q (L  )/L )u ■ (Q (L  VL )N and labour productivity 
is the same in union and non-union firms. If Cl * 1 and L u *  l.N this no longer holds.
* That is. non-union firms an at point C on iso-profit contour n 2 whereas union-firm bargains (on or off 
the labour demand curve) are struck on iso-profit contours corresponding to lower profits like fl| and flo-
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factors. Num bered among them are the magnitude o f the union wage premium, the employment 
level set in the bargain, the nature of the production technology and the price charged for goods 
sold by unionised firms relative to non-union firms in the same maricet: presumably these factors 
will depend on the strength and preferences of the union and on the characteristics o f the firm and 
markets in w hich it is located. Only if  trade unions do not care about employment and are free to 
choose a wage (when y  -  1) does the efficient bargain collapse to the monopoly model so that the 
outcome is guaranteed to be the same.
Analysis o f  union-firm bargaining models has proved popular in the recent economic litera­
ture. As such numerous extensions to the models discussed here have been developed. For exam­
ple. Manning(1987) has developed a more general model which nests the cases above in a frame­
work where sequential bargains over wages and employment occur. The advantage this set-up 
gives is that y  can differ in the wage and employment parts of the bargain. Another set of recent 
developments have tried to rationalise, in the confines of bargaining models, why unions exist 
and why. if  they are present, membership in a given firm need not be 100% : a survey of this 
work is given in Booth and Chatteiji(1988). Other extensions are discussed in the up-to-date sur­
veys by Oswald( 1985,1987b) and Ulph and Ulph(1988). Whilst these developments are of 
interest in their ow n right and their existence needs to be acknowledged the standard models dis­
cussed above are sufficient to illustrate what formal models have to say regarding the potential 
for unions to affect performance without going into any more detail.
Consideration of formal economic models yields some limited insight into the impact that 
unions have on economic performance. Things are a little better for predicting what the likely 
impact of unions on profitability will be and the general prediction (subject to certain caveats) is 
that price-cost margins are likely to fall as higher wages in the union sector are financed at least 
to a certain extent by unions capturing a share of profits. The union impact on productivity is 
however difficult to ascertain, even in very simplistic models. Brown(1986) notes this by stating 
'models o f wage bargaining behaviour can never be sufficient if they tacitly ignore that both 
employers and trade unions are, in their different ways, at least as concerned with the produc­
tivity implications o f the bargain as with the wage implications' [Brown(1986) p.208]. This is
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reflected in the fact that empirical tests of bargaining models are generally undertaken purely in 
terms of wages and employment and, as one might intuitively suspect, the outcomes they suggest 
are very mixed.10 The difficulty to tie down a firm prediction regarding union effects on perfor­
mance when using formal models may however be reasonable. Whilst consideration of union 
wage and employment effects is obviously necessary and tells pan o f the story it is unlikely to 
prove sufficient because the ability o f  trade unions to influence performance will vary from one 
situation to another and in particular will depend on the institutional and economic characteristics 
o f the firms and industries in which they are located.
13.  Institutional Considerations o f  the Union Impact on Performance.
As highlighted earlier, opposition to the notion of a union maximand has been considerable. 
A number o f authors are unable to com e to terms with a maximising trade union and as such 
prefer to discuss the possibility o f  union effects on performance in an economic context but 
appealing to alternative views in w hich union objectives are determined by a political process 
(Ross(l948)), its ability to provide a collective voice for its members (Freeman(1976). Freeman 
and Medoff(1984>) or by its nature as 'an organisational entity with security goals o f its ow n' 
[Faith and Reid(1987) p.40)J. These analyses prefer to recognise the institutional characteristics 
o f trade unions and note that simply considering a union in terms of the effects it has on wages 
and/or employment is not sufficient In doing so they aim to stress both the desirable and undesir­
able features of unionism. This framework allows a more general evaluation of the effects that 
trade unions may have on economic performance since it permits a broader view of the situations 
in which unions operate which could not be incorporated into the highly specific formal models 
which have been studied to date. Obviously the cost o f this approach is that it cannot be ade-
10 M ott, although not all. »uppon an off the dem and curve settlement but find it hard to determine whether 
the outcome i t  on a vertical contract curve : exam ples of such tests are Abowd(1987). Brown and Ashen 
felter{1986), MaCurdy and Pencavel(l986) and Svejnar<1986) using U.S. data and Camnh and 
Oswald(1983). Camnh. Oswald and Findlay(1986), Bean and Tumbull(1987) and Nickell and 
Wadhwani(1988) using British data. Thera is  a lso  some debate as to whether the testing procedure which 
nest* the labour demand curve models in the m ore general efficient bargain is appropriate : see Andrews and 
Hamson< 1988) who argue such models are non nested and that non-nested hypothesis tests should be used to 
discriminate between them.
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quately adopted in a formal economic sense as those models which attempt to do so rapidly 
become intractable.
In an effort to recognise the institutional and economic aspects of unionism Freeman(1976) 
interpreted Hirschman’s(1970) famous exit-voice model o f  the social system in terms of the 
labour market, paying particular attention to the distinction between the ability o f union and 
non-union workers to air their grievances to management. H e argues that individual workers are 
only able to express job dissatisfaction by quitting since once they have objected then they have 
been marked by employers as dissenting voices. This is what he refers to as the exit mechanism 
and is necessarily associated with a large cost (losing employment). On the other hand, in the 
presence of trade unions individuals who have similar grievances can air their views collectively 
through the union without fear of individual recrimination from employers. As such a trade union 
is able to provide a collective voice for its members which counters the need to quit as a means of 
making known discontent with the operations of the workplace. This view highlights a number of 
potentially desirable aspects of unionism which are relevant to the impact that unions may have 
on economic performance. Indeed the recognition that unions have 'two faces' (see Freeman and 
Medoff(1979)), the monopoly face and the collective voice face,11 has important implications for 
untangling the sources of the union impact on productivity and profitability and it is these possi­
bilities which are considered next.
Isolating the effect that trade unions have on productivity in the context of formal economic 
models is not straightforward. Consideration of institutional arrangements does not solve this but 
permits identification of a wide ranging number of possible routes through which positive and 
negative productivity effects may occur. For instance, the work of the collective voice school (see 
for example Brown and Medoff(1978) and Freeman and Medoff(1984)) isolates a number of pos­
sible sources of productivity improvements and reductions that might ensue from unionisation. It
11 Although it should be noted that this is by no means an original distinction. For instance, as far back as 
1902 Sidney and Beatrice Webb drew the distinction between what they term ed the doctrine of a living wage 
and the doctrine of vested interests. Whilst the former refers purely to  wage aspects of unions the latter 
focuses on the union's role in management decisions, watching over hiring methods, the use o f  new 
machinery and in identifying a role for unioas in dismissal and disciplinary procedures.
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•hould be noted that their analytii primarily ha* the U.S. in mind and as such one should be care­
ful not to  immediately translate their work to the British situation. However, most of the points 
they m ake are relevant to some degree and discussion in the British context supplemented by the 
relevant institutional context and by any additional observations relevant to Britain seems 
entirely plausible.
Neoclassical models of union behaviour axiomatically identify a  number of employer 
responses to higher union wages. First, the shift up the labour demand schedule will cause a sub­
stitution from labour to capital such that unionised Arms are more capital intensive. Secondly, 
unionised employers will hire higher quality workers, namely those who possess more human 
capital. A  third response is that, conditional on market structure, product prices may rise due to a 
higher marginal cost of employing an additional worker. The collective voice school accepts 
these theoretical channels but feels that discussion o f union effects on productivity should also 
recognise a number of other features. For instance, the exit-voice distinction suggests that quit 
rates will be lower in unionised circumstances. Reductions in labour turnover therefore mean that 
management may be more prepared to invest in Arm specific training w hich raises the average 
skill ratio thereby enhancing productivity. The collective voice view also argues that interactions 
between workers are important such that improved morale and motivation among unionised 
employees can engender productivity improvements. One channel through which this may occur 
is the presence of union backed seniority rules for lay-offs or promotion w hich can reduce rivalry 
among workers. This may contribute to productivity gains : on the other hand, it might be argued 
that such rules (which it should be noted are more prevalent in the U.S. than in Britain) can 
prevent workers from gaining promotion as quick as they might wish or prevent unproductive 
workers from being laid off and as such hinder productivity.
Another non-wage route via which unions can have an impact on the workings of the pro­
duction process is by ensuring that management recognise certain internal organisation pro­
cedures that they would not in the absence of unions. As Pencavel(1977) puts it 'the trade union 
may be interpreted as the employees' auditor of management checking that the employer is 
fulAlling his part in the labour contract* (Pencavel(1977) p. 139). The important point that this
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makes is that unions are able to have a say in the organisational set-up of the him and that any 
control they possess in this role may feed through into effects on performance. This monitoring 
role is also recognised by Faith and Reid’s(1987) analysis which depicts a union as acting as an 
agent for its members : they highlight the organisational characteristics of unions and their role in 
the firm and by doing so recognise the scope for unions to affect performance. More specifically 
they argue that unions are able to help a firm to earn higher (pre-distribution) monopoly profits by 
restricting output (via work stoppages and restrictive work practices) such that there exists a real 
role for unions to monitor ou tpu t This effective cartelisation of output also ensures that unions 
may obtain a share of monopoly rents. Faith and Reid also argue that the presence of restrictive 
work practices can aid a union in taking some control in the operations of the workplace. M ore 
typically, the output reducing role of restrictive practices has been highlighted and put forward as 
one explanation of why productivity may be lower in unionised situations. The wide ranging 
definition o f restrictive practices encompasses industrial action, overtime bans, bans on piecemeal 
rates, demarcation practices, the closed shop and a numerous other work related issues. In m ost 
situations these factors are likely to reduce levels o f  productivity.
The underlying economic, social and political climate is also pertinent to discussions o f 
union power and the degree o f control that unions have in the operations of the firm. Whether the 
industrial relations situation is more conducive to adversarial union management relations or 
whether, as recently in Britain, legislative measures force trade unions to behave in a more 
cooperative manner is o f som e relevance and will feed through into the union impact on produc­
tivity. The comparison between the 1970’s when, following the Donovan(1968) report, unions 
were able to behave in a more independent fashion and the 1980's where unions have had to com ­
ply more and behave in a more cooperative style is important. The empirical work presented in 
Chapters 3 to 6 is based on data almost entirely from the 1980's, a time when the role of unions 
and the trade union movement is being questioned. Unfortunately, as the empirical analysis 
reported in the following Chapters is based on cross section data (or only covers a few years) the 
effects o f a changing legislative environment cannot be ascertained. It does however lurk in the 
background and should be borne in mind when viewing the results.
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This discussion adequately illustrates that a number of channels exist through which unions 
may influence productivity that the formal models fail to identify. Indeed this highlights the main 
contribution o f the collective voice school : namely that recognition of the non-wage provisions 
made by trade unions is of some importance. For instance, they stress the role of unions in pro­
viding grievance and arbitration procedures, for recognising the channels of communication 
between workers and management, for negotiating workplace conditions and for providing hinge 
benefits such as pensions, holiday pay and accident insurance. The institutional and economic 
characteristics o f the plants and firms in which unions are located are also important and should 
not be forgotten in studying the union impact on productivity. The indeterminancy of isolating a 
firm prediction concerning the union impact on productivity however suggests that ultimately the 
question is an empirical issue, although one which can be best considered by allowing both a role 
for the wage and non-wage aspects of unionism.
Institutional and organisational characteristics o f unions and the Arms and markets in which 
they operate are also of importance in analysing union effects on profitability. It is evident that 
higher union wages may be financed in a number o f  possible ways. Among these are higher pro­
duct prices, through higher productivity, use of more efficient production technologies or via a 
reduction of profits. Whilst all are possible to som e extent, a number of reasons exist to explain 
why unions should have a claim to a share of a firm 's profits. In the formal models discussed 
above, unions are pictured as raising labour costs but also as making Arms cut back on output and 
raise product prices. The net effect on profit margins then depends on the magnitude of the price 
rise relative to the union wage effect. Market structure is of some importance in dictating the 
extent to which firms may raise product prices. Kalecki(1971) suggests that coordination in price 
setting among firms in oligopolistic markets means that producers are unlikely to be able to 
increase prices sufficiently to outweigh the union induced wage increase ; hence price-cost mar­
gins will fall in unionised circumstances as unions appropriate a share of excess profits for them­
selves and their members. Whilst, again this needs to be resolved empirically it seems the idea 
that unions can capture a share o f any rents thereby reducing profit margins has some intuitive 
appeal. As noted by the collective voice school the presence of negative union effects can also
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provide a very plausible rationale as to why managerial opposition to unionism occurs since ulti­
mately managerial performance is dictated by the profitability o f the Arm.
A further consideration is necessary. If a significant proportion of profits are distributed to 
labour this may deter investment (see Grout(1984)). Reducing investment can then hamper long 
term profitability. On the other hand, other arguments are possible : for instance higher union 
wages are often said to cause a switch from labour to capital thereby raising investment Hence, 
investment is also another area in which ambiguous union effects are predicted (see the discus­
sion in Metcalf(1988)>. However, investment strategies are potentially important when consider­
ing the union impact on productivity and profitability and necessary allowance for differences in 
capital intensity between union and non-union situations is important in analysing both.
The relevance of outside factors like legislative measures and/or the underlying industrial 
relations climate is also likely to feed through into the union influence on profitability. The 
existence o f a weaker trade union movement may shift the onus of control to management and 
away from unions and limit the ability o f unions to extract a share of the organisational rent. The 
legislative measures curbing the power exerted by closed shop arrangements introduced in the 
early 1980's, together with the high unemployment prevailing in Britain matte this a real possibil­
ity and one which should be recognised in interpreting the cross-section results reported in fol­
lowing Chapters.
The implication that follows from most of these considerations is that unions are likely to 
reduce profit margins : the channels through which this might occur are important and again one 
should be careful to identify the relevant characteristics o f the union and Arm or industry in which 
it is located. For example, Craypo(1981) notes that industrial structure is o f some importance in 
dictating whether it is possible to pass on higher union wages as higher prices to the consumer. In 
industries where this is possible higher profits can be earned and this raises another issue, namely 
that unions may be more likely to attempt to organise the workforce in these industries since the 
premium for organising workers in highly profitable situations may be higher (see Abowd and 
Farber(1988)). This same observation can be made at the firm level by suggesting that those
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firms which possess a greater degree of market power (presumably secured by a high market 
share) will be more prone to unionisation and thus more likely to be characterised by lower profit 
rates. This suggests the testable hypothesis that unions will be more likely to be a claimant of a 
share o f  profits in situations where there is a greater ability to earn economic rents. Again, the 
im plication of this discussion is that the analysis o f union effects on profitability is essentially an 
empirical issue and one in which organisational features of the firm, the institutional features of 
the union and the industrial characteristics o f the firm's operating market should receive a pri­
mary role.
2.3 Unions and Productivity : Existing Empirical Evidence.
T he majority of empirical work analysing the relationship between unions and productivity 
has been based on U.S. data. Some exceptions do exist, the British studies to date being 
PencaveTs(1977) historical study of British coal mining. Knight's(1988) analysis o f the relation­
ship between strikes and industry level value added per employee hour. Denny and 
Muellbauer's(1988) consideration of the union productivity effect between 1980 and 1984 and 
Edwards(1987) more institutional based approach. The main conclusions reached by the U.S. 
studies are more favourable to the collective voice unions raise productivity thesis than are the 
British studies although clearly direct comparison is complicated by the considerable institutional 
differences between the two countries.
T he basic empirical methodology for analysing the union impact on productivity was ini­
tially introduced by Brown and Medoff(1978) and essentially involves estimation o f a Cobb 
Douglas production function augmented by a vector of additional variables including a unionism 
variable. Their approach is best illustrated in the following way : a Cobb Douglas production 
function which is amended to allow one to draw the distinction between unionised labour (¿y) 
and non-unionised labour (£*) can be defined as
YmAK*%L*+cLv)'+' ( 0 < M D - (2.3.1)
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where Y is output, A is a constant, K  is capital. Pi is the elasticity of output with respect to capital 
and the production function is defined to have constant returns to scale.
If c > l  (<1) this implies unionised workers are more (less) productive than their non-union coun­
terparts. Rearranging equadon (2.3.1) gives
(1.3.2)
where L  - L n +Lu and U is the unionised proportion Lu /L .
Dividing throughout by L and taking natural logarithms yields
ln<r/L>*ln4+0,li»<*//.>+<l-fcXc-IX/ (2.3.3)
The productivity differential of unionised establishments is the coefficient on union density 
((1-fliX c-l)). If the differential is positive (negative) then the production frontier of union firms 
lies outside (inside) that o f the non-union firms. By the same token, (c-1) is the productivity dif­
ferential between unionised and non-unionised workers.
The assumption of constant returns can be relaxed by replacing (l-0i) by fc and rearranging 
to g ive12
W Y IL )  ■ InA H<Pt+P,-1 )lnL + fr(c-1)4/ (2.3.4)
Therefore, estimating equation (2.3.4) allows one to determine the impact of unionism on 
worker productivity for a given level of worker quality and capital per worker. To control for the 
higher capital to labour ratio suggested by the standard price theoretic union monopoly model 
ln(JC/£) is included as an independent variable. To control for the notion that an outward move­
ment in the labour demand curve occurs due to hiring higher quality workers is usually achieved 
by estimating an auxiliary earnings function and adjusting the labour input such that those work­
ers with more human capital represent more units of labour. A labour quality index based on the
to a test of W o:
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fitted values of an earnings equation is generally constructed and then included as an argument in 
the production function. Finally, perhaps the most troubling aspect is that the dependent variable 
usually used in these studies is value added and as such contains the price effects resulting from 
union induced wage increases. There seem to be two ways to circumvent this problem. The first 
and most desirable route is to define output in physical units so that there is no contamination 
by price effects : however such measures of output are only appropriate for certain sectors of the 
economy.13 In general such information neither exists nor is appropriate. The second alternative 
is to deflate value added by a relevant price deflator so as to isolate and remove the price effect. 
Clearly problems occur if the price index is not perfectly matched. Despite this, deflation of the 
dependent variable (even i f  by an imperfect index) is o f some importance in the empirical 
analysis of union productivity effects.
The Brown-Medoff approach is adopted by most studies as their starting point and the 
results from the U.S. are. as one might expect, fairly mixed but point if anything to a productivity 
enhancing role for trade unions. Examples of studies finding positive productivity effects are 
Brown and Medoffs(1978) analysis of U.S. manufacturing industry and Allen’s(1984) analysis 
o f U.S. construction. Examples of neutral productivity effects are reported in Clarit's(1984) firm 
level study and Allen's(1986a) study of elementary and secondary school construction projects.14 
The few existing British results are less optimistic. Pencavel's(1977) study o f British coal min­
ing utilises a CES production function in evaluating whether a unionised firm 's production fron­
tier lies inside or outside that o f  a non-union firm. His main conclusion13 is that ceteris paribus a 
totally unionised coalfield is 22% less productive than a completely non-unionised coalfield. 
However, as stated by Pencavel 'it would be absurd to generalise from a study o f a single indus­
try some seventy yean ago to the situation that obtains in Britain today'.[Pencavel( 1977) p. 145]. 
A contemporary study by Denny and Muellbauer(1988) utilises industry level productivity data
11 See for example O arit'sf 1980a. 1980b) analysis o f the U.S. cem ent industry or lchniowski's<19M) 
analysis o f  U.S. paper mills where ou tpu t can be defined in physical units.
14 For mote estimates showing the variety of U.S. results obtained see the surveys in Freeman and Med- 
off( 1984) and Hirsch and Addison(1986).
15 He also finds an insignificant union relative wage effect which he claims reduces problems of contami­
nation by price effects.
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supplemented by industrial relations data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 
1980 and 1984. For the most part they find neutral union effects although the use of some union 
variables produces a negative effect. Edw«rds(1987) uses data from the 1978 Warwick Survey of 
manufacturing establishments (see Brown(1981) fo r more details) and a survey carried out by the 
Industrial Relations Research Unit at Warwick in 1984 to analyse the effects o f  plant level union­
isation on company level sales per employee.16 H e finds that the effect o f unions is insignificant 
using data from both studies. Similarly Knight*s( 1988) study fails to isolate any discernible 
influence o f strike activity on labour productivity fo r British manufacturing industry in 1968. He 
interprets this as evidence to dispel the myth that unions always exert a depressant effect on per­
formance.
It might come as no real surprise that the results from the British studies differ from the 
U.S. results on unions and productivity. For instance. Pratten(1976) compares labour productivity 
(defined as value added per employee) between Britain and other countries using data on plants 
owned by international companies. He isolates a  productivity differential which suggests that 
British plants are 50% less productive than their U.S. counterparts. O f this 50% he attributes 15% 
to behavioural factors such as strikes, overmanning and restrictive work practices. Another inter­
national productivity study worthy of note is Caves*(1980) comparison of factor productivity in 
71 British and U.S. manufacturing industries. He argues that labour relations play an important 
role in determining productivity and pays particular attention to strikes, resthctive practices and 
overtime clauses in labour contracts. In a productivity regression (with dependent variable the 
ratio of British productivity to U.S. productivity) measures of strikes and work days lost have a 
statistically significant negative influence. Hence he argues that disruptions in the workplace do 
influence productivity and that a conflictual industrial relations climate has acted as a hinderance 
to productivity in Britain. Davies and Caves(1987) also come to a similar conclusion in finding 
the extent of unionism to be negatively correlated with productivity growth in their study using
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ind us trial data from the late 1960's and 1970's in Britain.17 The evidence presented by these stu­
dies suggests that talk of a union potential to raise productivity may be less applicable in the Brit­
ish situation.18
The studies cited to date generally derive some kind of average union effect on productivity 
within their sample. However, more recently some (mostly American) work has attempted to 
open up the 'black box’ containing the sources o f union effects on productivity. For instance, 
Freeman( 1980a,1980b) provides empirical evidence to back up the exit-voice idea that unionised 
workers have lower quit rates and that labour turnover is lower in unionised circumstances. 
Stewart( 1987b) provides similar evidence for Britain. Additional evidence for the collective 
voice notion that unionised workers are more likely to air grievances is provided by Leigh(1986) 
who reports evidence that unionised workers are more likely to express job  dissatisfaction. With 
reference to the notion that unions have some kind of 'shock effect' on managerial practices, 
Clark( 1980b) considers six U.S. cement plants that changed union sum s over the period 1953-76. 
Through interviews with management and unions he was able to obtain information regarding 
worker and management responses to unionisation. His main conclusion was that significant 
differences occurred following unionisation especially with respect to managerial behaviour. This 
he views as evidence for a union shock effect on management. Another conjecture offered in the 
discussion of routes through which unions may affect productivity levels was their impact on the 
morale and motivation o f their members. Pencavel’s(1974) analysis o f British coal mining con­
structs an index of industrial morale (based on quit rates, absenteeism rates, accident rates and the 
incidence of strike activity) and finds lower morale to be associated with lower output. This, he 
su tes, s u g g e s ts  that the morale and motivation o f the workforce is an important determinant of 
the workings of the production process.
On the negative side, the presence of restrictive work rules (such as overmanning, seniority
17 Although note that a  number of U.S. studies have reported negative union effect* on productivity 
growth : an example it  Hirsch and Link(1984). This suggests that static and dynamic productivity effects may 
be very different
"  See Addisoo( 19S4) who also points to the existence of the closed shop and the greater incidence of res­
trictive practices in Britain to make this point
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rules and 'make work' strategies) may provide sources of dampening productivity effects. Empir­
ical work on this has been carried out by Ichniowski(1984) and Allen( 1986b). again using U.S. 
data. Ichniowski( 1984) proxies the number and complexity of work rules by the number of pages 
of the labour contract and (whilst one can question the use of such a proxy on the grounds that a 
shorter contract does not necessarily mean fewer work rules) finds a significant inverse relation­
ship between plant productivity and number o f contract pages. He claims this as supportive evi­
dence for the view that restrictive work practices restrict productivity. Allen( 1986b) follows 
Freeman and M edoff »(1982) assertion that the existence of restrictive work practices generates 
lower price elasticities of demand and elasticities of substitution between factor inputs in the 
union sector.19 The sample used by Allen, based on data on commercial office buildings and ele­
mentary and secondary school construction projects, has the advantage of referring to identical 
products and technology for union and non-union constructors and hence he claims to be able to 
accurately test the hypothesis. He finds lower elasticities of substitution between skilled, super­
visory and unskilled workers in the union sector (but no difference in elasticities of substitution 
between labour and non-labour inputs) and claims this as some evidence to reflect the idea that 
work rules do have an adverse influence on performance. However, simulations based on his 
estimated model suggest the magnitude o f the effect is not particularly large. It can also be 
argued that unions impede productivity in unionised firms by disrupting production via industrial 
sanctions. However. Neumann and Reder(1984) find that in U.S. manufacturing strikes have little 
influence on firms' overall output. These results are mirrored for the British situation by 
KnighU1988).
A large (and growing) research programme has undertaken an empirical evaluation o f the 
impact that trade unions have on productivity and the routes through which these effects may 
occur. However, most of these studies have used U.S. data and making any firm predictions 
regarding the productivity effects of British trade unions is difficult since little work has been
ly aggregated data act. were unable to diicover w hether th il waa due to the pretence of union work ntlea or 
due to the notion that unions tend to organite labour in sectors with lower demand elasticities.
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conducted in this area. It seems clear from viewing existing evidence that the effect will vary 
from one situation to another and what needs to be examined is the variation o f union produc­
tivity effects in different contexts. Clearly the discussion in this section suggests a considerable 
need for the empirical analysis of the effects of contemporary British trade unions on the produc­
tion process.
2 A  Unions and Profitability : Existing Empirical Evidence.
A long history of Industrial Organisation studies analysing the determinants of profitability 
at the level o f the firm and industry now exists.20 Typically these studies identify a large number 
of determinants o f the ability to earn above-normal profits including the number and size distribu­
tion of sellers and buyers in the market, the share of the market possessed by individual firms, the 
nature and degree o f product differentiation, the conditions of entry for new sellers, the degree of 
foreign competition, the characteristics of demand and whether the firm produces consumer or 
producer goods. However, it seems plausible that labour activity may be able to play a role in the 
ability o f firms or industries to raise profit margins. Whilst this observation has been noted on 
theoretical grounds for a considerable time21 it is only recently that empirical structure- 
performance studies have viewed unions as a claimant to residual profits.
In a general sense a model using firm level data to empirically evaluate the impact of unions 
on profitability can be depicted as
,A , J U V) (2.4.1)
where k is the profit rate for the i *  firm operating in the j *  industry. X is a vector of structural 
characteristics of the operating industry (e.g. market concentration, the extent o f entry barriers, 
import competition), Z is a vector of firm specific variables (e.g. market share, capital intensity) 
and U  is a (scalar) measure of union presence in the firm.22
10 Surveys o f  these studies are given by Scherert 1980). Schmalanseet 1986) and Oeroski( 1988).
21 See for example. Segal<1964) or Levinson(l967) for two differing views on this subject
22 Due to  data difficulties some studies have been fotced to use industry level union measures which as­
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Equation (2.4.1) or an industry level equivalent has generally been estimated using a variety 
of U.S. data sources. O f considerable interest is that regardless of data source, measure of profits, 
or time period under consideration unions are found to reduce the profit rate. Industry level stu­
dies which show that unions erode price-cost margins are Freeman(1983), Karier( 1985,1988), 
Domowitz et al.(1986) and Voos and Mishel(1986). Firm level studies showing a lower rate of 
return on sales or capital o r a fall in market value based profitability measures are Clark(1984), 
Salingerf 1984), Connolly, Hirsch and Hirschey(1986) and Hirsch and Connolly(1987).23 No con­
temporary British studies exist at the time of writing although Cowling and Waterson(1976) do 
include a lagged union density measure in a first differenced industry level price-cost margin 
equation based on 1960's data but find no significant relationship. However, what does exist is 
the British studies o f unionism and wage share from which can be inferred a union profitability 
effect As the share of wages in value added is negatively related to the price-cost margin the 
positive estimates of union presence on wage share found in the British industry level studies of 
Cowling and Molho(1982), Henley(1984) and Conyon(1988) can be viewed as suggestive evi­
dence o f a negative union influence on price-cost margins.24 Thus the existing evidence from 
both Britain and the U.S. seems to support the notion that the profit rate will fall as a consequence 
of unionism.
As highlighted in the discussion o f existing theoretical explanations of union effects on per­
formance union profit effects are likely to be a function o f the characteristics of firms and markets 
in which they are located. In this light, it seems reasonable that product market imperfections 
may be interactive with the union ability to extract a share of profits. As Rapping(1967) puts it 
'unions are more effective when bargaining in industries in which product market competition is 
absent and ability to pay is high' [Rapping(1967) p.32). To test this assertion, a number o f the 
U.S. studies have tested whether this interactive relationship occurs and thus whether union 
profit effects are more marked in positions of product market power. Most of the industry level
sume that union activity in the firm ii  the industry average : this i t  obviously a  strong assumption.
23 See also the analysis of Ruback and Zimmerman« 1984) showing a negative relation between successful 
union representation elections and the equity valuation o f  firms.
M For some evidence using U.S. data see Henley( 1987a).
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studies (Freeman(1983), Karier(1985,1988), Voos and Mishel(1986)) find that unions reduce 
profit margins by more in highly concentrated industries.23 This is corroborated by the firm level 
study of Salinger(1984). Recent developments in the empirical Industrial Organisation literature 
based on firm level data have however questioned the use o f concentration as the key determinant 
o f the ability to earn monopoly profits. These studies (see Gale and Branch(1982), Ravens- 
craft(1983) and Kwoka and Ravenscraft(1986)) emphasise the role of firm specific market share 
as the main determinant of profitability. Firm level studies analysing the interaction between 
union presence and market share have produced mixed results. Hirsch and Connolly(1987) find 
some evidence o f more marked union effects in firms with higher market share. But they prefer to 
emphasise the role of other determinants of profitability such as R&D expenditure and cost 
advantages that firms possess due to technological innovations in providing rents that unions can 
capture.26 As such they prefer to conclude that union effects are negative but it is not necessarily 
market power but firm specific factors like R&D expenditure and the ability to innovate which 
determine the size of the union profit effect. Another U.S. firm level study is that o f Clark(1984) 
who finds the somewhat surprising result that those firms with lower market share are mote likely 
to be characterised by negative union effects. This data set does however seem to be something of 
an outlier (based on large firms, most of which have market power) and these results seem to be 
very specific to this data source.
Certain studies have tried to get a handle on what proportion of profits is redistributed to 
workers in the form of higher wage gains. Salinger(1984) finds that unions benefit most from the 
existence o f monopoly power and some 77% o f monopoly profits made by a sample o f U.S. firms 
go to unions. Voos and Mishel(1986) suggest that at least 80% of the entire union wage effect is 
financed from a redistribution of profits. This is therefore construed as evidence that unions have 
positive distributional effects (which may offset their detrimental allocative effect) since the 
majority of the union wage effect does not come either at the expense of non-union members or *
23 Domowitz e t aL( 19S6) however find no relationship.
*  See also Connolly et si.(1986) and H incb and U nk(1987) who forward argument, along the same 
lines.
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via higher prices bu t via a reduction in profits.
The empirical literature analysing the union impact on profitability is still relatively new 
although a num ber o f  interesting results have already emerged. The notion that unions have wide 
ranging effects and may Influence performance, one indicator of which is profitability, is of some 
importance. As w ith most economic hypotheses, the result that unions reduce the profit rate is 
open to interpretation in a number of ways. It is clear that the results finding negative union profit 
effects can be appealed to as a rationale for management opposition to unionism as ultimately 
this implies that trade unions damage the bottom line of company accounts. What is less clear is 
whether negative union profit effects are undesirable from a welfare stance. Whether union rent 
seeking is more or less marked in situations of market power is of some importance in attempting 
to answer this question. Since these ideas have yet to be confronted with British data it therefore 
seems that there is a need to attempt to examine union effects (and the channels through which 
they occur) on financial performance in Britain.
U  Unions and Alternative Compensation Arrangements.
Traditionally trade unions have fought hard to maintain wage premiums for their members 
based on the standard wage system giving a fixed rate per hour, week or month. However, 
recently there has been a renewed interest in flexible payment methods, partly due to the work of 
Weitzman( 1984,1983,1987) and partly due to a wony regarding high labour costs damaging the 
performance o f the economy.27 These involve paying workers a base wage plus some bonus 
which depends on the performance o f their establishment or firm. The performance measures gen­
erally considered are profits, share prices or value added, giving rise to profit sharing, share own­
ership or value added schemes respectively. It is hence o f some interest to see whether the recent 
uptake of these schemes in British workplaces creates a conflict with traditional union attitudes 
towards methods o f  pay.
27 Sec Eaton. G rout and Wadhwam<l9«7) and Standing» 1988) for extensive reviews o f the relevant liter«-
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Weitzman(1984) postulates three main reasons as to why a sharing system is superior to the 
traditional wage system. Firstly, holding shares or being paid some share o f value added or profits 
generates a greater allegiance to employer goals on the pan of employees. Increased company 
loyalty and a greater feeling of involvement in the actions of the firm is considered to increase 
employee morale and motivation and thus increase productivity. Sharing arrangements are likely 
to do so where worker effort is imperfectly observed such that sharing can mean that a firm and 
its workers can have similar objectives which then reduces a need for monitoring (see 
Hart(1983)). The second reason is  that performance linked pay adds a dimension of increased 
wage flexibility thereby reducing labour turnover costs. The idea here is based on the neoclassical 
premise that a firm will hire workers until the wage equals the marginal revenue product o f 
labour. If one specifies wages in terms of a base wage plus a bonus linked to performance then 
setting the base wage equal to the marginal product implies that, for a given overall wage, the 
firm will want to hire more workers. Any shocks then mean that wages will adjust (via the perfor­
mance linked component) so that employment stability is maintained. Hence, wages will be 
more flexible and employment higher than in a firm operating a conventional wage system. 
Finally, by extending this argument to the macroeconomic context profit linked pay will result in 
lower unemployment since macroeconomic shocks will be absorbed by the economy as wages 
adjust over the business cycle. Clearly it is mainly the first two propositions which are of interest 
here since it is the relationship between sharing arrangements and unionism at the level o f the 
plant or firm in which we are interested. What is o f considerable interest is that both the claim 
that sharing generates increased productivity through improved morale and motivation and the 
claim that sharing schemes may reduce turnover costs and increase wage flexibility are two o f the 
claims made in favour o f unionisation by the collective voice school. This might be construed as 
suggesting that by introducing performance linked payment methods employers feel they can 
achieve productivity gains without unionisation and without the other productivity reducing 
features o f union presence. Thus it seems to be o f considerable interest to ascertain whether or not 
these schemes are introduced in the presence of unions.
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Mitchell(1987) outlines three fundamental reasons why unions are likely to be sceptical 
about the introduction of performance linked payment schemes. Firstly, these schemes shift a 
portion o f the risk associated with variable wages from employers to employees. Secondly, the 
link with performance undermines the principle of equal pay for equal work, a long held union 
goal. Thirdly, because of the lower base wage management has an incentive to take on more 
workers and if  they do so this would dilute the bonus paym ent going to each employee. Reasons 
therefore exist as to why unions are likely to oppose the introduction of these schemes.
Given that unions are generally sceptical about changes in payment methods it is of consid­
erable interest to see whether these schemes have been introduced in unionised circumstances and 
to ascertain the motives behind their introduction. For instance, it is evident that the introduction 
o f schemes can alter the nature of the collective bargaining process. Take the case of profit shar­
ing. In the absence of profit sharing, profits may be defined as n  -* (L ) -  WL where the notation 
is as in Section 2.1. Wages and employment can then be se t as the solution to the Nash bargain­
ing problem (either unconstrained or constrained to the labour demand curve)
(Osysi). (2 J .1 )
Clearly, the bargain here occurs over wages and employment (or if constrained to the labour 
demand curve, just over wages). In a profit sharing firm things become more complicated. In this 
situation workers are paid a base wage W plus a share, say a, o f firm profits such that
(2.3.2)
and firm profits now become
fF  - 0 - * ) iR (L > - W L ) (2.3.3)
The difficulty now is how to define the bargain. Do unions bargain over the base wage alone ? Is 
the bargaining only over shares 7 Do they bargain over the base wage and the share separately 7 
Or, is the bargain the same as it would be in the standard wage system 7 In a general sense the
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Nash bargain under sharing becomes
V  -  UU(W J  x  )P tO -* X* a  y-WL ))'-» (2.3.4)
where the superscript 5 is an indicator that the objective function refeis to a firm with sharing 
arrangements.
What is clear is that the nature o f  the bargain can alter in the presence o f sharing arrange­
ments. It seems likely (although not necessary) that the relative strengths in the bargain and 
indeed the trade-off between W and X in the union utility function will alter in the presence of 
sharing schemes. This may impinge on the decision of whether or not to introduce schemes when 
unions are present and is addressed in more detail in Chapter 6.
Wadhwani( 1988) assumes a particular functional form for the objective function as £  -  w 911 
where 6 is the relative bargaining strength parameter ^ jf^y. to show that in unionised situations 
a wage system will generate a higher value o f 1  than will a sharing system.28 The argument here 
is that for a given overall wage employment will be higher in sharing firms : this is because 
employment is set in sharing firms according to the first order condition dR/dL  -  W  compared to 
dR idL m w  in traditional wage firms. Thus for a given overall wage profits are low er under shar­
ing and consequently so is £. Because o f this, unless tax relief is offered on sharing schemes so 
that £  under sharing can exceed its value in the traditional wage system, neither unions nor firms 
in which they are located will be attracted to schemes. As recent legislation in Britain (mainly the 
1978, 1980 and 1984 Finance Acts) has been geared towards offering tax incentives on share 
ownership and profit sharing (although not for schemes linking pay to value added) then it is pos­
sible that in some firms the potential value of £  under sharing can rise above its non-sharing level. 
The presence of tax incentives therefore provides a rationale for why some companies have 
recently introduced sharing schemes.29
M W adhw ani's analysis effectively augments that o f  Weitzman(1985) by the inclusion of a wage bargain. 
W einm an 's analysis is based on monopolistic competition in the product market and profit sharing in  the la­
bour market. An informal analysis is given in Weitzman( 1984); a more rigorous analysis in Weitzman<1983)
; and the issue o f  union-firm bargaining is also addressed in Weitzman(1987).
29 The theoretical papers by Jackman(1988)and Pohjola(1987) are also relevant here. The arguments 
underlying their analyses are that higher employment under profit sharing may be viewed as a way of forcing
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When lax relief is available there is also an incentive for firms and unions to get together 
and collude in wage setting so as to each obtain a share o f the additional rent that a government 
subsidy makes available. For instance, suppose the availability o f tax relief makes the wage in a 
sharing firm W + t s  (R (L ) -W L )IL  where t  is a tax parameter indicating the proportion of profit 
related pay not to be taxed. Given this overall wage and the higher resultant profits (because o f t)  
the value of 1? can exceed that o f E. Wadwhani( 1987a. 1988) however argues that there is a real 
possibility that the presence of tax relief can be exploited. If the union and firm collude to pick a 
total wage, say W + t  s (R (L y -W L )/L , then, as long as W > W , an even higher value o f I* can be 
achieved. In this situation schemes will be purely cosmetic as they are only introduced because 
firms and unions can take advantage o f  the subsidy. Despite the fact that the wage actually paid 
out by the firm falls it is augmented by the subsidised profit share payment so that the overall 
wage may be unchanged or could even rise. The advantage to the firm is that it can earn higher 
profits because it is paying out lower wages. As a consequence of this collusive behaviour the 
potential economic effects, in particular the higher employment levels Weitz- 
man(1984.1985,1987) claims profit sharing will generate, may be negligible. Thus, whilst the 
availability o f  tax relief for sharing arrangements can provide an incentive for the introduction of 
such schemes, the existence of cosmetic sharing means that their economic effects may be 
nullified.
Poole(1988) acknowledges the importance of tax incentives for the introduction of schemes
but also argues that additional factors are of some importance. The managerial style within a
given company is highlighted, as is the state of industrial relations. He describes data on 303
companies to show that where there exists more consultative management-worker relations and
where information is more freely given to workers and their representative trade unions schemes
are more likely to be present : on top o f this his data suggests that firms with formal collective
bargaining agreements are more likely to operate schemes. This is certainly of some interest and
is explored more fully using micro-data in Chapter 6. in particular linking the extent of union
labour contracts toward« an efflciMM bargaining outcoma rather than the 'on  the  labour demand curve' Mttie- 
menti characterising contract« in traditional wage Arms.
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presence to the probability of operating a scheme.
Other empirical evidence on sharing schemes is mostly very recent and generally considers 
their impact on economic variables. Much of this work has been aimed at testing the Weitzman 
propositions. Wadhwani and Wall(1988) present evidence to show that profit sharing actually 
increases overall remuneration such that it is simply a bonus on top of the 'norm al' wage. This is 
not in line with Weitzman's claim  that increased wage flexibility ensues from profit sharing and 
even suggests that schemes may be inflationary. In an employment equation they find that it is 
not the base wage, but the overall wage, which the firm considers to be the marginal cost of 
labour. In this situation the employment consequences o f  sharing profits are insignificant, hence 
casting doubt on the unemployment reducing facility o f  sharing as promoted by Weitzman.30 In 
the same study it is also of interest that Wadhwani and Wall find some evidence of higher pro­
ductivity levels in firms with profit sharing. This seems to  imply that, in their sample, profit shar­
ing is essentially an incentive type payment purely aimed at generating higher productivity.
Other empirical evidence on the economic im pact o f sharing arrangements is fairly mixed. 
For instance. Estrin and Wilson(1986) find that profit sharing significantly reduces remuneration 
and increases employment in a small sample of engineering firms. Cable and Wilson (1988) find 
that profit sharing boosts productivity in the same sample : interestingly they cite the industrial 
relations climate in the engineering sector as a source o f  such effects. Bradley and Estrin(1987) 
find higher employment in the John Lewis Partnership (a  firm that has engaged in profit sharing 
for some time) but no remuneration effect relative to  its four main retail trade competitors. 
Richardson and Nejad(1986) present evidence to show share prices in the multiple stores sector 
are higher in firms with employee share ownership schemes. However, most o f these are studies 
of particular sectors of British industry : Blanch flower and Oswald! 1987a.1987b) use the nation­
ally representative Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 1980 and 1984 to show that share 
owners hi p/profit sharing has no significant influence on levels o f employment or on managerial 
perceptions of capital investment or financial performance. Therefore, the economic effects of
30 Similar concluiion* are reached by Wadbwani(19S7b) in an em pirical itudy uiing aggregate data from 
Japan.
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performance linked pay are still far from clear. However, given the increased num ber of schemes 
linking pay to performance and the present Government's advocacy of such schemes it seems of 
interest to analyse whether schemes are being introduced in the hope of raising performance lev­
els in unionised workplaces, or to shift control from labour to management o r merely to obtain 
the tax advantages that recent laws make available to employers and employees participating in 
such schemes.
2.6 Sum m ary.
This survey of existing work analysing the relationship between unions and economic per­
formance highlights the fact that, to date, very little British work has studied these issues. It also 
emphasises that pure consideration of formal economic models is not sufficiently general to ade­
quately consider the link between unionism and the two indicators of performance chosen, 
namely productivity and profitability. Taking the predictions of economic theory in conjunction 
with those derived horn a more institutional viewpoint makes it clear that the determination of 
the union effect on productivity and profitability is a complex subject. T he approach to be 
adopted in the remaining Chapters is to empirically examine the relationship between unions and 
economic performance using microeconomic data on British firms and establishments. Finally, it 
was noted that the implications flexible payment schemes have for unions is o f some interest and 
thus, after determining the possible effects unions may have on performance in  Chapters 3-3, the 
relationship between trade unions and the presence of sharing arrangements will be analysed in 
some depth in Chapter 6, after which some insight is hoped to have been gained into some of the 
economic features of British trade unions.
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CHAPTER 3.
The Productivity Effects o f Unionisation and Firm Size in British 
Engineering Firms.
The discussion in Chapter 2 highlighted that, until very recently, little work has been under­
taken to analyse the influence that British unions have on productivity. Whilst the U.S. evidence 
is well documented and a number of data sets exist to permit examination of the union Impact on 
productivity data deficiencies have largely prevented study of this issue in Britain. Indeed data 
demands to cany  out such work are quite heavy. Adequate measures of productivity are not 
easily found and data sets which do include satisfactory productivity measures more often than 
not do not possess industrial relations data. On the other hand, industrial relations data sources 
rarely contain economic data of any note. However, a data set describing a small sample of Brit­
ish engineering firms over the period 1978-82, derived from a survey undertaken by J.Cable and 
N.Wilson does have the relevant information to empirically evaluate the effects that unions have 
on productivity. This is therefore the subject of this Chapter.
The data on engineering firms to be used in this Chapter is particularly useful in that it 
yields a considerable amount of information on a variety o f union related issues. Rather than sim­
ply looking at a single indicator of union presence this permits consideration o f  several dimen­
sions o f the union impact on productivity.1 In particular this lets recognition o f  certain institu­
tional characteristics of the firms in the sector under study enter the analysis. T he richness of the 
data also allows an evaluation of the importance of issues like firm size and the nature of the pro­
duction process in isolating the influence of unions on productivity. Additionally, the fact that 
the sample consists of a group of relatively homogeneous firms operating in the engineering 
industry means that, unlike studies which focus on the whole of manufacturing, omission of cer­
tain industry specific factors is not a problem. On the other hand, the relative disadvantage of 1
1 See Wilson( 1987) who utilises this data to estimate union wage and productivity effects using a  single 
indicator o f union presence. Estnn and Wilson! 1986) a lto  use this data set to examine the impact o f profit 
sharing on wages and employment Cable and W ilton! 1988) look at the impact on profit sharing on  produc­
tivity : this Chapter also has something to say about this latter area.
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using data from a single sector of the economy is that it prevents generalisation of the results to 
other industries.
The layout of this Chapter is as follows. The next section attempts to translate the relevance 
o f collective voice arguments (which have mainly been forwarded by U.S. labour economists) to 
the British situation. Section 3.2 considers the methodology to be employed in the empirical work 
and describes the construction of a union presence index. Section 3.3 describes the data and the 
institutional background underlying the sector under study. Section 3.4 presents empirical esti­
mates o f the union impact on productivity and examines in detail the source o f such effects and 
how they vary across the firms in the sample. Parallel results analysing the influence of the closed 
shop on productivity are also presented for comparison with those derived from the index. The 
differences between union effects on productivity in small and large firms are also considered in 
more detail. Section 3.3 analyses the robustness o f the main results and finally Section 3.6 
highlights the main results emerging from this Chapter.
3.1. Unions, Collective Voice and Productivity in Britain.
The need for economists to analyse the non-wage influence o f trade unions is made force­
fully by Freeman and MedofTs U.S. work.2 They state that researchers should recognise the insti­
tutional features of unionism and not simply treat trade unions as monopolistic suppliers of 
labour whose sole purpose is to push wages above competitive levels thereby inducing allocative 
inefficiency. Indeed some of the empirical research undertaken by the collective voice school 
suggests that the non-wage effects of unions may offset the efficiency losses highlighted by the 
traditional monopoly view o f unionisation. One such route through which this may occur is for 
unions to raise productivity. Empirical evidence for positive union productivity effects is pro­
vided by. among others. Allen(1984) and Brown and Medoff(1978). However, whilst other stu­
dies report statistically insignificant effects very few U.S. studies report a negative union impact 
on productivity.3 This suggests that there may be some credence in the idea of U.S. unions *1
* See Freeman and Medoff( 19S4) and ihe numerous references cited therein.
1 See Chapter 2 and the surveys in H in d i and Addison« 1986) and Freeman and MedofT(1984) for more 
details).
-41 -
having some beneficial impact on productivity which goes some way to offset their positive 
influence on wages.4 5The existing British evidence tends to reflect less of a productivity enhanc­
ing role for unions as the results of Pencavel's(1977) historical study and the research by Denny 
and Muellbauerf 1988), Kmght(1988) and Wilson(1987) point to a neutral or negative impact. It 
therefore is o f importance to consider the influence of unions on productivity in the British con­
text. especially given the considerable institutional differences relative to unions operating in the 
United States.
Trade union influences on productivity can be expected to manifest themselves in a number 
o f ways. A veritable black box of potential sources of union productivity effects has been 
identified by U.S. labour economists, some of which are clearly more appropriate than others to 
the British situation. One popular idea is that a trade union is able to monitor the behaviour of 
management thereby inducing an improvement in managerial efficiency. Brown and Med- 
off(1978) and Clark( 1980a. 1980b) allude to a union "shock effect" which prompts managers into 
recognising certain internal organisation procedures that they would not in the absence of unions. 
Improved managerial efficiency monitored by the union is then hypothesised to raise produc­
tivity. This idea is certainly feasible in situations where 'industrial relations are good, with 
management and unions working together to produce a bigger "pie”' [Freeman and Medoff(1984) 
p. 165]. On the other hand, an adversarial industrial relations climate is likely to generate union 
opposition to managerial attempts to re-define production operations. In Britain, this is evident in 
union opposition to the likes of overtime working or payment by piece rates. Clearly if  this non- 
cooperative situation exists then talk of unions having a depressant effect on productivity may be 
more appropriate. As more conflictual industrial relations have traditionally characterised British 
collective bargaining arrangements3 compared to the U.S. then this latter situation is probably 
more indicative of the British situation. The international studies of Pratten(1976) and 
Caves(1980) referred to in Chapter 2 report lower labour productivity in British plants compared
4 Although the evidence on unions and profitability is unambiguous in that all studies to date ftnd that un­
ions reduce profits : for some U.S. examples see Freeman« 1983) or Kaner« 1985) and the discussions in 
Hirsch and Addisoo« 1986) and Freeman and Medoff« 1984), for some British evidence see Chapters 4 and 3.
5 Although exceptions, most notably the electrician's union, do exist
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to their U.S. counterparts. This adds weight to the idea that control o f the production process and 
more conflictuel industrial relations may be more relevant as a source of dampening union effects 
on productivity in the British context relative to that (»residing in the United States.
The state of industrial relations also impinges on the issue of workplace control and the way 
in which the extent of worker control o f production operations can affect productivity. It is evi­
dent that if  unions are able to exert some control over the relevant production technology then 
they may enhance or restrict performance as a show of bargaining power through the control of 
manning levels or via sanctions like go-slows, overtime bans or strikes (on this power interpreta­
tion see Cable(1987)). I f  control is viewed as a zero-sum game then in a conflictual industrial 
relations climate characterised by each side trying to further its control of production at the cost 
o f the other side the likely outcome will be reduced productivity. If, on the other hand, coopera­
tive union-management relations exist, perhaps through extensive employee involvement in the 
running of the Arm and genuine (as a pose to cosmetic) 'power-sharing', then control need not be 
zero-sum and joint control of the workplace can raise productivity.
Obviously if managerial functions are operating efficiently in the absence of unions then 
there exists no monitoring role for the union. This begs the question of whether X-inefficiency (or 
sub-optimal production activity) is more or less likely to be present in union or non-union firms. 
Without going into great detail firms may not behave optimally (be X-inefficient) due to a 
number o f internal firm specific factors : these include the effort exerted by workers, the fluency 
of information channels between managerial hierarchies within the organisation, the existence of 
managerial perks, the motivation o f management, the native of the production process and so on.6 
These factors are necessarily tangled up with the size of the Arm. In particular, larger firms are 
often pinpointed as those with problems of X-inefficiency : for instance, larger firms are generally 
those which tend to suffer from poor information channels and find it harder to monitor workers' 
effort. Returning to the union issue, the existence of sub-optimal firm behaviour means that there 
exists a role for unions to monitor managerial behaviour (see Faith and Reid(1987)) and this is
4 Hirer id)
Fr*ntz(1988).
di»cuiied in more detail in the leminal article by Leibenstein(19M) and in (be book by
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one very plausible explanation of the empirical observation that unions are more likely to organ­
ise workers in large Anns. This suggests that a potentially important area o f examination is to 
explore w hether union productivity effects differ with Arm size and indeed whether this monitor­
ing role implies that unions may be able to possess greater control in such situations.
Whilst the nature o f the production process is  obviously a relevant factor in determining the 
union impact on productivity an importance can also be attached to the nature of labour force 
adjustment in union and non-union firms. For exam ple, it has been argued that lower labour turn­
over and quit rates among unionised workers reduces costs and may lead to productivity gains in 
unionised Arms (see Chapter 2 and the references cited therein). On the other hand, it may be that 
union "equality of opportunity” policies (such as seniority rules) prevent more ambitious workers 
from climbing the promotion ladder thus resulting in a potential reduction in productivity.
Neoclassical models of union behaviour also have something to say about the possible 
direction o f  the union productivity effect. T he monopoly union model predicts that the 
managerial response to the union wage effect causes a substitution from labour to capital, from 
unskilled to skilled labour (since unionised em ployers are more likely to invest in firm specific 
human capital) and a rise in product prices. T he social consequences o f this are that unions 
induce allocative inefficiencies through price distortions and that, even if  productivity effects in a 
given firm may be positive, from a welfare viewpoint unions are undesirable as they harm 
economic efficiency. The presence of restrictive work practices merely worsens this by inducing 
more inefficiencies.
As the discussion has already made clear the numerous routes through which unions may 
affect productivity suggest that the direction o f the effect is not obvious. Indeed the diversified 
nature o f these possible sources also makes it evident that some are more likely to be applicable 
than others to certain firms and certain industries. Thus to give an indication o f whether unions 
raise, lower or have a neutral influence on productivity it is necessary to confront these issues 
with data and this is the purpose of this Chapter, namely to analyse the influence of trade union 
activity on productivity in a sample of firms operating in a sector of British manufacturing indus­
try-
3.2. Modelling and Estimation of Union Productivity Effects.
The basic methodology used in the union-productivity literature (see for example the semi­
nal work o f Brown and Medoff(1978)) and in the closely linked empirical woik on participation 
(see for example Cable and Fttzroy(1980)) is to estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function 
augmented by variables indicating characteristics of the production unit under consideration. 
Chapter 2 showed that the Brown-Medoff approach based on a Cobb-Douglas production tech­
nology generates an equation of the form
in(l'/£.)aPo*p|ln(X/&) + (P}+0i~l)lid' ♦ fc (c - l) i /  (3.2.1)
where the notation is the same as in Chapter 2.
This is simply a re-arranged production function allowing for non-constant returns (when 
Pi ♦ Ps * 1) *nd includes a union variable as a determinant of labour productivity. Therefore the 
basic method o f discriminating between productivity levels in unionised and non-unionised situa­
tions is to estimate equation (3.2.1) supplemented by a number of control variables. The latter are 
included since the objective of the productivity studies is to determine the impact of unionisation 
on worker productivity in an otherwise comparable Arm. In convenient notation this can be 
expressed for the l * Arm as.
y ,- a  + X,'p + Z,'Y+t//5 + e. (3.2.2)
where y is the logarithm of value added per employee. X is a vector o f logarithms of factor inputs 
(i.e. In(,K/L) and Ini.), Z is a vector o f additional control variables. U  is a (scalar) measure of 
union presence, a  is a constant term and e a random error.
Measurement of the indicator of union presence U  is o f some importance. In existing 
empirical work analysing the effects of unions on economic variables several possibilities have 
been considered :
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(i) U  can be defined as a dichotomous variable indicating union or non-union status. The union 
non-union split is usually defined as whether or not unions are recognised by employers for col­
lective bargaining purposes.
(ii) The definition o f U  emerging as U I L  in the Brown-Medoff formulation is union density, 
namely the number o f union members divided by the number of employees in the firm.
(iii) A third possibility is the proportion covered by collective bargaining agreements : this gives 
an indication of the extent of union presence in terms of those being paid union wage rates.
Generally the measure of U  that is used is dictated by data availability. If a single measure 
were to be used the preferred measure would be an indicator o f whether unions are recognised by 
management for collective bargaining purposes : this gives a useful dichotomisation o f  union or 
non-union status. Unfortunately, despite the richness o f the data source to be utilised in this 
Chapter, data on recognition is unavailable. Several other firm-specific indicators of union 
activity are however available for use. Given the lack of recognition data, it is probable that sim­
ple use o f a single indicator of union presence in this framework may not tell the whole story. For 
instance, use of union density alone does not really give an indication of union strength. Hence, 
unions with similar density may have different impacts on the workings of the production pro­
cess.7 The other possibility is to consider using the information contained in a number o f indica­
tors. This generates problems of its own. Firstly, whilst several o f these indicators could be 
entered into the production function as individual arguments they are likely to be correlated with 
one another (some more heavily than others) such that entering them simultaneously may induce 
problems of multicollinearity that may cause misleading inferences to be drawn from the results. 
Second, it is also true that, in studies such as this where the sample size is fairly small, degrees of 
freedom limitations prevent inclusion of several indicators. This is especially true when interac­
tions between determinants of value added and indicators of unionisation are to be considered.
7 M etcalf >(1988) review  pouiu to Edwards and Scullion's« 1982) work which stales that unions with 
stroog roots in the shop floor organisation of the 1950’s and 1960's can possess a great deal more strength 
than other unions of similar density without such a tradition.
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Thus. the lack of information on trade union recognition prevents any meaningful union 
non-union distinction based on a single indicator of U  to be drawn and this makes a greater need 
for some appropriate measure of union presence to be derived. Therefore it is proposed to 
include an index V  which is a linear combination of the various components and may be defined
ponents in all. In some respects this is similar to the labour attitude index calculated by 
Norsworthy and Zabala( 1985a. 1985b) and in ideas to Katz. Kochan and Gobeille’s(1983) study 
of Quality of Working Life programmes in the U.S. The difference in the Nonworthy and Zabala 
approach is their use of a translog index which includes second order interactions between the v*. 
However in the present study it is preferred to stick with the tin t order specification since it is 
considered that use of a full translog index asks a lot o f the data. The main practical problem in 
constructing V  is to  ascertain the appropriate weights 4« attached to each indicator of union pres­
ence. As Cable(1985) has noted one obvious point is that choice of weighting structure is some­
what arbitrary and that this may enable researchers to effectively ’get the results they want'. 
Hence, rather than simply assigning some arbitrary values to 4*. the index is to be constructed as 
a linear combination of the v, using the weights implied by the first principal component of the 
variance covariance matrix of the various constituents of the index.8
As a further econometric point, several studies considering the effects of unions on relative 
wages have stressed the importance o f examining interactions between the union variable and the 
explanatory variables (examples are Mellow(1983) or Stewart( 1983b)). Thus it may also be 
interesting to examine whether interactions between the determinants of productivity and the 
index V prove important in the empirical analysis of trade union productivity effects. That is to
1 More details on the construction of the index are given in the Data Appendix. See Fencavel(1974) for a 
similar approach used to calculate an index of industrial morale from information on quiu. strikes, absentee­
ism and accident rates in British coal mining. It should however be noted that use of principal components is 
not without difficulties. For instance it is necessary that the variable» to be transformed have variances of 
similar size and that scaling of the data may influence the weighnng values. However, given that die four in­
dicators to be used are all bounded by 0 and 1 this is not a problem in this study. It should alto be noted that
V  -  v* where v» is the k *  component, 4« is the weight attached to v, and there are s com­
use of the first component weightings alooe ignores the other 
plaint a significant amount of the variance in V then this is re 
proportion then use of only the first component may be quesnoc
U -l) If the first
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say. the equation specified to date only allows the union effect to operate through the intercept 
term in the production function. It is however perfectly feasible (and probably likely) for the 
union impact to  make itself felt in an interactive manner with various characteristics of the firm. 
For instance, it may be that in large firms the union impact is different to that in small firms and 
simply allowing an intercept shift does not permit consideration o f  this. A fully interactive model 
can be written, replacing U  from equation (3.22 )  with the index V , as
y, •  a  t- Wt - \ ♦ V /0 ♦ (V,*W ,)’9  + t4 (3.2.3)
where W -  [ X 2 ) .
Obviously it is important to see whether or not the results from the interactive model differ 
to those from the case where the union effect manifests itself as a shift in the intercept term. This 
involves seeing whether the effects of the variables contained in the W -vector differ in union and 
non-union Arms. In terms of equation (3.2.3) this amounts to a  classical hypothesis test of 
H o : i  -  0 which, if  W is of length m is a ) test One can ascertain whether the impact o f indi­
vidual components of the W -vector differ with V by considering the partial derivatives
I f V< » 0  J j . - X * ! ' '«  (3.2.4)
I f V - 0  & - X
and their associated standard errors. In terms of the example cited above if the first component of 
the W -vector, say tv,. is a dummy variable indicating whether the variable is a large firm then 
any productivity advantages/disadvantages from scale economies in non-union firms can be 
denoted by the estimate of X(. In fully unionised firms (where V  -  1) this becomes the estimate of 
X| ♦ 6|. If these differ significantly from one another it is important to allow for this in the empir­
ical work.
In terms o f equation (3.2.3) the estimated union non-union effect on labour productivity in 
firm i is oj * d  ♦ W,'6. An average union effect across the sample is B  ■ 4  ♦ W'6 where a bar
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denotes a mean value. By partitioning the covariance matrix to obtain / ■  Vmrify where t, -  [0.61 
an asymptotic standard error for the union effect can be calculated as are (B )  -  (M '/M )v2 where 
M -  [l.W].9 Obviously standard errors can be calculated for each firm in an analogous way. sim­
ply replacing the mean values with those actually observed for each firm.
3 J . Institutional Background and Data Description.
The production function is to be estimated from a sample of fifty two British engineering 
firms over the period 1978-82. The source of the data is an ESRC financed survey conducted by 
J.Cable and N.Wilson. The nature o f the data is that time-varying information is available on 
economic characteristics of the firm although structural characteristics (such as the unionisation 
variables) are available only in 1982. This precludes consideration of the intertemporal relation­
ship between unions and productivity (for example in a fixed effects model taking deviations 
from time means or differencing the data would eliminate the union variables from the estimating 
equation) and thus the analysis is to be performed on the basic pooled cross section assuming no 
change in structural characteristics over the five years.10
Information on some indicators o f the extent of union activity in the firms in the sample is 
reported in Table 3.1. Several important characteristics of the sample can be noted. Firstly, the 
mean of union density (UNION) shows that the sample under study is comprised o f highly union­
ised firms and the mean exceeds the national average for this period (about 50%-55% : see Price 
and Bain(1983)). Secondly, the engineering industry is also characterised by multi-unionism : for 
instance in 1978 23 manual and staff unions were affiliated to the Confederation of Shipbuilding
* Note that the index V ii waled such that it lies in the (0.1) interval so that a non-union situation can be 
compared with ooe which has maximum union presence, or alternatively collective voice, where V equals un­
ity.
10 The instrumental vanahies methodology of Hausman and Tay lost 1981) does allow one to obtain the ef­
fects of a time invariant variable whilst allowing for the panel nature of the data. However, in the present 
analysis, the large number of time invariant variables In the data set make things somewhat difficult. When 
Hausman-Taylor estimate» were obtained the use of alternative instruments (the time-means of various time- 
varying variables in the data) showed the results to be sensitive to the choice of instrumental variables. As the 
focus of this analysis is on union effects and not purely on the determinants of productivity attempts to allow 
for the panel nature of the data were not pursued any further.
and Engineering Unions which had an affiliated membership o f some 2.5 million workers.11 As 
Marsh et al.(1981) report the majority of manual union members in 1978 were in one o f the fol­
lowing large unions : the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (then the AEUW), the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and the General and Municipal Workers Union 
(GMWU). M ost non-manual employees were in the Association of Professional. Executive. Cler­
ical and Computer Staff (APEX), the Association of Scientific. Technical and Managerial Staffs 
(ASTMS) and the Technical and Supervisory Section (TASS) o f the AEUW. This trend o f multi­
ple unionism is borne out in the current sample where a number of firms have more than one 
shopfloor and staff union, as depicted by the variables NSHOP and NSTAFF. A third point of 
note is that closed shop arrangements are common among the firms in the sample : 25 out o f  52 
firms have these arrangements. This is obviously an important institutional characteristic o f  the 
sample and needs to be considered in the analysis of union productivity effects.
Four components are therefore to be used to form the union presence index : the union den­
sity variable, the two multiple unionism variables and a dummy variable indicating whether a 
closed shop is present (CLOSED). The correlation matrix of the four components is reported in 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 reports the weights derived as the scaled first principal component o f the 
appropriate covariance matrix.12 The first principal component accounts for 47.8% of the varia­
tion in the four variables and it is interesting to note that all four weights have the same sign. 
Thus the strongest measure of union presence occurs for a firm with 100% union membership, a 
closed shop and multiple staff and shopfloor unions. This clearly conforms with the institutional 
background discussed above. For comparative purposes results are also reported in this Chapter 
using the closed shop dummy alone : this gives a weak union/strong union split in this highly 
unionised sample of firms.
One point that needs to be clarified here is the issue o f the potential endogeneity of union 
status. A number of authors have claimed that in analysing union effects on economic variables
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TABLE 3.1.
Industrial Relations Characteristics of Engineering Firms.
UNION Proportion of union 
members
0.784
CLOSED Proportion of firms with 
any closed shop 
arrangements
0.481
NSHOP Proportion of firms with 
multiple shopfloor 
unions
0.481
NSTAFF Proportion of firms with 
multiple staff unions
0.404
TABLE 3.2
Correlation Matrix of Union Presence Indicators.
UNION CLOSED NSHOP NSTAFF
UNION
CLOSED
NSHOP
NSTAFF
1.000
0.652
0.180
0.397
1.000
0.230
0.071
1.000
0.385 1.000
TABLE 3.3
Estimated Weights Used in Union Presence Index.
Indicator Estimated Weight
UNION 0.156
CLOSED 0.258
NSHOP 0.310
NSTAFF 0.277
Notes.
(i) Calculated weights are those suggested by the first principal component of the covariance 
matrix o f the four indicators and re-scaled such that the index based on the weights lies in the 0-1 
interval. More details are given in the Data Appendix.
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one should address the issue that not only is union status a determinant of the economic variable 
in question but that the economic variable is also a determinant of union status.13 Take the issue 
considered in this Chapter. The endogeneity issue arises because union activity affects produc­
tivity but it may also be the case that unions organise in more (or less) productive firms. Failure 
to account for this can induce simultaneity bias. However, the main measures o f union presence 
used in this thesis are union recognition and the presence of closed shop arrangements. These are 
historically determined variables which, as such, can be viewed as exogenous to the current 
period : in effect they can be treated as lagged endogenous variables. In terms o f the example 
used, it may be true that unions are more likely to organise in more (or less) productive firms : 
this however occurred in the past and is exogenous to the current period. This is the approach to 
be followed throughout this thesis. There are also statistical problems underlying this 
endogeneity question. To allow for endogenous union status one needs to estimate a union status 
equation along with the equation analysing the union impact on a certain issue. Therefore, cer­
tain identification problems emerge : what is left out of the union status equation that is included 
in the other equation (and vice-versa) proves paramount and results are often sensitive to these 
ad-hoc identifying restrictions. In this Chapter o f the 4 indicators used to construct the index the 
accusations of endogeneity problems can only really be levelled at one component, namely union 
density. However, as with all structural characteristics in the data set it is fixed over the five years 
and. as instrumenting one characteristic incorporated in the index is not very desirable, this is 
acknowledged but by-passed in the empirical work.
The dependent variable to be used in the empirical analysis is value added per employee 
where value added is deflated by an appropriate industry level price index (Source : Monthly Dig­
est o f Statistics). The point stressed in Chapter 2 was that this deflation is necessary to prevent 
confounding a union productivity effect with a union induced price effect. Obviously to the 
extent that the price index is mismatched then the estimated union effect on productivity will be 
contaminated by price effects. This possible contamination is obviously not a trivial one although
11 See .ii alia. Schmidt and Strmusa(1976) or Duncan And Leigh« 1985).
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the only way to circumvent it is to have some kind of physical output measure which does not 
contain any price effects : for instance, Clark’sC 1980a) analysis of the U.S. cement industry uses 
tons of cement as an output measure. However, such physical measures are for the most part not 
appropriate to firms operating in the engineering sector of British industry and even in those cases 
where they are relevant are not readily available for use. Therefore, the possibility o f price 
effects entering the analysis is one which must be acknowledged and dealt with in the best way 
possible given the available data, namely the deflation of value added referred to above.
Some raw data relating value added per employee to the union presence index and to the 
incidence of the closed shop among the firms in the sample is reported in Table 3.4. Value added 
per employee is converted to 1980 prices by the deflation procedure and is observed to be slightly 
higher than the average for engineering of £8493 per employee reported in the 1980 Census of 
Production. The first row shows that labour productivity between firms with high or low values 
o f the index is much the same. In the closed shop firms however value added per employee is 
lower. Breaking down labour productivity by union presence and firm size simultaneously points 
to one particularly strong looking result. In large firms (over 1000 employees) with greater union 
presence value added per employee is on average lower than for other firms in the sample. This 
points to a potentially important interaction between firm size and union presence in attempting 
to identify the union productivity effect in this sample of British engineering firms.
More detail on the means and definitions o f the variables to be used as explanatory vari­
ables and how they differ with the union presence index and the closed shop dummy are reported 
in Table A3.1 o f the Data Appendix. Since a Cobb-Douglas specification is to be used, the log of 
the capital to labour ratio ln(ff/£) is included to control for capital-labour substitution occurring 
as a response to union wage effects.* 134 To allow for non-constant returns to scale it was found that 
a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has more than 1000 employees (£ 21000) worked 
best.1*
14 A i often proves the case in the estimation of production functions the Cobh-Douglas ipectficaoon per­
formed utisfactorily. The iuuc  of alternative specification! of the production function is addreaaed in more 
detail below in Section 3.3.
13 The usual practice i t  to simply include InL as an explanatory variable. Inclusion of InL did produce
qualitatively lim ilar re iu lu  (although not as itrong statistically as the dummy) although, as the emptncal
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TABLE 3.4
Labour Productivity. Union Presence and Firm Size in Engineering Firms.
All Arms INDEX20.3 INDEX <0.5 Closed shop No closed shop
Value added 8759 8896 8650 8365 9123—
per employee 
N 260 113 145 123 135
Value added 8650 8362 9566 7322 10689*
per employee 
in large firms 
N 71 54 17 43 28
Value added 8799 9369 8528— 8911 8714*
per employee 
in small firms 
N 189 61 128 82 107
Notes.
(i) Value added per employee (deflated) is in units to the nearest £ per employee.
(ii) Large firms are those with 1000 or more employees.
(iii) Significant differences between sub-groups o f union presence are denoted by • .  • •  and 
for 1%. 3% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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V ariables indicating worker participation and involvement in decision making are often 
recognised as being important for productivity (see Cable and Fitzroy(1980) and Jones and 
Svejnar<1985)). Data is available on a number of firm characteristics such as those indicating 
whether th e  Arm has any quality circles, a works council, a cash based profit sharing or value 
added schem e or a share option scheme. Unfortunately, however, these variables are only avail­
able as a  single observation and as such exhibit no time series variation. Therefore, when 
modelled as  dummy variables they give no indication as to relative importance of these functions 
in each firm . Thus it is not possible to judge whether a positive coefficient on such variables indi­
cates w he ther progressive already productive Arms are introducing these functions or whether 
they have been  introduced and are instrumental in raising productivity. Similarly it is not clear 
whether a  negative coefficient means a need has been identified or whether they are actually 
damaging productivity. Instead o f including all four of these 0-1 variables it is preferred to use a 
variable (BONU S) which does indicate the relative importance of one o f these functions across 
firms, nam ely  the percentage o f wages that is paid, on average, in the form of a profit sharing or 
value added bonus.16 This is for the most part a small percentage although does reach as high as 
10% in so m e o f the firms in the sample. Whilst this still suffers from some of the problems dis­
cussed in th e  context of the other four variables it does exhibit cross Arm variation and may be 
viewed as a  proxy either for progressive management or perhaps for the productivity gains that 
might accrue from the incentive effects of having workers' pay linked to the performance of the 
firm. F inally  variables indicating the production technology used by the firm are included : these 
are dummy variables indicating whether the dominant mode of production is by job (JOB) or 
using flow lines (FLOW) compared to a base of batch production methods. The proportion of 
skilled w orkers in the manual workforce (SKILL) is also included so as to ascertain the produc­
tive quality o f  the workforce.
work to fo llow  shows, it is attractive to  model some kind of small Ann to large Ann decomposition especially 
in the light o f  the  theoretical discussion undertaken in Section 3.1 and in terms of the cross-tabulations in 
Tabla 3.4.
14 It shou ld  be noted that result* were not fundamentally different when 4 dummy variables reflecting 
whether the firm  operates the functions listed above were included : the only problems revolved around their
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3 A  Estimates of the Union Im p ac t on Productivity.
The discussion in Section 3.1 highlighted that determination of the sign and magnitude of 
the trade union impact on productivity is largely an empirical issue. To explore this notion in the 
context of British engineering Arms estimates o f augmented production functions are presented in 
Table 3.5. In the first two colum ns the parameters o f the production function are allowed to differ 
with the degree of unionisation, as measured by the union presence index in equation (1) and the 
closed shop dummy in equation (2). The interaction terms are on the whole very significant and 
their inclusion is statistically supported against the null hypothesis o f a model which simply 
allows for an additive union effect, the relevant x*(6) statistics being 18.80 and 23.79 respec­
tively, compared to a 3% critical value of 12.60. Columns (3) and (4) allow the parameters to 
differ between large and small firms and again the interactive model is preferred to a specification 
including a large firm dummy alone, the appropriate xH *) statistics being 14.70 and 21.45 as 
compared to a critical value o f  9.49.
Some diagnostic checks o f  the estimated models are also reported. The models perform rea­
sonably well with respect to the tests of functional form and suggest no need for further non- 
linearities in the equations.17 As often proves the case with cross-section data the null hypothesis 
of homoakedastic error term s cannot be accepted. This problem is countered by presenting 
White(1980) standard errors which correct the estimated covariance matrix for unknown 
beteroakedasdeity o f an arbitrary functional form. Tests for departures from normality were also 
calculated (using the Lagrange Multiplier tests as described in Kiefer and Salmon(1983>) and pro­
duced large values which decisively rejected the null hypothesis in all cases. It should however 
be noted that in the linear model these Lagrange Multiplier tests form part o f W hite’s(1982) 
Information Matrix (IM) test : see Hall(1987) who shows that the IM test is composed of three 
components, namely W hite‘s(1980) heteroskedasticity test, a skewness test and a kurtosis test. 
The sum of the last two is the normality test considered here. Both Cheslter and Spady(1988) and 
Davidson and MacKinnon(1988) have provided Monte Carlo evidence to show that for moderate
17 Waid
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Estimates of the Impact of Unionisation and Firm Size on Labour Productivity.
Equation No. 0 ) a > (3) (4)
U-INDEX U-CLO SED U-INDEX U-CLQSED
Constant
liXK/L)
¿21000
BONUS
JOB
FLOW
SKILL
U
U*ln(K/L) 
U*¿ 21000 
U'BONUS 
U*JOB 
U*FLOW 
U* SKILL
8.309(0.437)
0.054(0.038)
0.364(0.174)
-0.026(0.016)
0.202(0.121)
0.735(0.228)
0.400(0.160)
0.651(0.838)
-0.078(0.096)
-0.620(0.240)
0.079(0.026)
-0.813(0.297)
-1.297(0.391)
0.031(0.305)
8.056(0.407)
0.075(0.053)
0.095(0.071)
0.032(0.012)
0.091(0.074)
0.231(0.061)
0.302(0.134)
1.304(0.532)
-0.148(0.068)
-0.324(0.103)
0.002(0.014)
-0.730(0.117)
-0.218(0.147)
-0.126(0.172)
Constant
liKK/L)
¿21000
BONUS
JOB
FLOW
SKILL
U
¿21000*ln(K/L) 
¿21000*U 
¿21000*BONUS 
¿21000* JOB 
¿21000* FLOW 
¿ 2 1000* SKILL
8.902(0.362)
-0.021(0.048)
-1.603(0.910)
0.008(0.007)
-0.058(0.076)
0.031(0.137)
0.469(0.114)
0.053(0.075)
0.211(0.106)
-0.444(0.193)
0.058(0.021)
•
a
-0.002(0.265)
8.977(0.323)
-0.027(0.046)
-1.838(0.854)
0.010(0.006)
-0.078(0.074)
0.106(0.097)
0.471(0.113)
-0.002(0.054)
0.231(0.101)
-0.369(0.095)
0.062(0.021)
a
-0.086(0.243)
A*
N
0.161
260
0.191
260
0.147
260
0.183
260
Functional form 0.18(3.84) 0.39(3.84) 0.02(3.84) 1.58(3.84)
Heteroskedasticity 57.95(23.70) 85.62(23.70) 56.88(23.70) 76.19(23.70)
(i) The dependent venable u  the log o f  (deflated) value added per em ployee : in  mean is 9.005.
(W) * denotes that all Amts with FLOW  equal to one have 1000 or more employees : thus the 
L 21000*FLOW would, if entered, be perfectly collinear w ith FL O W  and was thus omitted.
(v) The test for functional fonn is Ramsey »(1969) RESET t e s t : i t  is  a  X*(l> Wald test o f the significance of adding in
(vi) The test for heteroskedasbcity is Breusch and Pagan's(1979) test and is distributed as g t y - 1 )  where p  is the 
number of estimated parameters. It is calculated as 1/2 the explained sum of squares from the auxiliary regression of 
/ ^ O 2 on the independent variables, where /  is the residuals from  the models and a2 the estimated (Maximum Likeli­
hood) error variance from the equations in the Table.
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sample sizes the White Information Matrix test has a tendency to reject the null far too often. 
Indeed, very large xJ statistics are often obtained. Davidson and MacKinnon highlight the prob­
lems with the kurtosis component which is where the problems tie here. Thus it should be noted 
that the null o f  normally distributed errors is not upheld but that the test statistics used to ascer­
tain this should not be viewed with a great deal of confidence. Indeed Davidson and MacKinnon 
go as far as saying ’it {the IM  test) should probably never be used unless the sample size is truly 
enormous’ [Davidson and M acKinnon(1988)p.ll].1*
The specifications in Table 3.5 identify a number of determinants o f productivity, most of 
which have differing impacts conditional on the degree of unionisation and firm size. Considering 
initially equations (1) and (2) the determinants of productivity in non-union firms can be ascer­
tained by ignoring the interaction terms (i.e. setting U  ■ 0). Non-union firms are more likely to 
have higher productivity if  they have in excess of 1000 employees, more sophisticated production 
technologies (as measured by the flow tines variable) and a higher proportion o f skilled workers. 
Examining the effects in unionised Arms requires consideration of the coefficients on both the 
non-interactive and interactive variables, as described in equation (3.2.4). As the degree of 
unionisation increases with higher values of INDEX in column (1) the positive effect of the skill 
variable remains but the flow tines variable actually exerts a negative effect as does the other 
technology variable JOB. This suggests that if unions are able to exert som e control over produc­
tion technologies then they may reduce productivity through the likes of overmanning and restric­
tive work practices. Also, if  employees are paid a higher profit sharing bonus unionised firms 
may be more productive, compared to the non-union situation where no such effect is observed.19 
This supports the arguments aired in Gregg and Machin( 1988) who suggest that profit sharing is
"  Hence ibe normality test ita tu n c t are not reported in the Table. As a matter at interest the large 
numbers they produced for columns ( l )  to (4) respectively were 801.04. 927.32, 634.23 and 733.82. Com­
pared to a 3 «  critical value of 3.99 these imply a decisive rejection of the null. It is. for the m ost part, due to 
very large kurtosis test staasncs that the tests fail. This rejection is clearly a combination o f  several factors : 
the poor quality o f  the te s t ; fat tails in the distribution ; sod because in the case of the normal distribution the 
fourth moment equals three times the square o f  the second, and the null of homoskedasnc errors (Le. constant 
second moment) is not upheld, the large kunosis numbers may be partially reflecting heleroskedasncity
'* Either that o r  Arms with a more progressive management strategy, as proued by the flexible payment 
scheme variable, in  conjunction with union pretence are more productive. This may conceivably be viewed 
as > proxy for the idea that cooperative industrial relaooot practices may raise productivity.
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likely to have differing impacts in unionised and non-unionised situations.20 Finally large union 
firms are not likely to have the productivity advantages that scale economies give large non-union 
companies relative to their smaller counterparts. These effects are similar for the closed shop 
measure used in column (2) with the exception of the flow lines and profit sharing effects. Again 
o f considerable interest is the strength of the negative coefficient for large firms with a closed 
shop.
In the equations reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 3.5 the interaction 
between union presence and firm size is again observed to be important as larger unionised firms 
are at a productivity disadvantage compared to both smaller firms and non-unionised large firms. 
The specifications conditioning the coefficients of the production function on firm size also offer 
some other interesting results. Performance linked pay only exerts a positive influence among the 
larger firms in the sample. There is also some weak evidence of the capital to labour ratio exert­
ing a positive effect (as would be expected), but only among larger firms. In small firms the effect 
is somewhat inexplicably negative although insignificant. Finally the skill ratio is positively 
related to productivity but no additional advantages accrue to larger firms.
The major result emerging from Table 3.5 is that the union impact on productivity interacts 
in an important way with firm size, at least in the context of this data s e t Consequently average 
union non-union and large firm small firm effects on productivity deduced from the models in 
Table 3.5 are reported in Table 3.6. Also reported is the average union nonunion effect among 
larger and smaller firms derived from equations (1) and (2) and an analogous measure, the aver­
age large firm small firm effect with maximum or zero union presence (i.e. INDEX or CLOSED 
set to 1 or 0) from equations (3) and (4). The effects deduced from both models point to the sam e 
conclusion : the average union non-union effect among larger firms is always negative and statist­
ically different from zero. In smaller firms effects are neutral. Productivity levels therefore do not 
differ with the degree of unionisation among smaller firms and scale effects are unimportant 
unless a firm is unionised. To summarise, negative union productivity effects only occur in larger *
*  This is also to be explored more fully in Chapter 6.
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firms and in firms with less than 1000 employees the effect of trade unions is largely innocuous.21
The results to date are strong evidence to suggest that trade union effects on productivity in 
this sample o f engineering firms are significantly negative among large firms but insignificant 
among the res t However, they yield little information about the distribution of these effects over 
the firms in the sample. Thus it is also o f interest to  calculate union productivity effects for each 
firm. Table 3.7 presents a summary o f such a procedure and illustrates that the effects, which are 
averaged over the five years for each firm, vary quite considerably about the average differential.
In terms of the overall sample the productivity effects deduced from the unionisation index, 
reported in the upper part o f Table 3.7. suggest that nine out of fifty two firms are characterised 
by statistically significant positive union effects and thirteen by statistically significant negative 
effects. Thus, despite an overall insignificant union effect, in a considerable percentage (42.3%) 
o f firms in the sample trade unions significantly influence productivity levels. This wide ranging 
dispersion of union productivity effects supports the idea that no one fixed rule holds for gauging 
union effects on performance : even in this sample o f relatively homogeneous firms the devia­
tions from the average are substantial. Given this considerable variation it seems particularly 
important to attempt to isolate the source o f these effects and Table 3.7 also breaks down these 
union effects by a number of variables and examines the distribution of the significance o f the 
effect»  in each sub-sample. The results are quite striking. None of the positive effects are located 
in firms with more than 1000 employees. Paying employees a profit sharing bonus features 
strongly among the firms with significantly positive union effects as all nine have some kind of 
cash based sharing scheme. This is in line Weitzman's(1984,1983.1987) advocacy of the poten­
tial for performance linked pay to raise productivity, at least in unionised circumstances.22 23A 
definitive statement on this cannot however be offered for the reason already given above, namely 
that it is not clear whether it is progressive managements in highly unionised already productive
21 These results remain essentially unaltered and are not sensitive to the inclusion o f  either a set o f  indus­
try dummies or time dummies or both to the specifications in Table 3.3 : see the robustness checks reported in
23 See also W adhwam and Wall(198S) who provide evidence to show that profit sharing raises productivi­
ty in ■ sample of large highly unionised British companies.
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TABLE 3.6
The Relationship Between Union Productivity Effects and Firm Size.
Based on 
Equation No.
Average Union 
Non-Union Effect
Average Large 
Firm Small 
Firm Effect
Average Union 
Non-Union Effect 
in Small Firms
Average Union 
Non-Union Effect 
in Large Firms
(1) -0.103(0.066) 0.050(0.073) 0.064(0.077) •0.353(0.204)
(2) -0.159(0.04«) -0.069(0.032) -0.070(0.050) -0.394(0.098)
(3) -0.068(0.076) 0.029(0.078) 0.053(0.075) -0.391(0.182)
(4) -0.103(0.046) -0.033(0.055) -0.002(0.054) -0.372(0.080)
Notes.
(i) These effects are calculated by setting INDEX/CLOSED and the large firm dummy equal to 1, 
0  or mean values where appropriate and all the other variables are set to  mean values. Variable 
means are reported in the D au Appendix.
(ii) Asymptotic standard errors, calculated using the methods of Stewart( 1987b) and described in 
Section 3.2, are in parentheses.
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firms who want such schemes or whether they are actually raising productivity. The relation 
between the presence o f performance linked payment schemes and unionism is explored in more 
detail in Chapter 6 using data from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey.
Turning to the thirteen significantly negative effects they are mostly located among large 
firms and. o f the two firms with flow lines as their dominant production mode, both are among 
them. Similarly half of those firms in the sample whose production method is mainly by job  are 
in the significantly negative region. No discernible pattern emerges with respect to the three 
union dummies CLOSED, NSTAFF and NSHOP although it can be seen that positive produc­
tivity effects are possible even in firms with closed shop arrangements. It is therefore not being 
unionised alone which reduces productivity nor is it being in a large firm : what implies a nega­
tive union influence on productivity is being both large and highly unionised.
Individual firm union productivity effects based on the regression including the closed shop 
dummy are reported in the lower panel o f Table 3.7. For the most part they tend to confirm the 
picture emerging from the effects on productivity deduced from the index, although fewer firms 
have statistically significant positive effects and more have significant negative effects. As with 
the index none of the larger firms are characterised by positive union effects. The negative union 
effects associated with the JOB and FLOW variables again emerge, as does the location o f perfor­
mance related bonus payments in the positive part o f the distribution. No clear-cut relationship 
follows from the consideration of the three discrete indicators o f union presence considered in 
this Chapter. These results very much highlight that firm size is an important determinant (along 
with other characteristics of the firm like the nature of the production technology and the pres­
ence of performance-linked pay) of the union productivity effect in this data.
The main result emerging from this analysis is that trade unions exert no damaging effect 
on productivity unless they are located in firms with more than 1000 employees. No claims to 
generalise this result outside of this sample are made here, especially noting the traditional 
strength o f union activity in this sector of British manufacturing. The importance of unionisation 
and firm size taken hand-in-hand suggests that the explanation underlying this result could be
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TABLE 3.7«
TABLE 3.7b
Estimisted Union Productivity Differentials for each firm - based on CLOSED.
Sample Number of 
firms
significantly insignificantly insignificantly significantly
positive
Ail firms 32 18 18 13 3
500>L 27 6 10 9 2
5 0 0 £ Z .< 1 0 0 0 11 1 5 4 1
lOOOiL 14 11 3 0 0
BONUS>0 21 7 7 4 3
JOB-1 6 6 0 0 0
FLOW -1 2 2 0 0 0
C L O SE D -1 23 8 9 7 1
NSTAFF-1 21 9 4 3 3
NSHOP-1 23 12 8 3 2
Notes.
(i) The upper panel is calculated from equation (1) and the lower panel from equation (2) In Table 
3.5.
(ii) Since the number of employees in the firm varies over time a firm is denoted as small, 
medium o r large according to which category it is located in most over the five years.
(iii) Significance levels are based on two tail tests at the 3% level of significance.
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greater X-incfficiency in unionised large firms. On the other hand, it might be that in the presence 
of managerial hierarchies where there exist greater communication problems (i.e. in large firms) 
unions are able to push the ’frontiers of control’ outwards thereby placing more formal structures 
on work practices, manning levels and so on. Hence, the productivity disadvantage faced by 
larger unionised firms may be attributed to the increased control over the functioning o f the pro­
duction process held by unions relative to the situation in smaller firms where management struc­
tures are more closely knit and less subject to informational difficulties.
3.5 Robustness o f Main Findings.
The analysis to date has considered the union impact on productivity in an effective but 
fairly simple econometric model. One therefore needs to see how robust the reported results are 
with respect to specification changes and certain generalisations of the model. Table 3.8 reports 
estimates of the union impact on productivity in small and large firms derived from generalising 
equations (1) and (2) reported in Table 3.5.
The first sensitivity check concerns whether the inclusion of a set o f industry specific dum­
mies (at the 2-digit level) alters the results. Comparing row (U) of Table 3.8 with row (1), which 
reproduces the earlier results to allow easy comparison, the effects are seen to smaller when 
industry dummies are included but maintain the overall pattern. Including year specific dummies 
(row (iii)) hardly influences the estimates and the inclusion of both industry and time controls 
(row (iv)) shows that the results stand up to these checks.
A further issue is that to date the analysis has been based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, a highly restrictive functional form, which, as is well documented, imposes a number of 
restrictions on technology, namely homogeneity, homotheticity and a unitary elasticity o f substi­
tution between factor inputs. It could be argued that the reported results are conditional on this 
choice o f frinctional form. It seems therefore of interest to consider other functional forms. One 
possibility is to extend the analysis to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
function which relaxes the assumption of a unitary substitution elasticity. The approximation pro­
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vided by Kmenta(1967) means that it can be written as
Ini' - a o  + oilnff -t-ejlnZ. + aj[ln* -  In/. ]* ♦ £ a j  M j  (3.5.1)
where Y  is output, K  and L  are capital and labour inputs and M  denotes other control variables.
Relative to the Cobb-Douglas function estimating a CES specification simply adds the term 
[In* -ln L J2, which allows a departure from a unit elasticity. Estimating equation (3.5.1), still 
allowing the parameters to differ with union presence, produces the results in row (v). The effects 
are less well determined with higher estimated standard errors but still tell the same story : in 
large firms the union impact is negative but in small firms it is neutral.23
The models reported in Table 3.5 allowed parameter estimates to differ with union presence 
o r firm size. Whilst in small samples such as this estimation of models with large numbers of 
parameters can be problematic it may however be worth generalising the model to allow interac­
tions with unionisation and firm size simultaneously. A final sensitivity check therefore estimates 
this model for both the index and for the closed shop dummy. Estimates of the union impact are 
reported in column (vi) of Table 3.8. They are remarkably similar to those deduced from the more 
specific model in Table 3.5.
Hence, none of the checks of robustness seem to warrant any amendment of the conclusions 
reached earlier. These results therefore emphasise the diversity of the union effect between small 
and large firms in this sample. They also illustrate that whilst the union impact in larger firms is 
fairly well determined as negative and statistically significant among smaller firms the union 
effect is less precisely determined.
23 Generalising even timber to a translog 
to the basic Cobb-Douglas model produces i
squares and cross-products of InK and InL 
suits but with an even greater loss o f praci-
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TABLE 3.8
Checks of Robustness of the Estimated Union Effect.
Model Average Impact 
of INDEX 
in Small Firms
Average Impact 
of INDEX 
in Large Firms
Average Impact 
of CLOSED 
in Small Firms
Average Impact 
of CLOSED 
in Large Firms
(i) Models in 
Table 3.3
0.064(0.077) -0.355(0.204) -0.070(0.030) -0.394(0.098)
(U) +  Industry 
dummies
0.048(0.062) -0.425(0.221) -0.029(0.056) -0.355(0.099)
(Ui) ♦  Year 
dummies
0.059(0.077) -0.357(0.220) -0.070(0.050) -0.394(0.096)
(iv) *  Industry 
and Year dummies
0.043(0.062) -0.430(0.222) -0.029(0.036) -0.356(0.097)
(v) CES production 
function
0.176(0.111) •0.61K0J71) -0.068(0.069) -0.387(0.131)
(vi) General model -0.043(0.060) -0.334(0.177) -0.033(0.049) -0.418(0.083)
Notes.
(i) The general model allows parameters to differ with both union presence and firm size.
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3 .6  Conclusions.
This Chapter presents evidence on the impact of union presence on the average productivity 
levels o f workers in a sample of British engineering Anns. A lack of information on union recog­
nition necessitates the use of an index o f union presence which is formed as a combined measure 
o f  a  number of indicators of unionisation. Using this index, the analysis finds that union effects 
o n  labour productivity in the average firm are insignificantly different from zero. However, 
effects in firms with over 1000 employees are found to be significant and negative when using 
e ither the index or a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has a closed shop to model 
union presence.
Union non-union effects on productivity are also estimated for each firm (averaged over the 
five years) and are seen to exhibit a considerable variation around the average neutral effec t This 
is  similar to Stewart's( 1983a) finding that the union non-union wage differential varies consider­
ab ly  although the present analysis is based on a far smaller database. Whilst in terms of generalis­
ing  the results the small and specific nature o f the sample is a disadvantage its main advantage is 
to  show that union effects may vary considerably across a relatively homogeneous group of firms. 
T h is  is especially interesting given that a great deal o f the now accepted industrial relations ortho­
doxy was based on case studies of various plants and firms operating in this particular sector of 
British industry. The analysis also attempts to isolate this variation and it is found that scale 
economies, the nature of the production technology and paying employees some kind of perfor­
m ance related bonus are important in explaining the influence of unions on labour productivity.
The particularly strong result emerging from the analysis reported in the Chapter is that, at 
least in this sample, negative union productivity effects only occur among relatively large firms. 
W hether this is due to increased X-inefficiency in large unionised firms or due to the increased 
control over the workings of the production process held by unions in large firms unfortunately 
cannot be untangled from the empirical results. Future research may be able to link information 
on the organisational form of companies and this may allow some discrimination between control 
and X-inefflciency arguments. This is however beyond the scope of this study. As a final point, it
is not entirely surprising that some of the U.S. results indicating that unions raise productivity are 
not mirrored using B ritish  data. This is especially true given the traditional adversarial relation­
ship between British unions and management compared to the U.S. situation where cooperative 
industrial relations and  business unionism are more the order of the day.
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The Im pact of Unions on the Profit M argins of British Companies.
CHAPTER 4.
Most empirical work analysing the economic effects of British trade unions has concen­
trated on their influence on relative wages.1 However, as the U.S. work on unions, summarised in 
Freeman and Medoff(1984), has made patently obvious the influence of unions stretches far wider 
than their effects on wages and unions can and indeed do influence other economic variables. 
Given their evidence it seems that a disproportionate amount of British work has focused on 
union wage effects and barely considered the other economic effects of trade unions.
At the date of writing there is a comparative dearth of British work on unions and perfor­
mance. A few studies have considered the relation between unions and productivity and there is 
even less work on unions and profitability.I 2 W hilst the reason for this lack of work is partially 
data difficulties this is by no means an adequate explanation since there is considerable scope to 
analyse these issues at various levels of disaggregation. As stated earlier this thesis prefers to use 
micro-data for a number o f reasons. Tw o microeconomic data sources are potentially available 
for use in the study o f the union impact on financial performance.3 Unfortunately there are 
difficulties associated with both. The first is to utilise existing survey data which often has good 
information on union related issues but is poor on economic data. The Workplace Industrial Rela­
tions Surveys of 1980 and 19844 are particularly guilty of this although the.data is o f sufficient 
quality to analyse union effects on financial performance : this is the issue to be addressed in 
Chapter 5. The second source is company accounts data which generally gives relatively good
I See. inter alia. Blanchflower« 1986a) or StewirtU 983a.1987a.1987c.l988)).
1 Chapter 3 presents some productivity results and other contemporary work (using 1980's data) oo pro­
ductivity has been carried out by Denny rod M uellbauert 1988). Edwards« 1987) and Wilsoo(1987). Only 
Cow ling and Waterloo« 1976) have included a union variable in a British profitability equMion and their study 
refers to aggregate industry level data from the 1960's.
1 Use of aggregate industry level data from the Census o f  Production and comparable union coverage in­
form ation from the New Earnings Survey (In 1973, 1978 and 1983) could permit a fairly highly aggregated 
study of the effects of unions on price^ost margins in British manufacturing. However, given the problems 
associated with industry level data (see Oeroski and Stewart« 1986)) this strategy is not to be pursued in this 
Chapter w hen  it is preferred to make use of more disaggregated data.
4 For comprehensive descriptions of the W orkplace Industrial Relations Surveys tee Daniel and MiU- 
ward( 1983) and Mill ward and Stevens« 1986).
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econom ic information but has no data on unions. It is these latter sources o f da»« which are to be 
accessed in this Chapter. To circumvent the problem of having no information on unionisation 
this study uses profitability data from company accounts and links it to data obtained from two 
surveys asking questions on union matters in a number of companies operating in British 
manufacturing.
The layout of the Chapter is as follows. Section 4.1 considers the theoretical underpinning 
o f  the union impact on profitability, discusses existing empirical work on unions and profitability 
and on the determinants o f profitability and also acknowledges the much discussed problems 
involved with the use of firm level profitability data. Section 4.2 describes briefly the nature of 
the data and presents some basic descriptive statistics on the companies in the sample. Section
4.3 presents estimates of a standard Industrial Organisation equation and attempts to ascertain the 
importance of labour's claim to a share of profits. The next section examines the relationship 
betw een the ability o f unions to influence profitability and various firm and industry level charac­
teristics. Section 4.5 considers the robustness of the results to certain issues not addressed in the 
previous sections, namely whether there is a role for absolute firm size, whether the results are 
sensitive to the choice of profitability measure used and whether the key results are sensitive to 
the inclusion of industry specific effects. Finally. Section 4.6 summarises the main results and 
offers some conclusions.
4.1. U nions and Profitability : Theoretical Background and Existing Evidence.
T he natural background to the work presented in this Chapter is the U.S. work on unions 
and economic performance, together with the fact that most of the issues addressed in the U.S. 
work have yet to be confronted with British data. Given the considerable institutional differences 
between Britain and the U.S. it seems to be of particular interest to analyse whether some o f the 
strong results found in the U.S. work also hold in the British context. A general consensus 
reached in the studies using U.S. data is that unions significantly reduce profitability regardless 
o f da ta  set. profitability measure or measure o f union presence used in the analysis.3 This is often *
* S ee . among otbeis. Clark(l984), Freeman! 1983). Kaner(1983.l988). Salinger! 1984). Vooa and
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appealed to as a rationale fo r explaining managerial opposition to unionisation. It is also in line 
with the predictions of econom ic theory. For example, both the union monopoly model or a bar­
gaining model of union behaviour depict a unionised Arm as being on an iso-profit contour 
corresponding to lower profits than an otherwise comparable non-union firm.
More formally, a sim ple bargaining model between firms and unions can be used to illus­
trate that ceteris paribus profit margins are likely to be lower in unionised firms. Unlike in 
Chapter 2 where union objectives were considered in general terms this Chapter assumes a 
specific functional form for union preferences so as to generate some Illustrative results regarding 
the potential union impact on profitability. Managerial objectives can be viewed as maximising 
the profit function n  -  R  (Z. y-W L where 11 is profits, R is revenue. W is the wage rate and L is 
employment Trade union objectives can be represented by a utility function defined over wages 
and employment U - U (W M )  : a useful characterisation depicts the union as attempting to maxim­
ise rents, namely the excesa o f union wages (IV) over non-union wages (VP*) times em ployment 
as U  (W 4 . )  m (w -W M ) L . T he  following asymmetric Nash bargain between firms and unions is 
sufficient to illustrate that the wage effects of trade unions are likely to be financed to som e extent 
by a share o f profits
In the Nash bargain y  is taken as the union’s strength in the bargain and'the resultant wage- 
employment outcome is the best that could be achieved given the behaviour of the other party in 
the bargain. The first-order condition with respect to W is
m  [(IP-IP* )L  m *  (L  y W L  IMS (OSySl). (4.1.1)
(4.1.2)
Defining the potential surplus available to the firm in the absence of unions as O - R {LY -W NL—xin —•
re-arranging and substituting into (4.1.2) gives the wage W‘  at the Nash solution
M iibell(19S6) and Healey( 1917b). The eminng liiem ure 11 marc fully surveyed in Chapter 1
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w• -¥gjj>)m-vKi-n)^U. (4.1.3)
Substituting (4.1.3) into the profit function and dividing by R to give a measure of the rate 
of return on sales revenue gives
Equation (4.1.4) suggests the profit rate in unionised firms will be lower (as long as unions 
possess some power such that y>0) than in otherwise comparable non-union firms. Equation
(4.1.4) also illustrates that stronger unions (higher y ) extract a greater share of potential profits. 
Thus, by appropriating a share of profits trade unions will reduce profitability relative to the case 
in which they are absent The extent o f this reduction is likely to depend on the product market 
conditions faced by the firm and on the union wage differential which determine the size o f the 
potential surplus and dictate how the resultant union induced rise in wages 'eats' into price-cost 
margins. Therefore, in this simple model trade unions are, all other things being equal, likely to 
capture a share of economic rents and as such exert a negative impact on profitability.6
The functions in the bargain above were chosen for their analytical tractability and hence it 
is a specific example. It is an efficient bargaining model which generates an outcome on a vertical 
contract curve (see Chapter 2 for more discussion). As such it is the relative bargaining strength 
parameter y  which determines the outcome : profits are maximised in the absence of unions 
where y  -  0  and unions are all-powerful where y -  l.7 However, it seems reasonable to expect 
that the main thrust of the results carries over to other models. Take the general Nash bargain 
£  -  argmax [U -U \*  [ f l-n i1-'», where U  and n  denote union and firm "threat points" or baseline 
utility and profits respectively. The Nash bargain can be illustrated diagrammatically as in Figure 
4.1.® Here a bargaining frontier sketches out the possible (Pareto-efficient) values of £ that can be
4 The model above only allow unions to affect wages and defines profits as a  function of W and L alone.
As such union effects on other factor inputs and prices, and indeed output prices, are not considered.
7 This model is also used by Svejnar<19M) : he points ou t that y  -  1 can be viewed as representing a  la­
the rn to have non-zero values does not add any extra insight to the discussion here (sec McDonald and 
Solow(1981)).
(4.1.4)
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Figure 4.1 : The Union Impact on Profits in the Generalised Nash Bargain.
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generated in the bargain. The Nash solution depends on the relative strengths of the two parties in 
the bargain. For example, if  y  -  0 such that unions are not present (or if  they are they have no 
power in the bargain) then the Nash bargain simply maximises profits at point A. More generally 
the wage-employment outcome from the bargain, say HV’ X 'l ,  generates an outcome [n*.i/*J 
such as point B in Figure 4.1. The exact location of the bargaining outcome, which gives the divi­
sion o f the surplus or organisational rent (see Aoki(1984)), along the frontier depends on the rela­
tive strengths in the bargain. Therefore the efficient bargaining framework predicts that profits are 
higher the lower is y  : a union non-union comparison indicates lower profits in the presence of 
unions. Hence, unless employers can raise prices to entirely offset the wage increase that the bar­
gain generates, o r in the absence of any offsetting productivity effect (as in the specific model 
above), price-cost margins will fall in the presence of unions.
The predictions of economic theory are therefore that unions are likely to reduce 
profitability (see the discussion in Chapter 2 for more details). In addition to this, strong argu­
ments can also be made for the idea that the union effect will vary with product market power. In 
perfectly competitive markets it seems unlikely that trade unions will reduce profits since, unless 
they are able to organise the whole market, a profit reduction will drive unionised firms out of 
business. The unlikely occurrence o f completely unionised markets9 tends to suggest that the 
union wage effect is more likely to be financed by unions appropriating a share of profits from 
firms which possess some degree of product market power (those firms with a higher f t  in the 
model above). One mechanism through which unions may reduce profitability in such situations 
is where the interdependence in price setting behaviour among firms operating in oligopolistic 
markets prevents the passing on of higher wages in the form of higher product prices. Also, in 
relatively larger firms unions may find it productive to pursue more aggressive wage policies 
which can become more credible as the revenue losses associated with the threat of strike action 
become greater. Thus, unless firms use their profits arising from market power to build up
* Observe far eum pta the 19*3 industry level coverage data from the New Earnings Survey where no 3- 
digtt manufacturing industry has all employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. Although note 
that 3 digit industries are only approximations to economic markets so that, in some albeit uncommon casea 
(e.g. newspaper printing), whole markets may be near enough completely unionised.
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inventories, price-cost margins will be lower in relatively large unionised firms.
Consequently a number of arguments10 1can be proposed for the idea that union strength in 
the bargain shifts excess profits from capital to labour if the firms in which they operate can exer­
cise some degree of power in the product market : this seems especially likely if the interaction 
between firms in a given industry prevents the passing on of higher wages through higher product 
prices. Indeed, results showing higher union wage gains in less competitive circumstances are 
reported by Stewart(1988) who uses data from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. 
He estimates a significant union non-union wage differential of 8% in plants facing few competi­
tors (£5) and no mark-up whatsoever (0%) in more competitive situations.11
A number o f U.S. studies have addressed the issue of whether product market power pro­
vides a source o f rcnu that trade unions can capture. However, less of a consensus has been 
reached here. Whilst most of the U.S. empirical work relates significant union profit effects to 
elements o f market structure (usually industry concentration)12 a sizable number of dissenting 
papers do e x is t : for example. Connolly. Hirsch and Hinchey(1986) and Hirsch and Link(1987) 
argue and provide empirical evidence to show that the main source of union profit effects is not 
market power but firm specific facton like RAD expenditure or innovative activity. Hence, they 
argue that unions capture a significant share o f the rents but they come not from market power 
but from intangible capital within the firm. In the light of this discussion it is therefore of some 
importance to empirically test whether the extent of product market power exercised by firms 
impinges on the ability of trade unions to influence profitability.
Before considering the data and empirical results, other points are worthy of discussion. 
Since the present analysis intends to use an accounting rate of return as a measure of firm 
profitability some acknowledgement of the debate questioning whether such a practice is valid or
10 For additional discussion tea Chapter 2 and Stewart« 1988).
11 M uch baa been made of the insignificant or negative effect o f the interaction between unionism and 
concentration often found in wage equations : see for example W eits(1966). Kwoka( 1983) o r 
Blanchflowerl 1986b). The problem here, as recognised by Stewart« 1988), it that concentration is not the ap­
propriate indicator o f market power when using microeconomic data. As such the issue of whether unioo 
wage gains come from market power remains far from resolved.
12 See Chapter 2.
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not should be made. In the empirical work to follow the measure of profitability to be used is the 
ratio of trading profits (that is income including depreciation, interest charges and taxation) to 
sales (hereafter denoted n/S). The concern expressed by some authors is that accounting rates of 
return such as this are misleading measures of economic profitability and as such should not be 
used to measure the ability to earn monopoly profits.13 O f particular relevance here is 
Flsber's(1987) claim that the profit-sales ratio is an invalid indicator o f the ability to earn high 
economic profits. These arguments are based on the idea that whilst accounting rates of return 
reflect cunent profitability they do not reflect the "true" economic profit rate which is the 
economic rate o f  return defined as the discount rate which maximises the expected net revenue 
stream o f an initial outlay. Essentially this is because current profit figures yield no insight into 
the future profit flows accruing to an investment. As such economic rates of return and account­
ing rates of return are likely to differ. However, it seems reasonable, as Geroski(1988) points out, 
that economic and accounting profits are likely to be correlated and indeed as stated in the 
response to Bens ton by Scherer et al.(1987) that these criticisms are unduly negative. This 
analysis therefore acknowledges that from a theoretical viewpoint accounting and economic rates 
o f return are likely to differ although from a practical stance that measures o f accounting 
profitability are a worthwhile indicator of the ability to make higher o r lower profits.14
Traditional Industrial Organisation studies generally identify structural characteristics o f the 
industry such as market concentration or barriers to entry as key determinants of industry 
profitability. These factors are presumed to encourage collusion, raise industry prices and thus 
enable higher profits to be made. For an industry level study an empirically implementable 
characterisation o f this can be represented for industry j as
(11/J ) /  -  a+X, "P+tj (4.1 J )
11 Sm  in particular Fither and Mc<Jowan< 1983). BenttmK 1983) and Fiihert 1917).
14 The obviout alternative It to ute tom e market value bated measure such aa Tobin'» q  (tee Sal-
of id
- 7 6 -
where X  is the vector of structural variables, a  and 0 are parameter vectors and e a random error
In the early empirical literature the conventional wisdom was that the coefficient on the 
concentration ratio contained in the X  vector is positive. Inference based on this then claimed that 
concentration acts as the major determinant o f high profit rates. However, it should be noted that 
industrial concentration is only one element o f product market power. This is an especially per­
tinent observation at the level of the firm. Indeed certain authors have recently used disaggregated 
firm level data and postulated that firm market share matters more than market concentration in 
determining the ability to make above-normal profits. These studies, such as those carried out by 
Gale and Branch(1982), Kwoka and Ravenscraft(1986). Martin(1983) and Ravenscraft(1983), 
typically estimate an equation for the i *  firm operating in industry j  which can be characterised 
as follows
(TVSly (4.1.6)
where Z is a vector of firm specific variables.
O f particular interest is the finding that when Z contains some kind of market share measure 
(as theory suggests it should) industry concentration is no longer positively related to profitability 
and sometimes the estimated relationship is observed to be significantly negative. This is usually 
rationalised by stating that inclusion o f the market share measure means that* an increase in con­
centration will, for a given market share for the i *  firm, mean that rival firms are stronger and as 
such will reduce the profit rate of firm i . The main point this suggests is that one needs to be care­
ful in defining product market power and. at the micro-level, market share and not industry con­
centration is the main indicator o f the ability to make above-normal profits.
Whilst the early empirical work did not contain a union variable more recent empirical 
work in industrial economics has begun to recognise a role for labour activity.13 Thus a final 
addition to equation (4.1.6) is an indicator of union presence U. Consequently, the basic equation
13 A typical example ii Dotnowiu et al.( 1986).
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to be estimated becomes
(IV5 )y -  a+X, 'fr+z.y *»♦</„ (4.1.7)
The union effect in equation (4.1.7) simply works as a shift in the intercept. It therefore 
sheds no light on whether product market influences are related to the ability o f unions to restrict 
profitability. However, the discussion above and the formal model suggests that product market 
strength is likely to affect the union's ability to capture a share o f rents. The interactive nature of 
equation (4.1.4) (the rate of return at the Nash solution) suggests that < o so that
unions erode profit margins by more in firms who possess a greater potential to earn higher 
returns (those with higher Q). If the bargaining strength parameter y  is treated as a function of U 
then the idea that product market power matters can be tested by including interactions between 
the union variable and various components o f the firm and industry vectors. In particular this 
permits a test o f the idea that union profit effects are related to firm specific indicators of market 
power like market share and industry level variables like industry unionisation, concentration and 
the extent of foreign competition.
4.2 D ata D escription.
The data to be used in this study is company accounts information (torn the Datastream and 
Exsuu databanks supplemented by industry level data from the Census o f Production and by 
information on union activity from two surveys of companies present in the two databanks. The 
first survey, carried out by the author in the summer of 1987, is discussed in more detail in the 
Data Appendix and the second was conducted by Sushil Wadhwani. also in the summer of 1987. 
The empirical work uses data on 14S firms. This number was arrived at after deleting observa­
tions with missing or inappropriate firm or industry information and, so as to ensure that any 
firms with misleading profit figures (for example, due to new setting up costs) do not enter the 
sample, only considering firms with complete information available from 1983 to 1985. In order 
to increase degrees of freedom the data was pooled over two years (1984 and 1985) to give a
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sample size of 290. Data on union activity is only available as a single observation and no retros­
pective information was obtained. It is therefore treated as a Axed effect in the empirical analysis. 
Because of this it was viewed as undesirable (despite the availability of accounts data) to stretch 
the sample further back due to the changes in unionisation following government legislation and 
the decline of manufacturing industry that occurred in the early 1980’s. This concern seems rea­
sonable given the changes in union density, union recognition and the extent of closed shop 
arrangements in manufacturing observed between 1980 and 1984 in the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys (see Millward and Stevens(1986)).16
Basic descriptive statistics on the profitability, extent o f union recognition and market 
shares possessed by the firms in the sample are reported in Table 4.1. The mean o f the 
profitability measure, the ratio o f trading profits to sales, is observed to be 9.4% over the whole 
sample. This is however an average over 1984 and 198S and one worry with the use o f cross- 
sectional accounts data is that profit measures derived from them may fluctuate considerably from 
year-to-year. For this reason some authors prefer to take a number of yean d au  and use averages 
to  smooth this o u t The d au  was however checked to see whether this is the case and Table 4.1 
shows a crude indicator of this by reporting sample averages for 1984 and 1985 : a t-test o f the 
difference in sample means is insignificant at conventional levels (III -0.46). When the trading 
profit margin is broken down by union recognition it is some 1.7 percentage points lower among 
unionised firms. This is what would be expected given the discussion in Section 4.1 and is in line 
with the raw U.S. d a u  presented by some authors (see for example Clark(1984). It is also clear 
that firms with higher shares of their m arket are able to earn higher returns on sales. Firms with 
market shares in excess of 5% have profit margins that are 1.8 percentage points higher than those 
with shares below 5%. This suggests that market share may imply an ability to raise margins and 
thus generate rents that unions can capture : it is however beyond simple breakdowns such as 
those in the Table to test this and a more detailed econometric approach is needed. After discus-
16 W hilu de recognition has been a fairly rare occurrence and most o f  the 1980-1984 fall was due to firms 
going out of business and plants being shut down the most recent annual report by ACAS( 1987) does identify 
some cases of de-unionisation and de-recognition occurring recently in Britain.
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TABLE 4.1
Profit Margins o f  145 British Companies. 1984-83.
Sample Sample Size Average Profit margin
All Finns 290 0.094
A ll firms in 1984 143 0.096
All firms in 1983 143 0.092
Unions recognised 234 0.091*
No unions recognised 36 0.108*
M arket share25% 78 0.107**
M arket share<5% 212 0.089**
Notes.
(i) See the text and the Data Appendix for variable definitions and sources.
(ii) A significant difference between sub-sample splits is denoted by * •• , •* and * for 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels respectively.
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sion of the data this is the subject of the next two Sections in this Chapter.
Turning to the description of the explanatory variables that are to be used in the empirical 
analysis, use of the return on sales as dependent variable necessitates the inclusion of a control for 
differences in capital intensity across Arms : a lack of current cost information for all the Arms in 
the sample prevents the construction o f  the capital stock measure used by Nickell and 
Wadhwani(1988) and thus capital intensity is simply proxied by the ratio of the book value of net 
Axed assets to sales (K IS ) . More details on the construction o f all the variables used here and 
their sample means are reported in Table A4.1 in the Data Appendix.
A second component in the vector o f Arm speciAc variables described in Section 4.1 is 
market share (MS) which is weighted across different industries to allow for the diversiAed nature 
o f those Arms which have activities in m ultiple industries.17 Construction of a reasonable indica­
tor of market share is somewhat difficult as the sales Agures in company accounts usually include, 
where relevant, sales income from overseas activity. Thus defining market share by dividing firm 
sales by industry sales from the Census o f  Production may tend to overstate 'true' market share. 
However, it does give some indication o f  relative market shares and the results reported below 
should be interpreted in this light The market share variable constructed in this way is seen to be 
higher among unionised firms : the mean o f MS in unionised Arms is 9.3%. whilst the mean in 
non-union firms is 1.2% : this reflects the well known phenomenon that unions are more likely to 
be located in larger Arms (which in this case it is still true even if industry size is taken account 
of). On this (mint it should be noted that MS is a measure o f size relative to Arms in the same 
industry. Absolute size is also of potential relevance : the size o f union Arms in the sample is 
much higher than non-union Amu (in 1984 prices the average o f total sales (SIZE) is £439 mil­
lion in union firms compared to £18 million in non-union firms). Absolute and relative size are 
however fairly highly correlated for this data set : a correlation coefficient between MS and 
ln(SIZE) is 0.70. Hence, whilst MS is used to indicate the returns to firm specific market power, 
the role of absolute size is also addressed below in the section concerning robustness checks.
17 The weight* used are the proportion of talcs in each of the Ann'* product group*.
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Another firm level variable that we would like to control for is the age o f the company since 
one argument that can be advanced is that newer firms can earn higher profits, at least in the short 
run. To allow for this possibility a variable indicating the number of years that a firm has been 
present in the Exstat databank was considered : presumably more recent entry to the data source 
reflects being, in relative terms, a newly set-up or newly quoted company.1* This is the variable 
YEARS which, as one would expect, indicates that non-union concerns have, on average, been in 
the databank for fewer yean.
Turning to the vector of industry level variables to  be used in the analysis the five firm con­
centration ratio (CONC) has a mean of 36%. which is slightly lower than the average over all 3- 
digit production industries.19 A second industry variable, included as an attempt to get a handle 
on the extent o f scale economies or entry barriers in a firm 's operating industries is a cost disad­
vantage ratio (CX). defined as the ratio of sales per em ployee in small plants in an industry to
sales per employee in larger plants.20 This is included to see if any profitability advan­
tages accrue to larger firms when there are cost disadvantages for smaller production units in a 
given industry. In the empirical work to follow a dichotom ous variable (CDR) is defined equal to 
one if CX<0.87 and 0 otherwise.21 *To control for disequilibrium factors industry sales growth 
(GROWTH) over the previous five years is also included. As discussed in the context of the 
market share measure the fact that a number of the companies in the sample operate in world 
markets also seems pertinent to this study. Unfortunately complete infomuttion on exports and 
overseas activity is not available for all firms : thus an industry level export to sales ratio (EXPS) 
and an import share variable (IMPS) are included in the vector of industry level control variables. 
As Table A4.1 in the Data Appendix shows EXPS is m ore likely to be higher if  the firm does not 
recognise trade unions for bargaining purposes. Sim ilarly trade unions are more likely to be
11 C a n  waa taken to ensure that relatively recent additions included in the sample w e n  not due
'* The mean over all production industries (SIC 200-499) from  the Census of Production it  mote o f  the 
order of 30 * .
20 Small plants a n  those with less than 100 employees and large p lan ts those with 100 or more.
21 The cut-off point of 0.17 was found by grid search methods, searching at intervals o f 0.01. which m ax­
imise the appropriate log-likelihood.
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active in firms which are less exposed to import competition. Finally, the theoretical discussion 
in Section 4.1 indicated that the extent of unionisation in the ñ rm ’s operating market may 
impinge on the union impact on profit margins. Additionally, it could be argued that unions are 
more likely to gain a greater wage premium and hence reduce profits by more in highly unionised 
markets. To allow for this an industry level union coverage variable (COVER) is also considered 
and, not surprisingly, union firms are more likely to be located in highly covered industries.
The basic variable used to model union or non-union status is a dummy variable equal to 
one if unions are recognised for bargaining purposes among manual or non-manual employees 
and. within this sample, its mean is 0.81. Also a feature of the firms participating in the survey is 
that a considerable proportion which recognise unions for manual workers do not have union 
recognition among non-manual employees.22 Indeed, non-manual unions are only recognised in 
just over half of the firms in the sample. This suggests a further method o f modelling union pres­
ence. namely to define two dummy variables indicating whether employers recognise trade 
unions for both manual and non-manual employees (ALLREC) or merely for manual or non- 
manual workers alone (SOMEREC). This (admittedly naive) split permits a somewhat crude test 
o f whether workplace representation for both manual and non-manual employees means that 
trade unions have more power and as such are able to extract a greater share of any excess profits. 
The other possibility here is to use an interaction between RECOG and the Industry coverage 
measure COVER to model union strength as one would expect unions in highly unionised situa­
tions to be stronger (i.e. be able to achieve a higher mark-up) and hence to have some claim to an 
additional share o f the available rents. This notion is also tested in the interactive specifications 
reported in Section 4.4.
4 J .  Estimates of the Union Impact on Profitability.
The key hypotheses to be tested in this Chapter are first whether unions affect profitability 
and second if  so, do they do so by more or less in situations where firms possess product market 23
23 One firm a lio  recognises non-manual unions bul not manual unions.
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power. This Section addresses itself to the first issue whilst the second is explored in the follow­
ing Section. The upper panel of Table 4.2 presents some simple illustrative regressions to show 
the influence of market share and union recognition on profitability whilst controlling for capital 
intensity but, for the moment, excluding other controls. In column (1) market share is positively 
and significantly related to the return on sales. This is in line with a number of U.S. studies (see. 
for instance. Sbepherd(1972), Gale and Branch(1982) and Ravenscraft(1983)). The basic impact 
o f  union recognition in column (2) indicates that unionised firms have significantly lower rates of 
returns than non-union firms in this sample. This conforms to the discussion of Section 4.1. When 
market share and recognition are considered simultaneously in column (3) both remain significant 
and impact on profitability in opposite directions.
Columns (1M 3) simply give the basic correlations between the two main variables of 
interest and profitability. The lower part of Table 4.2 adds the other controls and presents esti­
mates of profitability equations both including and excluding measures of unionisation. Colum n 
(4) is a standard Industrial Organisation equation without a union variable, column (3) supple­
ments this specification by the basic union recognition dummy and the industry level coverage 
variable and column (6) considers the union effect on profitability conditional on whether unions 
are recognised for all employees or just for one of the two broadly defined occupational 
categories. Diagnostic checks indicated that heteroskedasticity is a problem : to counter this 
W hite’s(1980) standard errors are presented. Again, as in Chapter 3. the null hypothesis o f  nor­
mally distributed errors cannot be accepted : the reservations expressed by Chesher and 
Spady(1988) and Davidson and MacKinnon(1988) regarding the validity of these kinds of 
Lagrange Multiplier based tests for the normal linear regression are therefore re-iterated here.23
The specifications in Table 4.2 for the most part reflect the usual results found in the Indus­
trial Organisation literature. The control for capital intensity raises profitability as would be 
expected, and the market share effect remains robust to the inclusion of the controls.24 The age
“ A n  consequence of these doubt« regarding the quality and power of the ten  the normality stadsUcs are 
not reported in the Table. For the three equations in Table 4.2 the values obtained for the Kiefer 
Salmon! 1983) test were 288.18,334.33 and 327.71. compared to a 3% critical value o f  3.99.
M The potential endogeneity o f  market share is a pertinent issue : when instrumented by lagged market 
share similar results were obtained For example, calculating a Hausmant 1978) test statistic based on this
TABLE 4.2
Determinants of Profitability Among a Sample of British Firms 1984-83.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.061(0.006) 0.082(0.013) 0.082(0.013)
K/S 0.105(0.019) 0.113(0.019) 0.109(0.019)
MS 0.042(0.018) 0 058(0.019)
RECOG * •0.025(0.012) -0.029(0.012)
#> 0.132 0.144 0.159
N 290 290 290
Mean of 0.094 0  094 0094
dep. var.
(4) (3) (6)
Constant 0.067(0.023) 0.070(0.027) 0.070(0.027)
K/S 0.107(0.019) 0.109(0.018) 0.109(0.018)
MS 0.044(0.022) 0.054(0023) 0.052(0.023)
YEARS -0.0030(0.0014) -0 0018(0.0014) -0 0019(0 0014)
CONC 0.066(0.031) 0.068(0.031) 0.067(0.031)
CONC>0.56 -0.080(0.017) -0.082(0.017) -0.083(0.017)
CDR 0.021(0.007) 0.022(0.007) 0.022(0.007)
GROWTH 0.012(0.014) 0.010(0.014) 0.010(0.014)
IMPS -0.020(0.035) -0.025(0.033) -0 026(0.033)
EXPS 0.018(0.034) 0.023(0.033) 0 022(0.034)
COVER . 0 009(0029) 0.008(0 030)
RECOG . -0.026(0 012) -
ALLREC - - -0.025(0.012)
SOMEREC * * -0.027(0.012)
#* 0.236 0.273 0.273
N 290 290 290
Mean of 0094 0 094 0094
dep. var.
Functional form 17.10(3.99) 14.90(3.99) 13.14(5.99)
Heteroskedasticity 115.78(18.30) 132.33(21.00) 132.28(22.40)
Notes.
(i) The dependent variable is the ratio of trading profits to sales.
(U) C D # -1 if  O f <0.87 and 0 otherwise.
(iii) All equations include a time dummy equal to one for 198S.
(iv) Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
(v) The test for functional form is Ramsey's( 1969) RESET test : it is a xH2) Wald test o f the 
significance of adding in the squares and cubes of the fitted values from each model.
(vi) The test for heteroskedasticity is Breusch and Pagan's(1979) test which is distributed as 
xH p-l) where p  is the number of estimated parameters in the model.
(viii) The numbers in parentheses adjacent to the diagnostics are the relevant 3% critical values.
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proxy YEARS is negatively related to profitability and illustrates that firms newer to the databank 
earn higher rates o f return. This confirms the view that higher short-run profits can be made by 
more recently quoted Arms.
When entered by itself the continuous concentration variable was found to be negatively 
related to the return on sales. However, further examination revealed a non-linear relationship 
where moderate concentration (below 36%) raises profitability, after which the effect o f concen­
tration becomes negative.* 23 These concentration variables point to a complex non-linear relation­
ship between profitability and market concentration (on this see also Geroski(1981)). The 
estimated effects are however in line with the existing U.S. firm level studies as discussed earlier 
and confirm that, after including a market share variable, high concentration reduces the return on 
sales, albeit in a more complicated manner than usually considered. As would be expected in a 
study of large firms, if there is some cost disadvantage associated with small plants in an indus­
try , firm profitability is higher. However, being in a faster growing industry, a highly covered 
industry or in one with high import or export activity does not yield any statistically significant 
differences in profit rates, at least in the specifications in Table 4.2. Thus, o f the variables other 
than unionisation, the ability to make above normal proflu U determined by both firm specific 
factors like market share and capital intensity and by external industry level variables like the 
degree of seller concentration and cost advantages that larger firms might have over their smaller 
competitors.
The basic union recognition dummy is negative and statistically significant in column (3) 
and suggesu that, after controlling for both firm and industry specific factors, unions reduce the 
rate of return on sales by some 2.6 percentage poinu. This corresponds to a decline of 27.6% rela­
tive to the sample mean or 24.1% relative to the non-union mean. This amounts to a substantial 
union impact on profitability : this result proved robust across a number of alternative 
specifications and sample definitions.26 Note however that the xH2) Wald tesu of functional form
produced a X ^D  value of 0.88 In the specification o f  column (3) In Table 4.2 which Is well below the 3 «  
critica l value of 3.84.23 The cut-off point of 36% which dicta»« the "critical concentration ratio" (sea White! 1976)) was found
by grid
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all produce statistics that lie above the 5% critical value suggesting some missing non-linearities 
in the m odel: this provides a statistical rationale for the consideration of interaction terms, which 
is undertaken in the following Section. Comparison of column (S) with column (4) also shows 
that omission of the union variable causes little bias : the YEARS variable loses significance 
although this apart very few changes emerge. Notwithstanding this, union effects are certainly 
important and the union status of the firm acts as an important determinant o f profit margins in
th ia  timm
The equation in column (6) indicates that recognition for all employees generates a fall in 
the return on sales of 2.3 percentage points whilst the corresponding reduction if  unions are 
recognised for only manuals or non-manuals is 2.7 percentage points. The specification in column 
(6) can be tested using a formal hypothesis test against that in column (3) : as heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors are reported this necessitates the use of a Wald test based on the 
appropriate adjusted covariance matrix. The resultant x*(!) statistic is 0.074 which, compared to 
the 3% critical value o f 3.84, suggests that no difference emerges if  unions are recognised for all 
workers compared to the case where unions are only recognised for a sub-set of employees.27 
This implies that strength o f the union is less of an issue than its mere presence in this sample of 
firms. However the data is hardly strong enough to validate this assertion as the variables 
ALLREC and SOMEREC are very imperfect measures of differential union strength ; moreover 
the interaction with the industry coverage measure considered in the next'section shows that 
stronger unions (i.e. unions in highly covered industries) may influence the profit rate more 
heavily, a result which is in line with the bargaining model set out in Section 4.1. Nonetheless, as 
they stand these results tend to support the view that managerial opposition to unionisation occurs 
because ultimately, regardless of any potential productivity enhancing role o f trade unions, 
unionised firms are more susceptible to having their price-cost margins eroded by labour activity
are included in (he equation in column (3) the union effect i t  eulmaied to be -0.027(0.012).
r  Other splits possible in the smaller sample (N -174 ) from the smaller survey (excluding W adhwani's 
firms) were whether a firm has a closed shop or a  jo in t consultative committee in any of its plants. Decom­
posing the union recognition dummy into categories based on these variables yielded no stao toe  ally 
significant differences far profitability equations based on (he smaller sample.
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and correspondingly less profitable than otherwise comparable non-union firms.
4A . The Union Im pact on Profitability and P ro d u ct M arket S trength.
Whilst the specifications in Table 4.2 served their purpose in showing that profit equations 
should include some indicator of labour's claim  to a share of residual profits, it seems likely that 
the influence o f unions is interactive with the characteristics o f the firms in which they are 
located. An exploration of the variation in the union profit effect is undertaken in Table 4.3 which 
presents profitability equations including interactions between union recognition and firm market 
share, industrial concentration, union coverage, import penetration and export intensity. Inclusion 
o f these interactions permits an explicit test o f the ideas outlined in Section 4.1, in particular 
allowing a test o f  the hypothesis that product market power matters in isolating the union impact 
on profitability.28
In the first column of Table 4.3 the interaction with market share is strongly significant and 
negatively related to the rate of return on sales. The Wald autistic W shows that the union effect 
differs significantly with market share and. as the coefficient on RECOG loses statistical 
significance, this suggests that product market power is a pre-requisite for capturing a share of 
available rents and reducing profitability. Also o f interest is that in this specification high market 
share only raises the profit margins of firms in the non-union sector. Thus product market 
strength, as measured by firm market share, interacts in an important way with the ability of 
unions to capture economic rents among the firms in the sample. This is strong evidence for the 
product market power matters hypothesis set out in Section 4.1.
A great deal of the U.S. evidence postulates that market concentration can be used to proxy 
the existence o f monopoly rents and as such union profit differentials are more likely to be greater
“  Table 4.3 only presents interactions with certain variables as prescribed by the theoretical discussion in 
Section 4.1. The other alternative is to estimate a fully interactive model allowing all the explanatory vari­
ables to have different effects in the union and non-union sectors. However there are only 5b nonunion ob­
servations and more precise parameter estimates were obtained by considering the parsimonious interactive 
specifications whilst telling the overall same story. For sake o f  completeness when interactions with CDR. 
GROWTH and YEARS were added to the specifications in Table 4.2 all had positive signs but each interac­
tion terms had an insignificant (heteroskedastic consistent) t-stadstic (t-0.05. 1.43 and 0.27 respectively).
TABLE 4.3
Profitability Equations • Interactions With Firm and Industry Characteristics.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.063(0.029) 0.070(0.033) -0.018(0.048)
K/S 0.103(0.017) 0.107(0.018) 0.113(0.017)
MS 0.633(0.276) 0.046(0.022) 0.057(0.023)
YEARS -0 0018(0.0014) -0.0016(0.0014) -0 0020(0.0014)
CONC 0.067(0.032) 0.057(0.065) 0  056(0.031)
CONC>0.56 -0.081(0.017) -0.115(0.043) -0.079(0.017)
CDR 0.023(0.007) 0.022(0.007) 0.021(0.007)
GROWTH 0.014(0.014) 0.017(0.013) 0.016(0.013)
IMPS -0.034(0.032) -0.015(0.033) -0.020(0.032)
EXPS 0.024(0.033) 0.024(0.034) 0.032(0.032)
COVER 0.011(0.029) 0.013(0.029) 0.159(0.072)
RECOG -0.019(0.012) -0.041(0.019) 0.083(0.046)
RECOG* MS -0.383(0.276) . -
RECOG *CONC . 0.041(0.047) .
RECOG *CONC>0 56 . 0.018(0.068) .
RECOG‘ COVER • -0.184(0.074)
R 2 0.282 0.285 0.294
N 290 290 290
Mean of 0.094 0094 0.094
dep. var.
W 4.47(3.84) 2.48(3.99) 6.14(3.84)
Functional form 9.63(5.99) 17.25(3.99) 8.12(3.99)
Heteroskedasticity 141.10(22.40) 129.54(23.70) 130.45(22.40)
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TABLE 4.3 (CONTINUED).
Profitability Equations - Interactions with Firm and Industry Characteristics.
(4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.096(0.029) 0.101(0.028) -0.026(0.049)
K/S 0.115(0.017) 0.113(0.016) 0.108(0.017)
MS 0 049(0.022) 0.052(0.022) 0  654(0.237)
YEARS -0.0015(0.0014) -0.0019(0 0013) -0 0020(0.0014)
CONC 0.064(0.031) 0.057(0.030) 0  055(0.031)
CO NC >0.56 -0.074(0.016) -0.073(0.016) -0.077(0.017)
CDR 0.021(0.007) 0.020(0.007) 0.022(0.007)
GROWTH 0.022(0.014) 0.026(0.014) 0.020(0.012)
IMPS -0.108(0.066) -0.016(0.030) -0 029(0.031)
EXPS 0.032(0.033) -0.068(0059) 0034(0.032)
COVER 0.001(0.028) -0.006(0 028) 0.163(0.072)
RECOG -0.067(0.024) -0.065(0.021) 0.092(0.047)
RECOG*MS • . -0.601(0.236)
RECOG‘ COVER - • -0 186(0 074)
RECOG‘ IMPS 0.110(0.065) . .
RECOG'EXPS - 0.127(0.061) -
R* 0.292 0.303 0.303
N 290 290 290
Mean of 0.094 0 094 0 094
dep. var.
W 2.83(3.84) 4.35(3.84) 9.50(3.99)
Functional form 13.22(5.99) 9.30(5.99) 2.12(5.99)
Heteroskedastic ity 129.51(22.40) 119.07(22.40) 142.49(23.70)
Notes.
(i) As for Table 4.2.
(ii) W is a Wald test o f the significance o f the interaction terms. The number in parentheses is the 
appropriate 5% significance level.
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in highly concentrated industries or in Arms operating in such industries. However, when 
RECOG is interacted with CONC and HCONC a positive but statistically insignificant effect is 
observed.29 Thus being in a  highly concentrated industry does not imply a greater ability of 
unions to erode profit margins. It should be noted that this does not rule out the existence of such 
a relationship at the industry level where market concentration is a more appropriate measure of 
market power. However, irrespective of this possibility, the dominant source of excess profits and 
consequently union rent seeking in this sample is individual firm market share and not industry 
concentration.
A  third interaction considered in Table 4.3 is whether the extent of industry unionisation 
impinges on the union non-union profit differential. The coefficient on the interaction term 
RECOG •COVER is estimated to be negative and strongly significant and union rent seeking is 
seen to be more marked when competitors in the firm's operating industry are also unionised. If 
being in a highly unionised market adds to union power in the wage bargain (as one would intui­
tively feel it does) then stronger unions are more able to capture a share of profits. This is 
interesting as it coincides with the work on relative wage effects which finds that individual, plant 
or firm specific unionisation measures need to be augmented by industry level unionisation meas­
ures in wage equations to ascertain more accurately the union wage premium (see Lewis(1983)). 
Since part o f the profit effect is likely to finance the union wage differential then it is reassuring 
that the industry level coverage measure is o f importance in addition to the firm specific recogni­
tion measure used in this study.
A fourth interaction reported in Table 4.3 is with import competition. This is included to 
test the idea that protection from international competition implies that unions can pursue more 
aggressive wage policies and hence obtain a significant share of the organisational rent. This is 
confirmed empirically (although the interaction term is only significant at the 10% level) as the 
profit margins of firms which have more exposure to import pressures are less affected by union 
activity. The interaction with the other foreign activity variable EXPS is also positive and
19 The same pattern of statistical insignificance is observed if interactions with the continuous measure or 
with the dummy indicating high concentration are considered individually.
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indicates that being in an environment where diversification into foreign markets is easier enables 
firms to  dampen down the union effect on profit margins. These two interactions taken hand-in- 
hand are mild evidence for the idea that being active only in domestic markets where barriers to 
international competition exist and where firms are less able to shift sales abroad facilitates a 
greater ability of unions to reduce profitability.
I f  all the interactions with RECOG considered in columns O H S ) are included in a single 
specification a Wald test suggests they are jointly significant 15 .20). However, the general 
model incorporating all these interactions can be simplified to the model only including interac­
tions w ith  MS and COVER, the appropriate x*(4) statistic being 9.29. compared to a 5% critical 
value o f  9.49. This gives the parsimonious specification in column (6) which illustrates that the 
key characteristics which determine the union profit effect are market share and the extent of 
unionisation in the firm's operating market. Additionally, in column (6) the RESET test passes 
com fortably thereby rejecting the possibility of model misspecification through a need for any 
further non-linearities in the model. This is evidence for the importance of these two interaction 
terms, relative to both the non-interactive models in Table 4.2 and the other specifications of 
Table 4 .3 , and highlights that the key determinants of the union effect in this data are market 
share and industry unionisation.
T he simple one-way interactions in Table 4.3 make interesting reading and stress that cer­
tain characteristics of firms and their market provide sources of potential rents that unions are 
able to  capture. In particular the interactions with market share and union coverage warrant 
further investigation : given that union effects are seen to be more negative in firms with high 
market share or In firms in highly unionised industries it is interesting to consider the effect for 
firms characterised by both. A set of more detailed interactions examining this are chronicled in 
Table 4.4.
T he estimates in column (1) of Table 4.4 re-define the union variable in terms of two mutu­
ally exclusive dummies which break down the basic recognition dummy by high and low union 
coverage.30 A Wald test supports this decomposition on statistical grounds (x*(l)-5.72) and the 
*° The critical value of 0.67 was found by simple grid searches to maximise the log-likelihood of the es-
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TABLE 4.4
Profitability Equations - Multiple Interactions.
MS
COVER
RECOG “COVERTO. 67 
RECOG *COVER<0.67 
RECOG *CO V ERi0.67 •  M S 
RECOG *COVER<0.67*MS 
RECOG* MS
(1)
0.031(0.022)
0.066(0.039)
-0.043(0.014)
-0.016(0.012)
(2)
0.397(0.240)
0.066(0.039)
-0.035(0.014)
-0.010(0.013)
-0.551(0.238)
-0.547(0.245)
(3)
0.682(0.217)
0.069(0.039)
•0.029(0.011)
•0.637(0.213)
Ä* 0.289 0.296 0.295
Functional form 3.95(3.99) 2.06(5.99) 1.52(5.99)
Heteroskedasticity 123.81(22.40) 139.36(25.00) 124.03(22.40)
Notes.
(i) As for Table 4.2.
(ii) All equations include the explanatory variables from column (1) Table 4.2.
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impact of unions on profitability is more m arked in firms in highly covered industries, the effect 
only being statistically significant for the high coverage group. Introducing interactions between 
the two union variables and MS shows that h ig h er market share provides a source o f rents which 
unions are able to capture regardless o f the ex ten t of unionisation in their market. However, 
effects unrelated to market share are only significant for firms in high coverage industries : there­
fore the general model in column (2) can be simplified to the form in column (3), the relevant 
X*<2) statistic being 0.38. The upshot of this is  that unions located in Arms in highly unionised 
industries may erode price-cost margins but th e  union induced reduction will be greater if the 
firm has some market power. In less unionised industries unions can only extract a significant 
share from high market share firms. These resu lts  reinforce the view that in firms with product 
market power there is more scope for unions to  reduce profit margins : in addition they show that 
higher unionisation in the firm's operating environm ent can also generate reduced profit margins.
The results presented in this section p rovide strong evidence to show that union activity in a 
number of large companies is negatively re la ted  to the ability to earn a higher return on sales. 
They also suggest that the negative effect is m o re  marked in situations where firms possess some 
degree of market power. The implication o f th ese  results is that because the erosion o f price-cost 
margins is greater in firms who can exercise so m e degree of power in their operating market then 
trade unions are appropriating a share of rents from  oligopoly power. Overall consideration o f the 
results lends more weight to the notion that un ions reduce and re-allocate excess profits than to 
the idea that union profit effects are merely dam aging corporate performance.
4.5. F u rther Considerations and Robustness C hecks.
Other extensions to the basic model presented here are possible. This section considers 
some of these possibilities as a means of checking  the robustness of the results reported to date.
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TABLE 4.3
Robustness Checks.
MS RECOG-COVER*) 67 RECOG-MS S i«  control
(i) Basic model 0.683(0.217) -0.029(0.010) •0.641(0.213)
Size C ontrols
(U) ln(SIZE) 0.609(0.221) -0.031(0.011) -0.398(0.216) 0.432(0.300)*
(iii) SIZE 0.682(0.217) -0.029(0.011) •0.639(0.213) 0.046(0.186)*
Profitability Measures.
(iv) Pre-tax return 
on sales
0.716(0.164) -0.033(0.011) •0.638(0.164) •
(v) Post-tax return 
on sales
0.398(0.128) -0.024(0.008) -0.363(0.129) *
(vi) Pre-tax return on 0.819(0.241) -0.033(0.013) •0.764(0.240) •
Industry  Dummies.
(vii) 19 2-digit industry 
dummies
0.3*7(0.131) •0.033(0.011) -0.337(0.131)
Noies.
(i) ln(SIZE) and SIZE are instrumented by their lagged values.
(U) * denotes that the coefficient and its standard error have been sca led  up by 102 for presenta­
tional purposes.
(ill) * denotes that the coefficient and its standard error have been sca led  up by 10* for presenta­
tional purposes.
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(i) Absolute Size.
Despite the strong intercorrelation between market share and absolute size in this data it 
seems important to check whether, in addition to the relative size measure, there is a  ro le  for 
absolute size in determining profit margins. This is especially true as some British studies o f  large 
firms have isolated a negative impact of firm size on profitability (an example is W hitting- 
ton(1980)>. Rows (ii) and (ill) o f Table 4.3 add the natural log of sales and the linear sales vari­
able to the preferred specification from earlier. Both are instrumented by their lagged values due 
to the endogenous nature of the variable.31 As Table 4.3 shows no such negative effect emerges 
from this data when either variable is included. The results reached earlier are not qualitatively 
altered and remain very robust.32 Controlling for absolute size, in addition to relative size, does 
not affect the basic thrust of the results. Including interactions between the size controls an d  the 
union variable also proved unfruitful as the key film level determinant of the trade union effect 
remains to be relative and not absolute size.
(11) Profitability Measures.
If results can be reproduced using alternative profitability measures this adds w eight to  the 
conclusions generated. Consequently, rows (iv)-(vi) of Table 4.3 re-estimate the basic interactive 
model for three alternative profitability measures : the pre-tax return on sales, the post-tax return 
on sales and the pre-tax return on total assets. All are again derived from company accounts and 
remain subject to the criticisms made by Fisher and McGowan(1983) and others as discussed 
above. However, they provide a useful sensitivity check of the results given earlier. Estimated 
coefficients are of a different scale due to the use of alternative dependent variables although the 
same pattern of results emerges. Hence, the main results prove robust to alternative definitions of 
the profit rate. *1
11 A  Hausmant 1978) esogencity lew confirmed ihe need for this.
11 Considering (be total number o f  employees or lou l assets did not alter these conclusions.
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(iii) Industry dummies.
As reported earlier (footnote no. 26) the basic union effect remained unaffected by the 
inclusion of a set of 19 2-digit industry dummies. Row (vii) adds this vector of dummies to the 
parsimonious model. Whilst the same pattern o f significance emerges the estimated coefficients 
are reduced somewhat. The coefficients on MS and RECOG*MS only remain significant due to 
the use o f White standard errors suggesting some underlying problems o f potential 
misspecification, which become noticeable once one adds in the industry controls. It should how­
ever be noted that the inclusion of an extra 19 parameters is asking a lot o f the data and as such it 
is reassuring that the results remain qualitatively similar. Nevertheless they do suggest thst pan 
o f the market share effect is wiped out by certain unobservable industry level factors. This sug­
gests a further avenue for future research, considering in more detail interactions between firm 
level and industry level determinants of profitability.
4.6. Conclusions.
This Chapter provides some estimates o f the impact of trade unions on profitability in a 
sample o f large companies. The study is very much considering a snapshot o f a number of 
manufacturing firms in 1984 and 1985. As such the longer term aspects of unionisation are not 
considered : this means that there is no allowance for dynamic or individual firm specific effects. 
A lack o f longitudinal data on trade union presence at firm level precludes study of this although 
results from this initial study are clearly illuminating. The general finding of U.S. studies, namely 
that unions reduce profitability, is mirrored for this data source. This union induced reduction is 
found to be more marked where firms in which unions are located possess some product market 
power although, unlike most of the U.S. work, the ability of unions to capture a share o f profits is 
not related to concentration but is intrinsically linked to firm specific market share and to the 
degree o f union activity In the firm's operating industry. The implication of these results is there­
fore that unions seem to re-channel excess profits made by firms with market power from capital 
to labour. These issues are further explored using a different data set in the next Chapter.
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CH A PTER J.
T he Im pact of Union* on the Financial Perform ance o f British Private Sector 
Establishments.
As earlier Chapters have pointed out there is now a long history of Industrial Organisation 
studies analysing the determinants of Arm performance, which pays particular attention to the 
impact o f market structure on the ability of firms to make above-normal profits.* 1 This literature 
provides extensive evidence o f links between structure and performance, although there is 
disagreement about the appropriate measurement of the variables, the interpretation of the 
observed correlations and the policy implications to be drawn.
Also long debated has been the ability of trade unions to affect profit levels in certain situa­
tions by extracting a share o f any rents. This interface between the labour and product markets 
has however been far less fully investigated and it is only recently that much effort has gone into 
the empirical estimation o f the union impact on financial performance. Chapter 4 provided some 
evidence to show that labour's claim to a share in profits is a strong one and one that is intrinsi­
cally linked to the market power that a firm possesses. The analysis presented in this Chapter 
uses establishment-level data from the 1980 and 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys to 
examine the determinants o f financial performance at the micro level.2 In particular the data set 
allows an examination o f the impact of unions on financial performance in abroad cross section 
o f British private sector establishments.3
The layout of the Chapter is as follows. Section S.l discusses the measure of financial per­
formance used in this Chapter and why use of alternative measures of the ability to earn higher 
returns is desirable. Section 5.2 sets out the appropriate modelling strategy. The data is discussed 
in more detail in the following section and Section 3.4 presents some basic estimates of the union 
impact on financial performance. Section 3.3 considers the variation in the union effect with
1 For surveys o f  (his work see. inter alia. Scberer<1980). Schmaiensee(1986) and Geroski(198S).
1 Blanchflower and Oswald« 1987b) also utilise the 1984 data to examine the extent to which 
performance-Linked payment schemes exert an influence on financial performance.
1 This Chapter draws heavily on Joint work with Mark Stew an  : see the paper by Machin and 
Stewart(1988) for more details.
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respect to the relative market power of the production units in the sample. Section S.6 considers 
the robustness o f the results to certain respecifications. Included here is modelling the perfor­
mance measure by transforming the data to allow for industry specific fixed effects. This is 
treated as a sensitivity check of the results presented earlier. Finally Section S.7 compares and 
contrasts the results with those using the company accounts measures of profitability reported in 
Chapter 4.
5.1. O n M easuring Financial Performance.
There has been considerable disagreement about the appropriate measurement of the perfor­
mance variable in Industrial Organisation studies o f the determinants o f financial performance. 
Results may be biased as a consequence o f differences between the accounting measures often 
used in empirical work and real economic rates o f return. These differences arise from, amongst 
other things, the depreciation methods used in accounting conventions. Fisher and McGowan 
(1983), for example, go so far as to assert that as a result of this 'there is no way in which one can 
look at accounting rates o f return and infer anything about relative economic profitability or. a 
fortiori, about the presence or absence of monopoly profits' [Fisher and McGowan(1983) p.90]. 
This position has been strongly contested by a number of respondents to the Fisher-McGowan 
article in the American Economic Review in 1984 [pp.492-517], Kay and Mayer (1986) and oth­
ers. Geroslri (1988) notes in his survey that 'it appears to be easy to construct examples in which 
accounting and economic rates of return diverge spectacularly’ [Geroski(1988) p . l l l ] ,  but is 
reassured by the fact that, although the most important systematic determinant of the difference 
seems to be firm size, 'correlations between this type of measurement error and market concentra­
tion do not appear to be very strong'. However since current evidence suggests that market share 
rather than concentration is the appropriate indicator of market power at the micro-level4 and 
since market share is o f course highly correlated with size this may be misplaced. Price-cost mar­
gins, now usually preferred to rates of return in empirical work, also seem to suffer from similar
4 See Chapter 4 and the U.S. stud io  of Gale and Branch(1982). Ravenicraft(19S3) and Kwoka and 
Ravenacraft(1986).
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anomalies (see Leibowitz(1982)). A number o f recent studies have examined Tobin's q as a 
measure of monopoly rents.3 However this also has a number of shortcomings.* 6 As Chapter 4 
modelled the union impact on accounting rates o f return it also seems desirable to utilise some 
other indicators of financial performance to ensure that it is not simply use of accounting data 
which generates the reported results. Given the potential deficiencies of the various measures, 
strength is obviously added to the weight of evidence on the hypothesis if  evidence can be pro­
duced on the basis of a range of performance measures. It is in this spirit that the evidence on the 
measure used in this Chapter is presented.
A point made in the previous Chapter was that there is no natural source of data to investi­
gate the impact of unions on financial performance at the micro-level in Britain. Such a study 
requires a combination o f  both financial and industrial relations data. Since there is no existing 
survey sample with extensive information covering both these dimensions, one o f two approaches 
can be adopted, using either a financial data source or an industrial relations data set as the start­
ing point. Chapter 4 begins with financial data and augments it. using a small postal survey, with 
some basic union information. This Chapter follows the opposite route : an industrial relations 
survey is used and, since the plants and firms involved cannot be identified (ruling out augmenta­
tion). use is made of the limited financial information provided by the survey.
The measure of financial performance used in this Chapter is qualitative and based on sur­
vey questioning of managers. The question asked in the surveys was
"How would you assess the financial performance o f this establishment, compared with other 
establishments and firms in the same industry 7
(i) Better than average
(ii) About average 
(ill) Below average.*
* See. inter alia. SalingeK 19S4) and Smirlock a t al.(!9S4).
6 See Gerotki(19M . iccond footnote, p. 111) for discussion o f  the virtues and defects of this
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In 1984 additional information is provided with the 'above' and 'below' categories being divided 
into "a lot" and "a little'' above or below, thus yielding five rather than three categories. Despite 
the reduced information provided by a categorical variable such as this relative to a continuous 
profit measure, and the subjective nature o f the question, it still possesses useful information per­
tinent to an empirical analysis of the determinants o f financial performance. Given the anomalies 
associated with accounting measures o f profitability and Census based price-cost margins this 
type o f information has advantages as well as disadvantages and provides a useful counterpoint to 
the more conventional measures. In particular, it reflects what managers actually consider to be 
financial performance and, even if this is a mixture of various indicators like accounting profits, 
productivity and cash flow, this is of considerable interest in itself. It obviously provides a rather 
noisy signal of financial performance, but if  meaningful results can be extracted despite the noise 
this provides useful evidence on the likely effects.
Survey respondents may be prone to overstate (or understate) their own establishment's 
financial performance. However, as long as such reporting errors are non-systematic and in par­
ticular uncorrelated with establishment performance and the explanatory variables to be used in 
the analysis, these managerial responses provide an unbiased estimator of the relative financial 
performance o f establishments that can be used in the analysis without measurement-error biases. 
Some raw data on the proportion of plants in each response category is reported in Table 5.1. 
More detail and comparison with data from the whole sample population of'the two Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys is given in the Data Appendix. Table 5.1 does indeed show that 
respondents may be more likely to say their performance is above rather than below average. This 
should not however detract from the information contained in this variable. The data also shows 
that the probability o f reporting above average financial performance is lower for plants with 
recognised unions across both yean. By the same token it is also observed that the probability 
that non-union plants report below average performance is very low (6% in 1980 and 5% in 
1984). Given the evidence reported using accounting profit rates in the previous Chapter and in 
the U.S studies referred to in earlier Chaptera this is what would be expected. Whilst one could 
say that perhaps m anagen in union plants have some in-built reasoning as to why they should
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TABLE 5.1
Relative Financial Performance and 
Establishments.
Union Recognition in British Private Sector
1980 1984
All Union
Sector
Non-Union
Sector
AU Union
Sector
Non-Union
Sector
Above Average 0.480 0.4S1 0.595 0.464 0.438 0.555
About Average 0.443 0.467 0.349 0.436 0.446 0.400
Below Average 0.077 0.082 0.0S6 0.100 0.115 0.045
N 623 497 126 511 401 110
Notes.
(i) The (unweighted) data refen to private sector establishments in manufacturing and is derived 
from the 1980 and 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys.
(ii) N is the number of cases : this sample is the one used for most of the empirical work in this 
Chapter. For details on all plants in the W orkplace Industrial Surveys, see the Data Appendix.
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slate that they have lower performance or that the variable essentially reflects 'managerial opti­
mism' it is reassuring that this variable corroborates, at least in its raw form, data from other
5JL Econom etric Modelling o f tbe Financial Perform ance M easure.
The econometric model used to analyse financial performance in this Chapter is conditioned 
by the nature o f the data Since the available measure of performance in the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys is categorical standard econometric techniques for a continuous dependent 
variable are not appropriate. The ordinal nature o f the question indicates that financial perfor­
mance is appropriately modelled here as an ordered response model. More specifically it can be 
viewed as an ordered response model where the (unobserved) thresholds between performance 
categories vary with an industry average measure of financial performance.7
More formally, let y* denote the level of financial performance in the I* establishment. 
Since the dependent variable measures financial performance relative to competitors then some 
kind of industry financial performance measure is needed as a normalisation measure to ensure 
that it is relative rather than absolute performance that is being modelled. Thus if yT is the indus­
try average measure of financial performance for the industry in which the establishment 
operates, then (for the 1980 survey) the unobservable variable y* can be related to the observable 
qualitative variable y, as follows :
3 If y * -$ r  >*r
yi ■ 2 if 5j > y*-yT > 5| (3.2.1)
1 i f *  >*•-*■
where 8( and fe are the unobserved thresholds defining the boundaries o f below and above aver­
age financial performance respectively.
7 For» survey o f  ordered reiponte model! see Amemiyt( 1911,1913).
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Financial performance can be viewed as a function of a vector of explanatory variables, z,. 
which may include both establishment and industry level factors such that
> * « * /7**4  e,**N( 0.O2) (5.2.2)
In this framework the probability that an establishment has above average financial perfor­
mance is
*-l*-3) -  Pr |y;-yT>«J (5.2.3)
- P r [ z i 'y*€4-y?>& 2]
where O is the standard normal distribution function, x, '  -  (*/. yT). P -  ( y o . -  I/o) and 6] -  5yo .8 
Similarly the probabilities of about average and below average financial performance are
-2] -  'Pl-*ie1 -x, "p] (3.2.4)
(5.2J)
where S i-ii/o .
Given these probabilities the appropriate likelihood function may be written for the stan­
dard ordered probit model in the following way
t - j ^ l * - l ) J j y r [ * - 2 1 J J ^ l * - 3 )  (5.2.6)
-  ' P l j j w e , - *  'P l-^ e .-x , 'PD
or 1
1 Now that a  li  noi identified unleu  one is prepared to adopt the strong assumption that yT is not one of 
the industry level variables included in z ,.
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Since the x -vector contains a constant, the full set of 6’s is not identified. To put it another 
way the origin on the scale of measurement for y* is not identified in such a model. Only differ­
ences in the 0 ’s can be estimated and thus a normalisation is required to fix the origin of the y- 
scale. The conventional one adopted is 0, - 0 .  As a consequence, the estimated 0’s are effectively 
measured relative to 0i, the lowest threshold. Maximisation of the likelihood function therefore 
gives Maximum Likelihood estimates o f 0 and the thresholds differences 0y-0 , ( /  ■ 2 in 1980 and 
J  -  2,3,4 in 1984).9 The likelihood is globally concave (Pratt(1981>) and thus convergence to the 
global maximum is guaranteed. The framework is obviously easily extended to the 1984 case 
where there are five distinct categories and correspondingly four unobserved thresholds between 
performance categories, three of which are estimated as free parameters.
Until recently very few studies analysing discrete data have presented diagnostic checks of 
their models. T he reason for this is essentially because most specification tests have been 
developed with the classical linear regression in mind and do not translate to the case where the 
dependent variable la not continuous. Recently however some authors have proposed diagnostic 
tests for limited dependent variable models. Chesher and Irish(1987) and Gourieroux et al.(1987) 
have suggested defining an analogue to least squares residuals from discrete data models and to 
derive Lagrange M ultiplier tests based on these generalised residuals. More specifically, Chesher 
and Irish offer tests fo r the probit, tobit and grouped dependent variable cases.
The Ordered Probit model is similar to but has notable differences from the grouped depen­
dent variable (GDV) model (see Steward 1983c) for a discussion of the properties of the GDV 
model). In particular the GDV model has known values for thresholds between groups : in the 
case of the Ordered Probit the thresholds have to be estimated. However, the diagnostic tests 
developed for the GDV model by Chesher and Irish can be extended to the Ordered Probit case in
* The estimate« reported in this Ch spier were all carried out using LIMDEP (see Greenet 1985)). The algo­
rithm used is that o f  D avidson. Fletcher and Powell and standard e rro n  are calculated from the Berndt, Hall.
Hail and Hausman(1974) variance matrix baaed on the inner product o f the first derivatives of the log- 
likelihood.
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quite a straightforward manner.10 1T his is outlined in the Appendix to this Chapter. Hence, to 
ascertain the statistical adequacy o f the estimated models these diagnostic checks of functional 
form, heteroskedasticity, normality and heterogeneity in the estimated thresholds are reported in 
this Chapter.
U .  D ata Description.
The 1980 and 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys contain respectively 2040 and 
2019 British establishments with tw enty five or more employees and give detailed information on 
trade union matters and certain, fairly limited, information on the economic characteristics o f the 
establishment.11 More detail on the sam ple used here and the derivation of data from the Work­
place Industrial Surveys is presented in  the Data Appendix. Some brief discussion is given in this 
Section. The initial analysis presented here focuses on private sector manufacturing establish­
ments (SIC(1980) Divisions 2-4). Each establishment is allocated to a 3 digit SIC industry and 
this permits consideration of industry level factors. After allowing for missing values and for 
deletion of observations with unsuitable industry information the number o f establishments under 
consideration is 623 in 1980 and SI 1 in 1984. This fall in numbers over the two yean  obviously 
reflects the decline of the manufacturing sector since 1981 (see Oulton(1987)). The decline in 
unionisation over this time period is also  illustrated by the data : see the definitions and weighted 
means of the variables to be used in the analysis which are reported in the Table A4.3 o f the Data 
Appendix.
The vector of determinants o f financial performance (x, ) contains the following establish­
ment level variables :
(1) To get a handle on the market shares possessed by establishments in the data set the variable 
MS was defined as total employment divided by industry level em ploym ent12 Market power is
10 This extension was developed by Mark S tew en  a i pan of joint work.
11 See Daniel and Millward( 1983) and M illw ard and Steven« 1986) for more deuils.
11 Since it can be arftied that use of em ploym ent shares can understate the relative size of large plants in a 
given Industry, a  re definition of the variable as a  sales based proxy utilising data from the Census of Produc­
tion was undertaken. Use of this measure altered the results linle.
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measured in relative terms : a dummy variable (HMS) equal to one for the 30% of establishments 
with the highest values of MS is used.13 This dichotomous representation permits a comparison 
to be drawn between union effects in high and low market power establishments. Diagnostic 
checks o f the adequacy of this binary measure relative to the continuous one are conducted. It 
should also be noted that HMS measures relative size : the issue of whether absolute size 
impinges on financial performance is considered in more detail below.
(ii) The analysis also allows for different dimensions o f unionisation to influence financial perfor­
mance. The most basic measure is a dummy variable indicating whether or not any manual 
unions are recognised for collective bargaining purposes in the establishment (RECOG). Given 
the evidence in Steward 1987a. 1987c) that larger union wage premiums occurred in plants with 
pre-entry closed shop arrangements (denoted here by the variable PRE) it is of interest to investi­
gate whether stronger unions (i.e. RECOG*PRE) are able to redistribute income at the expense of 
higher profits by more than weaker unions (RECOG*(l-PRE)) and this issue is also addressed.
(ill) A dummy variable indicating whether the demand for an establishment's products has been 
rising (DR1SE) over the previous twelve months. The relevant base group is the stable or falling 
demand category.
(iv) Establishment level capital intensity in 1980 is also measured by a dummy variable indicat­
ing whether capital investment has been increasing (IR1SE) over the previous two or three years 
relative to a base group of stable or falling investment. Unfortunately the 1984 survey did not 
have a question in the basic management questionnaire concerning investment but instead asked 
whether the plant is operating at or below full capacity. Thus a dummy variable indicating 
whether the establishment is at full capacity (FULLCAP) is included in the 1984 specification.
The following industry level variables (measured at the 3-digit SIC level) are used in the 
analysis :
(i) An Industry level price-cost margin (PCM) to proxy average industry profitability yT : this is
the HMS-1 group lentiovicy
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derived from the Census of Production and defined as (Net output-Wage bill o f operatives-Net 
capital expenditure)/Gross output.14
(U) The five firm concentration ratio in the appropriate 3-digit industry (CONC).
(iU) The extent of coverage by collective bargaining for male manual employees in the plant’s 3- 
digit industry (COVER).
5.4. E stim a tes o f the Union Im pact on Financial Performance.
T he set o f basic results are reported in Table 3.2. Column (1) reports results using the 1980 
data and colum n (2) corresponding results for 1984. Only differences between the unobserved 
thresholds are identified and estimates of these differences are also reported as e>-6 |. J  « 2  for 
1980 and J  -  2,3,4 for 1984. The measure of union presence in columns (1) and (4) is the basic 
union recognition dummy variable.
Firstly, considering briefly the variables other than unionisation, the estimated coefficient 
on DRISE implies that those establishments which have increasing demand are likely to be in a 
more favourable financial position than those which do not. The notion that financial advantages 
may accrue from more recent capital Is also supported by the capital Investment variable in 1980. 
Similarly, plants operating at full capacity in 1984 have an improved financial standing. A higher 
relative share of employment in the establishment's operating industry does not have any discer­
nible im pact on financial performance either in 1980 or in 1984, at least in the formulations in 
Table 3.2. The three industry variables fail to reach statistical significance in both years. Score 
tests for a set o f 2-digit industry dummies produce significant statistics for 1980. although not for 
1984. As a result the importance of industry specific fixed effects is addressed in more detail 
below in the Section analysing the robustness of the results.
The union variable provides interesting results. In the basic equations reported in Table 3.2 
the coefficient on the union recognition dummy variables is negative and statistically significant 
in both years (although only at the 10% level in 1980). This result is robust to specification
14 See Cow  ling( 1982) for ■ justification of using this definition of •  price-cost margin.
TABLE 5.2
Ordered Probit Estimates o f the Union Impact on Financial Performance.
1980 1984
0 ) (2)
Constant 1.699(0.375) 2.262(0.358)
Establishment
Variables
DRISE 0.391(0.114) 0.411(0.101)
IRISE
FULLCAP
0.496(0.103)
0.202(0.108)
HMS 0.017(0.113) 0.102(0.119)
RECOG -0.222(0.125) -0.336(0.127)
Industry
Variables
PCM -0.209(0.587) -0.463(0.599)
CONC -0.150(0.279) 0 006(0 291)
COVER -0.046(0.043) -0.053(0.042)
ej«o-e /«o
W«4_0/«M
1.553(0.079)
0.524(0.091)
- 1.962(0.117)
* 2.751(0.126)
lo»L -542.13 -659.48
N 623 511
Heteroskedasticity 7.77(14.07) 13.16(14.07)
Non-normality 4.70(5.99) 0.32(5.99)
Heterogeneity in 
thresholds
12.24(14.07) 28.41(32.67)
Omitted variables
(1) Continuous MS 2.64(3.84) 1.95(3.84)
(U) 2-digit 
industry effects
34.29(31.41) 17.04(31.41)
Functional form 4.88(7.81) 3.57(7.81)
Notes
(i) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
(ii) Details o f the construction o f the diagnostic tests are given in the text.
(iii) The figures in parentheses adjacent to the diagnostic test statistics are the relevant 5% critical 
values.
- 109-
changes or changes in sample definition. Score tests based on generalised residuals from the lim­
ited dependent variable models also engender considerable confidence in the results. The null 
hypothesis of homoskedasdcity cannot be rejected for the specifications in Table 3.2. Non­
normality is not found to be a problem for either year.19 A  score test for heterogeneity in the 
thresholds, allowing them to differ with all elements of the x -vector, cannot reject the null of no 
such threshold heterogeneity in either year. An adapted form o f a functional form test (see Ram­
sey (1969) or Ramsey and Schmidt(1976)) suggests that higher order terms in
these variables are not required. The fact that the estimated models survive this barrage of diag­
nostic tests bodes well for inferences based on the reported models.
T he estimated specifications suggest that unions, regardless of any potential positive pro­
ductivity effects they may have, limit financial performance to  a significant degree. This helps to 
explain management opposition to unionisation. It is also in line with evidence based on account­
ing profit measures reported in Chapter 4 and with the mass o f  U.S. evidence. Additional infor­
mation can be provided by considering the probability that a unionised establishment has. relative 
to an otherwise comparable non-union establishment, o f having below average, about average or 
above average financial performance. Such probabilities are reported in Table 5.3 for the three 
categories in 1980 and the five categories in 1984. Clearly unionised establishments are less 
likely to have above average financial performance and are more likely to have about average or 
below average levels of performance. As an example, a unionised establishment is some 3% and 
5% more likely to have below average financial performance in 1980 and 1984 respectively, 
while on the other hand, the probabilities that a unionised establishment has above average per­
formance are 9% and 13% lower.16 There does seem to be a  shift in this effect over time, the
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TABLE 5.3
The Impact o f  Unions on Financial Performance - Probability Effects.
1980 1984
Pr [y ,-U  R E C O G -\]-P r  [y ,-l \ RECOG  -O]
0.026
0.020
Pr [y, -21 R EC O G  -1 )-P r  [y, -21 RECOG  -0) 0.028
Pr [y, -31 R EC O G  -1 )-P r [y, -31 RECOG  -0] 006 3 0.085
Pr [y, -41 R EC O G  -1 )-P r  [y, -41 RECOG  -0]
-0.088
-0.036
Pr \y, -51 R EC O G  -1 )-P r  [y, -51 RECOG  -0) -0.097
Notes.
(i) For ease of comparison, in 1984 * -1 ,2 .3 .4  and 5 correspond to well below average, below 
average, about average, above average and well above average financial performance respec­
tively. For the 1980 data 1 and 2 are grouped together for below average financial performance. 3 
refers to about average and 4 and 5 are grouped together for below average performance. Sum­
ming together the 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 categories enables comparison between 1980 and 1984. 
The about average (y, -  3) groups are directly comparable.
(U) These effects are calculated from the specifications in Table 5.2 and are evaluated at weighted 
means, reported in Table AS.3 o f the Data Appendix.
comparative probabilities in Table 5.3 indicating a stronger downward effect in 1984 than in 
1980.
5.5. Union Perform ance Effects and Relative M arket Power.
The next question to be addressed is that of identifying the economic environments in 
which union effects are most prominent In the context o f  the present analysis interaction terms 
between the union variables and the relative market share dummy are included to see i f  union 
effects are any more pronounced in establishments with a high or low relative market share. 
Therefore. Table 5.4 reports results in which the recognition dummy is decomposed into two 
mutually exclusive categories conditional on whether the plant is in the top 30% o f the market 
share distribution. The impacts on financial performance in both 1980 and 1984 are seen to be 
more pronounced in establishments with ’high’ market share. This is further illustrated by the 
probability effects derived from the specifications in Table 5.4 which are presented in Table 5.5. 
They show the extent to which these performance effects are broken down between high and low 
market share. For instance, in plants with high market share unions are 29% and 40% less likely 
to have above average performance in 1980 and 1984 respectively. In low market share situations 
these effects are dampened down as the probabilities fall to 5% and 11% respectively. Hence, like 
the results in Chapter 4, these results confirm that in the union sector, unions are likely to restrict 
financial performance where market share is relatively high and that union effects are less marked 
if  market share is low. The score tests are again reasonably favourable to the models and generate 
confidence in the results.17 However, it should be noted that the reported effects are not that pre­
cisely determined and in 1980 are not significantly different from one another, with column (1) of 
Table 5.2 being acceptable against column (1) of Table 5.4 in terms of a Likelihood Ratio test.
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TABLE 5.4
The Union Impact on Financial Performance and Relative Market Share.
1980 1984
(1) O ) (3) (4)
Constant 1.644(0.379) 1.602(0.379) 2.246(0.359) 2.159(0.359)
Establishment
V ariables
DRISE
IRISE
FULLCAP
HMS
RECOG*HMS
RECOG*(l-HMS)
(l-RECOG)*HMS
0.376(0.116)
0.491(0.104)
0.582(0.297)
-0.768(0.290)
-0.135(0.138)
0.395(0.113)
0.491(0.104)
0.699(0.279)
0.412(0.102)
0.194(0.108)
1.093(0.510)
-1.319(0.510)
-0.261(0.133)
0.413(0.100)
0.215(0.108)
1.279(0.503)
Industry
V ariables
PCM
CONC
COVER
-0.326(0.597)
-0.137(0.282)
-0.043(0.044)
-0.338(0.593)
-0.189(0.261)
-0.031(0.042)
-0.554(0.610) 
0.011(0.290) 
-0.037(0.042)
-0.634(0.610)
0.013(0.267)
-0.074(0.041)
W—
1.555(0.080) 1.552(0.080)
0.523(0.091)
1.964(0.117)
2.738(0.126)
0.520(0.090)
1.954(0.117)
2.745(0.124)
logL
N
-540.56
623
-541.32
623
-657.17
511
-659.26
511
Heteroskedasticiiy 10.37(15.31) 9.68(12.39) 14.67(13.31) 13.20(12.39)
Non-normality 5.82(3.99) 3.44(3.99) 0.34(3.99) 0.11(3.99)
Heterogeneity in 
thresholds
17.29(14.07) 17.21(12.59) 33.86(36.42) 29.04(28.87)
Omitted variables
(I) Continuous MS 3.32(3.84) 1.41(3.84) 2.02(3.84) 0.72(3.84)
(11) 2-digit 
industry effects
34.21(31.41) 34.74(31.41) 17.86(31.41) 17.49(31.41)
Funcdonal form 11.99(7.81) 10.52(7.81) 1.56(7.81) 1.73(7.81)
Notes
(1) As for Table 3.2.
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TABLE 5.3
The Impact of Unions on Financial Performance - Probability Effects.
1980 1984
P r\y ,- \  1 RECOG*HM S  - 1 \-Pr [y,- 1 \RECOG*HMS =0)
0.135
0.291
P r  [y, -21 RECOG*HM S  -1 \-Pr [yt -21 RECOG*HM S  «0] 0.090
P r  [y, »31 RECOG*HM S  -11 -P r  [y ,-31 RECOG*HM S  =0) 0.134 0.023
P r  [y, -41 RECOG*HM S  -1 )-P r  [y, -4 \RECOG*HMS -0]
-0.289
-0.133
P r  [y, -51 RECOG*HM S ~ \)-Pr [y, -51 RECO G* HMS -0) -0.271
P r [y ,- i  1 RECOG* (1 -HM S  )= 1 )-P r  (y, = 1 \RECOG* (\-H M S )~0)
0.018
0.039
P r  [y, -21 RECO G* (1 -H M S ) - 1 ]-P r  [y, -21 RECOG* (1 -HM S  >-0] 0024
P r  [y, -31 RECO G* (1 -H M S ) - 1 ]-P r  [y, -31 RECOG* (1 -HM S  )-0] 0.036 0.045
P r  [y, -41 RECOG * (1 -H M S ) -1 \-Pr [y, -41 RECOG* (1 -H M S  )-0]
-0.054
-0.018
Pr[y ,= 5\REC O G * ( l-H M S )- l]-P r[y ^ 5  \RECOG* (l-H M S  )=01 -0090
P rly ,- l\ ( l-R E C O G )*H M S ~ \}-P r[y ,- l\ (\ -R E C O G )*H M S~ 0 )
-0.053
-0.031
P r  [yi -21(1 -RECO G )*HMS = 1 ]-P r  (y, - 2 1 (1 -RECOG )*HMS =0] -0.055
P r  (y, -31 (1 -RECOG)*HMS« 1 ]-P r \yt -31 (1 -RECO G )*HMS -0] -0.209 -0.334
P r  [y, -41 (1 -R EC O G ) • HMS - 1 )-P r  [y, -41 (1 -REC O G ) * HMS -0)
0.261
-0.045
P r  [y,-51 (1 -R EC O G )*H M S- 1 )-P r  [y ,-5 l( l-RECOG )• H M S-0) 0.465
Notes.
(i) For ease o f comparison, in 1984 y ,» l, 2 .3 .4  and 5 correspond to well below average, below 
average, about average, above average and well above average financial performance respec­
tively. For the 1980 data 1 and 2 are grouped together for below average financial performance, 3 
refers to about average and 4 and 5 are grouped together for below average performance. Sum­
ming together the 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 categories enables comparison between 1980 and 1984. 
The about average (y( -  3) groups are directly comparable.
(11) These effects are calculated from the specifications in Table 4.4 and are evaluated at weighted 
means.
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The estimates of the general model also indicate that higher relative market share raises 
financial performance only in the non-union sector. If the part of the model concerning union 
recognition and market share is written separately as
y*  •p iH M S  + kRECOG*HM S + k R E C O O * (l-H M S )+ x * 'p  + e  (5 .5 .1)
where x* is the components of the x-vector not including RECOG and HMS. then the effect o f 
high market share is given by
3&OJ- - & ♦ ( » > -  fclRECOa (5.5.2)
In non-union establishments the market share effect (pi) is positive in both years, while the 
effect in union establishments (Pi + Pj  -  Ps) is numerically small in both years (-0.051 and 0.035 
respectively) and insignificantly different from zero in both cases (the appropriate asymptotic 
standard errors are 0.122 and 0.123 for 1980 and 1984). The strong hypothesis that unions capture 
the whole of the returns to higher performance generated from high market share is not rejected 
by the data. Whilst it seems likely that this rather overstates the effect, it does highlight the 
importance of considering union interactions when examining the impact o f market share on 
financial performance.
An even stronger version of the hypothesis states that these returns fro pi high market share 
provide the entire source of union gains : that is. Pj -  0 in addition to Pi+Pt-Pj ■ 0- Under the 
imposition of both restrictions the model becomes
y* -  p,(1-RECOG)* HMS + x* 'P + e (5.5.3)
Estimates of this model are given in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5.4. Although Pj is 
significantly different from zero in the general model in 1984, Likelihood Ratio tests of imposing 
these two restrictions yield x*(2) statistics of 1.52 and 4.18 for 1980 and 1984 respectively (com­
pared to a 5% critical value of 5.99) implying that imposition of the two restrictions cannot be 
rejected by the data. The estimated coefficient on (l-RECOG)*HMS is also positive and strongly
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significant in both years. Non-union plants with some degree of market power hence are more 
likely to have above average performance levels. In probability terms, these plants are 26% and 
42%  more likely than otherwise comparable union plants to have above average performance lev­
els (see Table 3.3). Additionally, it should not be forgotten that for the 1980 data the non- 
interactive model in column (1) o f Table 3.2 is acceptable against the general model in column 
(1) o f Table 3.4. However, for both years the restricted models o f columns (2) and (4) of Table
3.4 dominate the other models in terms of the Akaike Information Criterion.1'  Thus the dominant 
model among the specifications reported to date in Tables 3.2 and 3.4 is one in which unions are 
able to capture the whole of the returns from high market share.19
5.6. Investigations o f the Robustness o f the Main Findings.
The results reported to date provide evidence to support the idea that product market power 
provides a major source of tents which unions are able to capture. This is in line with the results 
reported in the previous Chapter. A number of additional issues concerned with the robustness of 
the results and possible refinements of the hypothesis are considered in this section.
(i) Union Bargaining Strength.
The first additional issue to be addressed is whether the increased bargaining strength result­
ing from a pre-entry closed shop arrangement increases the ability o f a union to extract a share of 
any rents. Table 5.6 presents some estimates which allow a role for the pre-entry closed shop 
(PRE) in affecting financial performance both independent of and in conjunction with relative 
market power. In columns (1) and (3) the relative magnitude o f the coefficients implies that 
unions reduce financial performance by more where there is a pre-entry closed shop. However, 
the estimates lack precision and the coefficients on the two mutually exclusive dummies are not 
significantly different from one another in either year. When interactions with HMS are 1
11 The Akaikc Information Criterion ii  the minimum of < -21og lV ^  ) H 2 K /N ) .  K being the number o f 
estim ated parameters and N the sample size (sec Maddalal 1988) p.429 for a discussion).
'*  One reservation here is that columns (3) and (6) show a  deterioration in the diagnostic tests relative to 
colum ns (1) and (4).
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TABLE 5.6
Pre-entry Closed Shop Effects.
1980 1984
0 ) (2) (3) (4)
HMS 0.020(0.115) 0.584(0.296) 0.101(0.119) 1.085(0.510)
RECOG »PRÉ -0.343(0.180) . -0.560(0.179) .
RECO GM -PRE) -0.202(0.126) . -0.301(0.128) .
RECOG*HMS*PRE - -1.103(0.336) - -1.429(0.541)
RECOG *HMS*(1-PRE) - -0.701(0.295) . -1.295(0.512)
RECOG*( 1 -HMS)*PRE - -0.128(0.229) . -0.541(0.207)
RECOG •( 1 -HMS)*( 1 -PRE) * -0.136(0.139) * -0.218(0.135)
logL -541.67 -539.25 -657.95 -655.49
N 623 623 511 511
Heteroskedastic ity 8.62(15.51) 16.51(18.31) 12.98(15.51) 16.05(18.31)
Non-normality 4.39(5.99) 3.50(5.99) 0.74(5.99) 0.66(5.99)
Heterogeneity in 
thresholds
12.24(15.5!) 23.39(18.31) 34.85(36.42) 39.43(43.77)
Functional form 3.70(7.81) 9.83(7.81) 2.77(7.81) 3.09(7.81)
(I) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
(II) Details o f the construction of the diagnostic tests are given in the tex t
(ill) The figures In parentheses adjacent to the diagnostic test statistics are the relevant 5% critical 
values.
(iv) All equations include the same controls as in Table 5.2.
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considered in colum ns (2) and (4) the observed effects are strongest for pre-entry closed shops in 
plants with market power. However, in high market share unionised plants without a pre-entry 
closed shop effects remain significantly negative and the coefficients are not precisely determined 
enough to reject a  null o f equality. Finally, note that columns (2) and (4) of Table S.4 are accept­
able against colum ns (2) and (4) of Table S.6. Thus while there is some evidence that unions 
extract a bigger share of the rents when there is a pre-entry closed shop, the results in Table 5.6 
do not suggest a modification of the conclusions reached in the previous section.
(U) Number o f Competitors and the Measurement of Market Power.
The 1984 data also has qualitative information on the number of competitors that an estab­
lishment perceives it faces. This permits some investigation o f  the appropriate measure of market 
power. Given that Stewart(1988) finds that union wage differentials from W1RS are greater in 
plants facing relatively few competitors (&5) than in those which face many this is obviously 
worthy of investigation here. A consequence of the use o f this variable here is that missing 
values on the ’num ber of competitors' variable generate a reduction in sample size from 511 to 
423 establishments. A  dummy variable indicating few competitors (FEW) is introduced to the 
analysis and, as colum n (1) of Table 5.7, shows, it is not significant and the other results remain 
largely unchanged.20 In column (2) the union effect is broken down by this new variable. 
Significant negative union effects are only observed for those plants operating in less competitive 
markets. This is in line with the wage results of Steward 1988). Based on the smaller sample the 
strong effects o f HM S are again observed as reported in column (3).21 The fourth column 
includes multiple interactions between RECOG, HMS and FEW . Whilst there is some evidence 
that the union effect in an establishment with a high market share is greater if there are also rela­
tively few competitors, the coefficients on the FEW and (1-FEW) interactions are not 
significantly different from one another. Restriction of the specification in column (4) to that in
10 The dummy variab le  FEW coven just over half (unweighted mean -  O JM ) of these establishments 
(weighted mean -  0 .493).
21 To ensure com parability  between resulu on  the larger sample HMS is defined using the same cut-ofT as 
for the larger sample. It therefore refers to the top  30.3% of planu in the m arket share distribution.
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TABLE 5.7
Few Competitors Effects.
1984
O ) (2) (3) (4)
HMS 0.152(0.127) 0.150(0.127) 1.292(0.579) 1.268(0.562)
FEW 0.155(0.109) 0.365(0.238) 0.148(0.109) 0.344(0.243)
RECOG -0.325(0.141) . .
RE COG‘ FEW -0 458(0.213) .
RECOG*( 1 -FEW) -0.191(0.178) .
RECOG* HMS -1.457(0.577)
RECOG*(l-HMS) -0 258(0.147)
RECOG*HMS*FEW . -1.653(0.562)
RECOG*HMS*( 1 -FEW) . -1.227(0.593)
RECOG*(l-HMS)*FEW . -0.331(0.224)
RECOG*( 1 -HMS)*( 1 -FEW) -0.193(0.193)
logL -543.35 -542.81 -541.37 -540.23
N 423 423 423 423
Heteroskedasticity 9.30(15.51) 15.43(16.92) 13.02(16.92) 20.68(19.68)
Non-normality 0.33(5.99) 0.57(5.99) 0.24(5.99) 0.43(5.99)
Heterogeneity in 29.35(36.42) 32.67(40.11) 33.64(40.11) 68.79(47.11)
thresholds
Functional form 1.95(7.81) 0.83(7.81) 4.73(7.81) 3.87(7.81)
Notes
(i) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
(ii) Details of the construction of the diagnostic tests are given in the text
(iii) The figures in parentheses adjacent to  the diagnostic test statistics are the relevant 5% critical 
values.
(iv) All equations include the same controls as in Table 5.2.
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colum n (3) is acceptable, giving a x*<2) Likelihood Ratio statistic of 2.28. The further 
stratification by FEW is not required. Restriction to the equivalent o f column (4) in T able 5.4 is 
again acceptable to the data, giving a %H5) Likelihood Ratio statistic of 7.40. Thus the m ain con­
clusions o f Section 5.5 remain intact
(Ui) Absolute and Relative Size Effects.
T he measure of market power used to date is a variable indicating the relative size o f  estab­
lishments in a given industry. It may however be that absolute size also has a role to play either in 
addition to or instead of HMS. This possibility is considered in Table 5.8 where a dummy vari­
able (BIG ) representing those plants with 500 or more employees is added to the specifications 
presented in Table S.2.22 Columns (1) and (5) add the BIG dum m y to the basic 1980 and 1984 
specifications respectively. It is almost significant at the 10% level in 1980 but has no influence 
in 1984. Breaking down the recognition dummy by the size variable in columns (2) and (6) pro­
duces more negative coefficients for large union plants but, com pared to columns (1) and (5), the 
union effect does not differ with absolute size (x*(l) -  0.72 and 0 .9 2  respectively). In colum ns (3) 
and (7) the interactions with HMS and (1-HMS) are reproduced fo r the equations including the 
size dummy and these dominate columns (2) and (6) in likelihood terms. Finally columns (4) and 
(8) present the most general models breaking down the union effec t by both absolute and relative 
size. Evidently the relative size split dominates as the coefficients on thç BIG and (1-BIG) 
interactions are very close to one another for both yean : the m odels can easily be simplified to 
the equations in columns (3) and (7) with x*(2) Likelihood Ratio statistics o f 0.44 and 0 .10  for 
1980 and 1984. Simplification to the restricted model of columns (2) and (4) of Table 5.4  is  also 
easily upheld with x*<5) statistics of 5.20 and 4.34 respectively. H ence the relative size measure 
and not the absolute size variable is what matière for isolating the union impact on financial per­
formance.
23 Result* are unaffected by the choice of 500 a* the cut-off point : m u lt i  u tin g  300. 400 or 600 employ­
ee* produced very nattier result* to those in the Table. The mesa of BIO I* 0 .3 4 0  for 19SO « id  0.370 for 
1984 : corresponding weighted means are 0.063 and 0.047 re.pechvely.
1 2 0 -
TABLE 5.8
1980
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HMS -0.108(0.136) -0.105(0.136) 0.502(0.300) 0.505(0.309)
BIG 0.206(0.128) 0.520(0.393) 0.233(0.130) 0.226(0.432)
RECOG -0.261(0.129) . .
RECOG*BlG -0.565(0.393) . .
RECOG*(l-BIG) -0.226(0.135) - .
RECOG* HMS -0.870(0.304) .
RECOG*( 1 -HMS) -0.170(0.140) .
RECOG*HMS*BIG . -0.886(0.450)
RECOG*HMS*( 1 -BIG) . -0.761(0.386)
RECOG •( 1 -HMS)*BIG . -0.115(0.459)
RECOG*( 1 -HMS)*( 1 -BIG) - -0.182(0.142)
lo«L -540.83 -540.47 -538.94 -538.72
N 623 623 623 623
Heteroskedasticity 8.05(15.51) 8.34(16.92) 10.79(16.92) 12.08(19.68)
Non-normality 5.36(5.99) 6.22(5.99) 6.12(5.99) 6.53(5.99)
Heterogeneity in 13.68(15.51) 14.21(16.92) 18.80(16.92) 19.55(1968)
thresholds
3.46(7.81) 4.43(7.81) 7.49(7.81) 7.26(7.81)
1984
(3) (6) (7) (S)
HMS 0.090(0.150) 0.097(0.150) 1.080(0.516) 1.051(0.603
BIG 0.021(0.142) 0.430(0.491) 0.034(0.142) 0.109(0.565)
RECOG -0.342(0.130) . . .
RECOG*BIG -0.743(0.485) . .
RECOG*( I -BIG) • -0 304(0.135) .
RECOG*HMS • -1.332(0.510) .
RECOG *(1H M S) . -0.269(0.135) .
RECOG* HMS* BIG . . -1.384(0.553)
RECOG*HMS*( 1 -BIG) . . -1.251(0.653)
RECOG*( 1 -HMS)*BIG - . -0.327(0.583)
RECOG*( 1 -HMS)*( I -BIG) * •  * -0.271(0.138)
logL -659.47 « 59  01 -657.14 -657.09
N 511 511 511 511
Heteroskedasticity 15.97(15.51) 16 41(16.92) 17.00(16.92) 18.57(1968)
Non-normality 032(5.99) 0.31(5.99) 0.33(599) 0.33(5.99)
Heterogeneity in 27.96(36.42) 40.31(40.11) 35.25(40.11) 41 90(47.11)
thresholds
Functional form ___ 3 ,O P .» U _ ___ 3.07P.H )
Notes
(i) As for Table 5.6.
- 121 -
(iv) Industry Effects.
The 3-digit industry variables Included in the earlier results did not add significantly to the 
explanatory power of the models but score tests revealed some role for 2-digit industry effects in 
the 1980 model. This is of some concern since it might be that some unobservable industry vari­
ables are o f importance in determining financial performance. Inclusion of 3-digit industry dum­
mies would seem to be the best way to get round this problem : but, incorporating a large number 
of 3-digit dummies is likely to prove computationally burdensome. Recalling that the ordinal 
information on the dependent variable refers to financial performance relative to competitors in 
the establishment's operating industry then, in terms of the notation adopted in Section 2. this is 
y ’ -yT- Thus it is financial performance relative to the industry mean. This suggests another way 
of modelling financial performance which can control for industry specific unobservable effects. 
Write the model for the latent performance variable as
y r-z j 'p  + di + «, (5.6.1)
where 4  is an industry specific fixed effect for the industry In which the 1* establishment 
operates. Subtracting industry means gives
5 i'P + Vt (5.6.2)
where T, is the industry average z -vector for the industry in which the i *  establishment operates. 
Thus the Ordered Probit with (i< - i j )  as explanatory variables becomes the appropriate model. 
Note of course that this transformation eliminates any industry level variable in z. Also, the 
transformation may induce heteroskedasticity : appropriate tests are conducted for this and in all 
cases the null hypothesis of homoskedastic error terms cannot be rejected.
This is obviously analogous to a fixed effects model in panel data except that industry 
means are subtracted out rather than time means. Estimates of this 'fixed effects' model are 
reported in Table 5.9. One advantage of this model is that the sample no longer has to be confined 
to manufacturing alone and thus estimates are reported for manufacturing and across all indus-
1 2 2 -
TABLE 5.9
'Fixed Effects' Estimates (Subtracting Out 3-digit Industry Means).
1980 1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufac­
turing
All Manufac­
turing
All
Constant
Establishment
Variables
1.485(0.075) 1.533(0.061) 1.836(0.106) 1.860(0.081)
DRISE 0.340(0.121) 0.409(0.092) 0.370(0.114) 0.352(0.087)
I RI SE 0.521(0.113) 0 498(0.088) .
FULLCAP • . 0.165(0.115) 0.214(0.088)
HMS 0.118(0.139) 0.122(0.130) 0.108(0.135) 0.164(0.125)
RECOG -0.237(0.145) -0.162(0.104) -0.351(0.139) -0.307(0.093)
W " - o r ° 1.538(0.079) 1.588(0.065) . .
- - 0.514(0.087) 0.458(0.064)
• . 1.931(0.111) 1.906(0.084)
- - 2.704(0.119) 2.621(0.090)
logL -548.73 -852.5 -668.29 -1184.90
N 624 984 512 916
Heteroskedasticity 2.26(9.49) 2.98(9.49) 3.76(9.49) 8.15(9.49)
Non-normality 1.70(5.99) 1.51(5.99) 0.77(5.99) 2.11(5.99)
Heterogeneity in 
thresholds
2.36(9.49) 2.98(9.49) 7.76(21.03) 12.71(21.03)
Function^ form 5.28(7.81) 1.45(7.81) 2.08(7.81)
Notes
(i) As for Table 5.2.
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TABLE 5.10
'Fixed Effects' Estimates with Market Share Interactions.
1980 1984
(1) (2) O ) (4)
Manufac- All Manufac- AU
hiring hiring
Constant
Establishm ent
1.486(0.075) 1.536(0.061) 1.837(0.106) 1.863(0.081)
Variables
DRJSE 0.331(0.121) 0.400(0.092) 0.366(0.114) 0.347(0.087)
IRISE 0.316(0.113) 0.497(0.088) .
FULLCAP - 0.165(0.116) 0.207(0.088)
HMS 0.526(0.434) 0.593(0.359) 0.625(0.620) 0.915(0.415)
RECOG • HMS -0.634(0.422) -0.652(0.352) -0.872(0.618) -1.122(0.431)
RECOG*( 1 -HMS) -0.179(0.153) -0.113(0.109) -0.319(0.144) -0.273(0.094)
1.538(0.080) 1.588(0.065) .
- - 0.514(0.087) 0.458(0064)
- • 1.931(0.111) 1.907(0.084)
• 2.706(0.119) 2.625(0.090)
logL -548.11 -851.33 -667.83 -1182.70
N 624 984 512 916
Heteroskedasticity 5.48(11.07) 7.04(11.07) 3.84(11.07) 7.49(11.07)
Non-normality 2.48(5.99) 2.65(5.99) 0.63(5.99) 3.13(5.99)
Heterogeneity in 
thresholds
5.08(11.07) 7.06(11.07) 9.27(23.00) 16.16(25.00)
___ »03(7.8,0 3.76(7 81) 0.80(781)
Notes
(1) As for Table 3.2.
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tries. As one would expect (implicit) inclusion of a large number of industry dummies results in a 
rise in the estimated standard errors. O f course the demands made by this transformation ask 
rather a lot o f the data to expect any precision in the estimates. However, despite this, the 
coefficient estimates remain remarkably robust to the data transformation. In all columns the 
basic union effects are negative, both for manufacturing and across all industries.23 Again, the 
models perform well and satisfy the diagnostic checks in all cases. Greater precision is obtained 
for the larger samples in both years.
Table S.10 reports estimates of this fixed effects model which stratify the union effect by 
the relative market share dummy variable.24 For the manufacturing equations in columns (1) and 
(3) it seems that this is really asking too much o f the data, although for the larger sample 
(columns (2) and (4>) the estimates are still fairly well determined. As for the earlier results nega­
tive union effects are seen to be more pronounced in establishments with relatively high market 
power. In this specification it is still possible to test the hypothesis of whether unions are able to 
capture all the returns available from HMS. Test statistics are reported in Table 5.11. The first 
row reproduces the results from the manufacturing sample used earlier. The second and third 
rows report Likelihood Ratio test statistics derived from the models in Table 5.10, for manufac­
turing and across all industries. It is evident that the hypothesis cannot be rejected with one 
exception : in 1984 for all industries the hypothesis cannot be accepted at a 5% level of 
significance, although is not rejected at a 1% level, which comes about as a consequence of the 
significant coefficient on RECOG*(1-HMS). Hence, earlier results are not altered fundamentally 
by the ones reported here as the sensitivity checks reported in this Section illustrate the robust­
ness of the main results o f this Chapter.
23 Observe the slightly larger sample sixes for the manufacturing equations since there is no need to in­
clude industry level variables on which there were missing values in the earlier analysis.
24 Again, to ensure comparability. HMS is defined in terms of the cut-off point used earlier. The smaller 
number of relatively large non-manufacturing plants means that HMS equals unity for 20.3% of plants ui 
1980 and 18.5% of the sample in 1984. Changing this to the top 30% over all planu a lien  resulu little.
-1 2 6 -
5.7. Conclusions.
The evidence presented in this Chapter using the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 
1980 and 1984 suggests that trade unions significantly restrict financial performance in a sample 
o f British establishments. This is in line with U.S. evidence on this issue and, taken in conjunc­
tion with the evidence of Chapter 4 and Stewartf 1987a. 1987c, 1988), backs up the view of 
Hill(1981) that ’collective rather than individual bargaining may indeed produce some change in 
the way in which surpluses would otherwise be distributed, away from profits and into wages’ 
[Hill(1981) p.130]. It is also found that these effects are more pronounced in establishments 
which, in terms o f employment, have a larger share of their market which implies that unions are 
able to obtain a significant share of the returns to market power. In fact the data do not reject the 
very strong hypothesis that unions capture the whole of these returns from high market share and 
that these rents provide the entire source of union gains.
Union effects are also found to be more negative in 1984 than in 1980. This is consistent 
with Stewart's( 1987c) finding that compositional changes, particularly the shift in the size distri­
bution of establishments and the decline o f manufacturing, have caused a rise in the union wage 
differential from 7% in 1980 to 8.5% in 1984. Hence, the early 1980’s may not necessarily have 
seen a weakening o f union power but a concentration of union activity in those areas where they 
have traditionally been strong. In these areas the economic effects of trade unions remain impor­
tan t
It is very reassuring that the results presented in this Chapter are very similar to those from 
Chapter 4, where the use of more traditional accounting profitability measures produced results to 
suggest that the main source of union gains is high market share. After all. the two Chapters use 
very different data sources and very different measures of the ability to earn higher returns. This 
corroboration of results from both plant and firm level data evidently adds weight to inference 
based on the results from both Chapters.
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A ppendix : Diagnostic Tests for the O rdered  Probit Model.
The log-likelihood for the Ordered Probit model is
N L - ¿ ¡ £  l o g ! « « / - * * p ) I (A5.1)
Fbr the Grouped Dependent Variable (GDV) model, the generalised residuals of Gourieroux et 
al.(1987) or first moment residuals of Chesher and Irish(1987) are given by
where ^  ), + denoting the standard normal density function. -  <b<w,, ) and wA -  0; - x , 'p.
A hat denotes that unknown parameters are replaced by their Maximum Likelihood estimates. 
These are the estimated intercept (po) score contributions. The score contributions for the remain­
ing elements of p (i.e. dlogL/dP) are simply the products of these with the corresponding element 
O f* .
The extension to the GDV model is that in the Ordered Probit model it proves necessary to take 
account o f the threshold score contributions which are given by
(A3.3)
for y -  2— J - 1.
Teau of Arst order adequacy of the estimated models can be based on seeing whether any
omitted regressors are correlated with the To test for higher order adequacy of the model, 
higher order moment residuals are required. Higher order conditional moments of the latent vari­
able can be specified in terms of the functions defined in Stewart( 1983c):
128 -
. .  ♦>< 
M u  "  ~~A-----7k -------- (A3.4)
The first four moment residuals (Chesher and Irish(1987)) are then defined as
4i« > - * • . (A3.3)
/<<*>-2//»+
i f * - 3 4 *  + * »
The score test statistics reported in this Chapter all take the form25
l - r F i r ' F r ' F ' i (A5.6)
where / is an N-dimensional vector of ones and F  is a matrix with row order N (the sample size), 
each row of which contains the score contributions for all parameters of the model, both those 
estimated and those set to zero under the null. (The elements of F ' l  corresponding to the p ’s and 
6’s are all zero). Hence $ is simply N times the non-centred K 1 from a regression o f l  on the 
columns of F . The test statistics used in this Chapter are now discussed in turn
(1) Omitted Explanatory Variables.
The general model is assumed to be given by
'a  + *  (A5.7)
where q is a vector of length k (not including a  constant) then for y * -  x, 'p + e, to be the model 
prevailing under the null hypothesis a score test for model misspecification amounts to a test of 
a  ■ 0, the test statistic being of the form t  given above with rows o f F  given as
23 The general form for a »core te u  it, in terms of the  log likelihood function. [dlogL/df)) [ /( |J )J -1
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Ft -  (iP 'xi. l i* ......iP 'q t). (A5.8)
U nder the null hypothesis $ is distributed as %Hk).
The tes t statistic for functional form presented here is an adapted form of a RESET test (see Ram­
sey (1969), Ramsey and Schmidt( 1976)) and is a test o f the significance of powers o f  yf-jn 'jJ . 
Three powers are added (squared, cubed and quadrupled) so that the test reported is a x*<3) test
(U) Heteroskedasticity.
The variance of e can be assumed to be given by
o p - l + « 'a  (A5.9)
The row s o f F  for the score test o f a  -  0 become
F t -  Wi(1)* . i) ........ 1W-IX. >•
Under the null hypothesis $ is distributed as xH k). In this Chapter «  
the x-vector.
(iii) Non-Normality.
The row s o f  F  in the usual x*<2 ) test for skewness and/or kurtosis are given by.
Ft - ( / /» * .q*.... iW-i» .iP .it"> . (A5.ll)
(iv) Heterogeneity in the Thresholds.
Under the alternative the thresholds are allowed to vary systematically over the observations
(A5.12)
(A3.10)
is taken as all components of
so that a score test can be constructed for the null o f a , - 0 ,  /  -  2 ....../-I. The rows o f F  in this
case w ill be given by
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CHAPTER 6.
Unions and  the Incidence o f P erform ance Linked Pay Schemes.
The recent economic literature has seen an increased interest in discussion of the merits of 
performance linked remuneration schemes. M uch of this interest has developed from worries 
regarding the inflationary nature of traditional payment methods and from the work of Martin 
Weitzman( 1984,1983 and elsewhere) who claim s that profit sharing can relieve the major unem­
ployment problems currently faced by most W estern economies.1 Instrumental to these ideas is 
the way in which employers, employees and their representative trade unions view these schemes. 
If. as Weitzman has argued, sharing schemes can improve performance and induce greater wage 
flexibility then it can be argued that these schemes may be more attractive to unionised 
employers. This is especially true given the evidence that unions reduce financial performance 
reported in the previous two Chapters. On the o ther side of the coin, trade unions are often scepti­
cal about proposed changes in methods of payment. Observe the view of John Edmonds of the 
General and Municipal Boilermakers who has stated that management 'were keen on share own­
ership when it induces people to comply with their objectives, but not when it eroded their own 
power' [Edmonds(1987) p.8]. The focus o f  this Chapter is on the relationship between trade 
union presence and the existence of sharing arrangements in British workplaces. The analysis 
explores this relationship using data from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey by 
estimating incidence equations for three kinds o f sharing schemes and relating the degree of 
union strength to the probability of operating a scheme.2
The layout of the Chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 considers the theoretical background
concerning union attitudes to the introduction o f performance linked payment methods. Section
6.2 sets out the appropriate modelling strategy and Section 6.3 discusses the data to be used in the
1 Review* of the relevant literature can be found in Eatrin. Grout and Wadhwani(19B7), Standing! 1988).
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 ditcusse* the work pertinent to  this study
1 T his Chapter is a  revised, re-estimated version o f  G regg  and Mac hm( 1988) focusing very much on the 
relationship between union strength and the incidence o f  sharing schemes.
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analysis. The following three sections estimate Probit equations for the incidence of share owner­
ship. profit sharing and value added schemes in just over 1000 British private sector establish­
ments. Section 6.7 compares and contrasts the relationship between union status, union strength 
and the presence of these three schemes in British workplaces. Finally, some concluding remarks 
regarding the relationship between unions and sharing schemes and on the reasons why 
em ployers may be more (or less) able to introduce such schemes if  unions are present are offered.
6-1 T rade Unions and Performance Linked Payment Schemes : Theoretical Background.
As discussed in Chapter 2. most British empirical work analysing performance linked pay 
tests the effects of profit sharing or share ownership on various economic variables like wage 
costs and employment (Estrin and Wilson(1986). Bradley and Estrin(1987). Wadhwani and 
Wall(1988)), share prices (Richardson and Nejad(1986)), investment, employment and financial 
performance (Blanchflower and Oswald( 1987a.1987b)) and productivity (Cable and Wil- 
son(1988), Wadhwani and Wall(1988)). The evidence is fairly mixed regarding the potential pro­
ductivity gains and increased wage flexibility that operating schemes may yield (see Section 2.3 
in Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion).
T he point made strongly in earlier Chapters is that the presence o f a trade union impinges 
on a num ber of economic characteristics of the workplace. W hether the beneficial economic 
effects that advocates of performance linked pay promote are able to come about is therefore 
likely to depend on the extent of trade union activity. As such, the correlation between union 
activity and the incidence of sharing schemes can give an indication o f  whether or not unionised 
managements are attracted mote or less to these schemes as a means o f  improving the workings 
o f their firm. The impact of unions on the incidence of sharing arrangements is likely to manifest 
itself in a  number of ways and may be best considered in terms of the objectives of management, 
union leaden  and the rank and file membership, all of whom will be attracted to these schemes if 
the perceived net gains from their introduction are positive. What is however clear is that dif­
ferent objectives apply to different groups and that in many cases a potential benefit to one group 
of agents is a potential cost to another.
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Pooled 988) nukes the point that the decision on whether to introduce these schemes is int­
rinsically linked to the managerial style within a given Arm. Hence, from a managerial viewpoint, 
the potential gains associated with schemes are likely to be generated from improved economic 
performance, a less adversarial industrial relations climate and through greater motivation, loy­
alty to the company and increased effort on the pari of workers. These potential benefits to 
management will be perceived to be greater in unionised firms if unions reduce profitability and 
financial performance (as in Chapters 4 and 5) or productivity (as found for larger engineering 
firms in Chapter 3) or if  they promote non-cooperative relations between workers and manage­
ment Indeed. Poole(1988) observes a positive correlation between union activity and the pres­
ence of profit sharing or share ownership schemes in a sample of 303 firms in Britain in 1986.
From a worker’s viewpoint dissatisfaction with his or her current pay package could prompt 
a desire to participate in these schemes in the hope of improving their individual remuneration. 
However, this may create a conflict of interests with those union leaders who view schemes 
suspiciously in that they herald a new industrial relations climate in which the union's role could 
be reduced to bargaining over shares.3 If unions view flexible payment methods unfavourably and 
as shifting control from them to management then it seems reasonable that they will oppose their 
introduction through their ability to influence managerial objectives ; this will be especially true 
if the rank and file are satisfied with their current pay and also wary of any proposed change in 
the payment system.4 Following this line of argument the influence of unions will be on the 
management based decision on whether to introduce a scheme : the union effect will therefore 
work through threats o f what they could do to economic performance or worker-management 
relations if  a scheme were to be introduced against their wishes. This threat effect will be more 
credible if  it comes from a stronger union and. in the empirical work to follow, stronger unions
* See the T U C 'i official guidelines on profit related pay for an example of trade union suspicion of profit 
sharing unless, as Wadhwani and WaU( 1988) nose, it is treated simply a t a  bonus payment on u p  of the bar­
gained wags .
4 As sharing increases the risk associated with an employee's level of pay it then induces tome degree of 
uncertainty. Clearly employee* w ill be less attracted to sharing if they are risk averse and/or satisfied with 
their pay under a wag* system. T his will be the case if the certainty equivalent level of pay under a sharing 
arrangement it  less than the level o f  pay baaed on a standard fixed wage
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are divided from weaker unions by the presence of a closed shop. This practice is further justified 
by the second element dictating union ability to resist which is whether union members are con­
tent with their current earnings.3 This is more likely to be the case where union wage premiums 
are higher which, as Stewartf 1987a, 1987c) has shown, is more likely to be the case if  a closed 
shop is present. Indeed Weitzman(1987) him self also recognises this when saying ’the greatest 
resistance to profit sharing is likely to come from those sectors or Arms where powerful unions 
are able to extort above-competitive wages’ [Weitzman(1987) p. 103].
The introduction of sharing arrangements may also alter the relative bargaining strengths of 
unions and Arms. Take the usual Nash bargain I  =* argmax ( l /- f /)v (n -n ) l"'r where U  is union 
utility, n  is firm profits, y  the strength of the union in the bargain and a bar denotes union and 
Arm ’threat’ points or baseline levels of utility and profits respectively. If y  is reduced under shar­
ing then managers may want to introduce schemes as the distribution of the organisational rent £ 
shifts in their favour. The likelihood of a change in bargaining power emerges if collective bar­
gaining arrangements are altered under profit sharing. If the switch to profit sharing simply 
means that unions and firms bargain only over the base wage or shares then y  is likely to fall 
under sharing ; if bargaining still occurs over the overall wage, in the form of a bargain over the 
base wage and the share, then y  is more likely to remain unchanged.6 If the move to profit shar­
ing reduces y  sufficiently then management may want to introduce schemes when facing union 
opposition, even in the absence of any incentives such as the tax relief available on share owner­
ship and profit sharing schemes in Britain.
This discussion therefore generates several empirically testable propositions. First it is 
argued that the incidence of schemes is likely to differ with union status. Where union perfor­
mance effects are negative schemes are more likely to be attractive to managers of unionised 
firms. Similarly if  the schemes are viewed as a means of fostering 'cooperative' industrial rela­
tions and switching employee loyalty from the union to the firm then unionised managers will be
* T b it is oot to say ihsi all unions actively oppose these schemes : for example, the electricians' union has 
openly encouraged their uptake and introduction.
6 Note that Estrin. Grout and Wadhwani(1987) cite that over 9 0 «  of share ownership schemes 
do not involve a bargaining role for the union.
in Britain
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attracted to them. Also, when the presence of tax incentives can facilitate mutual benefits to both 
parties in the bargain (as in Wadhwani's(1988) discussion o f the possibility of 'cosmetic' sharing 
schemes - see Chapter 2) their introduction may be attractive. The second proposition is that the 
incidence of schemes will differ with union strength such that, in situations where managers 
would like schemes but union opposition exists, the threat effects o f stronger unions makes them 
more able to resist the implementation o f flexible payment methods at their workplace. A third 
possibility is that where unions feel they can take control of such schemes (as they did with pay- 
m enu by resultt systems in the 1960’s) then their introduction may be encouraged by union 
leaden. Some raw data on the incidence of sharing schemes from the 1984 Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey is reported in Table 6.1.7 Share ownership and profit sharing schemes are more 
likely to be present in workplaces which have recognised trade unions but no closed shop. This 
conforms to the discussion set out above : in these situations schemes offer potential benefiu to 
managers and, even if unions disapprove, the threat of strike action may not be strong enough to 
deter their introduction. However, in planu with closed shop arrangements both schemes are less 
likely to be present and. in the case of profit sharing, less prevalent than in non-union planu. For 
value added schemes the pattern is different as schemes are least likely to be present in esublish- 
m enu with a closed shop but the incidence is highest in non-union planu.
The data in Table 6.1 implies different correlations between union status and. on the one 
hand, share ownership and profit sharing schemes and. on the other, value added schemes. It is 
therefore also of some importance to see whether the determinants of different flexible pay 
schemes vary and indeed whether unions are more likely to welcome or oppose one type of 
scheme more than another. It is possible to shed some light on this by examining whether dif­
ferent explanatory variables are statistically important in incidence equations for different 
schemes. There are a number of reasons for expecting this to be the case. For example. Estrin, 
Grout and Wadhwani(1987) point out that share ownership schemes are likely to weaken work-
7 The actual question asked in the survey is reproduced in the Data Appendix along with more details on 
Use data. Only data on one kind o f  scheme, namely share ownership schemes, is available from the 1980 sur­
vey. Therefore the analysis only considers data from 1984.
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TABLE 6.1
Proportions of British Establishments with Performance Linked Pay Schemes in 
1984.
All establishments No unions recognised No closed shop, 
unions recognised
Closed shop
Share ownership 0.293 0.176 0.377 0.315
Profit sharing 0.216 0.205 0.231 0.173
Value added 0.116 0.147 0.106 0.091
Sample size 1001 341 406 254
Notes.
(1) The (unweighted) data re fen  to private sector establishments and is derived from the W ork­
place Industrial Relations Survey of 1984.
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ers’ monopoly power in the long run. They argue that this results in a reduced role for unions in 
the wage setting process and as such shifts power from unions to management This is the very 
point made above in terms o f the potential for a change in the relative bargaining strengths of 
firms and unions that could be generated by a switch to sharing arrangements. This might pro­
vide a greater incentive for managers to introduce share ownership schemes in the union sector. 
However, cash based profit sharing or value added schemes are more likely to be treated in con­
junction with and not independent of wage negotiations. This suggests there may be different rea­
sons underlying the introduction of cash based or share based pay schemes.
A second reason for expecting differential determinants is that recent legislation has offered 
tax incentives to employers and employees who participate in share ownership or profit sharing 
schemes. No such tax benefits are available for value added schemes.
Thirdly, the performance measure used to gauge the bonus payment is different for each 
scheme : whilst share ownership and profit sharing link pay to financial measures value added 
schemes are based on output measures. This suggests that the question of whether to introduce 
the latter schemes may be more appropriate within individual establishments whilst, as the former 
require some corporate measure o f performance like share prices or profits, the decision on 
whether to introduce share ownership or profit sharing may be more company based. However, 
given that profit centres do exist in most large companies discussion of whether to introduce 
profit sharing may be feasible at a lower level than that o f the organisation. .Therefore it is con­
sidered that the three schemes are likely to have different determinants : in particular it seems 
likely that establishment variables will be of most importance in explaining the incidence of 
value added schemes, of some importance to profit sharing and less important than organisation 
variables to the explanation o f the incidence o f share ownership schemes.
6  J .  Modelling the Incidence o f Sharing Schemes.
The discussion in Section 6.1 implied that an employer will wish to introduce a scheme if 
the perceived benefits from its introduction outweigh any perceived costs (such as threats from a
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hostile union regarding what it may do to production in the event of a scheme being introduced 
against its wishes). This can be characterised by the following latent variable model
S,*-X,'P + e, (6.2.1)
where S '  is the perceived net benefits from introducing a scheme in the <* establishment, p is a 
parameter vector and e, a random error term.
S ’  is not however directly observable but instead information is available on whether or not 
an establishment operates a share ownership. profit sharing or value added scheme. This can be 
represented by a dichotomous variable S, where 5,-1 if  an establishment operates a scheme and 
Si-O otherwise. The unobservable variable S '  can be related to the observable variable 5, as fol­
lows
St (6.2.2)
As Si is to be used as dependent variable the classical linear regression model is no longer 
the appropriate estimating method.The reasons for this are well documented : use of least squares 
can generate predictions outside the [0,1] interval ; errors in the least squares model will not be 
homoskedastic ; the distribution o f errors given X  will not be normal and OLS standard errors 
and thus t-statistics will be biased (see Maddala(1983)or Amemiya(1985) foY more details). An 
estimator which allows for the discrete nature o f S, is therefore required and a Probit estimator is 
to be used. Probit models effectively transform the real line [—•, ~] into the unit interval [0.1] by 
reformulating the dependent variable in terms o f probabilities. Specifying the probability of an 
establishment operating a scheme as Pr[5, -  1] -  «b(X. 'P) where <&(.) is the standard normal distri­
bution function then the probability of not operating a scheme is of course Pr[S, -  0] » 1 -  <ViX, 'P). 
Probit models can be estimated consistently using Maximum Likelihood methods. Hence, the 
log-likelihood function for the Probit model can be written as
k » g L - |j5 , log<*X,? ) ♦ ( ! - $ ) log<1-<*X,'P)) (6.2.3)
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Maximisation of this function gives Maximum Likelihood estimates of p which are not subject to 
the problems that applying least squares to a discrete dependent variable generate. This is there­
fore the estimation method applied in this Chapter.8
As remarked in Chapter S regarding the Ordered Probit model, very few studies analysing 
categorical data have reported diagnostic checks o f their models. Recently, this deficiency has 
been remedied somewhat as some authors have developed testing procedures for limited depen­
dent variable models. Chesher and lrish(1987) and Gourieroux et al.(1987) have recognised that 
test procedures based on the classical linear regression model are often based on residuals and 
have defined analogous residuals for models based on grouped or censored data. Tests developed 
by Chesher and Irish for functional form, heteroskedasticity and non-normality for the Probit 
m odel are reported in this Chapter. Their method of construction is given in the Appendix at the 
end o f the Chapter.
Section 6.1 isolated a number of reasons as to why the incidence of sharing schemes will 
differ with (a) union status and (b) union strength. To test these ideas the model is to be estimated 
(if  upheld statistically) over three sub-samples namely, non-union establishments, those establish­
m ents which have recognised unions but no closed shop and those which have a closed shop. This 
generates three sets of estimates of p which can be denoted pw . $u and $£L respectively where 
N U  denotes non-union plants, U  denotes the non-closed shop weak union group and C L  denotes 
plants with a closed shop (the strong union group). An average weak union effect on the 
incidence of sharing arrangements can be calculated as  &  -  X'($t/-0 M/) where a bar denotes a 
m ean value and a hat an estimate. An asymptotic standard error is a ie ( S ) m ^X'HX  where H is 
the sum of the covariance matrices from the U and NU sub-samples. To calculate strong union 
non-union effects and their standard errors it is simply necessary to replace with and to 
use the appropriate covariance matrices in setting up H . •
•  All estimation it  this Chapter w at undertaken using LIMDEP (tee  Greene<l9iJ)). The algorithm used 
for the Probit model is the Newton-Raphson method and the reported standard errors are based on the vari­
ance matrix derived from the second derivatives of the log-likelihood function.
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These average union non-union effects analyse the influence of unions on S '.  It is also of 
interest to calculate probability figures which allow comparison of magnitude of weak and strong 
union effects for different schemes. These are calculated in the following way
W eak  U n io n  ?  -  W W  ) - * & ’# « )  (6 .2 .4 )
S tro n g  U n io n  ?
6 J .  Data Description.
The data to be accessed in this Chapter is the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey of 
1984. As remarked in Chapter 5 and expanded on in the Data Appendix this is a survey of 2019 
British establishments which gives detailed industrial relations information. It also gives informa­
tion on sharing arrangements and this is the data to be focused on in this Chapter.
The vector o f independent variables to be used in the analysis is split into the following 
three groups as dictated by the theoretical discussion undertaken in Section 6.1.9 More details on 
the data and their construction plus weighted means are given in the Data Appendix.
(i) Organisation variables.
The Workplace Industrial Relations Survey is an establishment based survey but it does 
give information on various characteristics o f the organisation to which the establishment 
belongs. Those to be considered in the empirical work are
(a) Organisation Size : the number o f employees in the organisation is available as a grouped
variable and thus organisation size (OSIZE) is modelled using three dummy variables indicating
whether the organisation has between 500 and 9999 employees, between 10000 and 49999
employees or in excess o f 50000 employees. If tax incentives are more appropriate to large firms,
if  large firms are more informed of their existence or if  enforcement of effort to prevent shirking
* The variables chosen are those found by G re w  and Machin( 1988) to be the major determinants of shar­
ing schemes in British establishm enu.
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is more necessary in larger firms then one would expect a positive correlation between organisa­
tion size and the probability of operating a scheme.
(b) Information given regarding company performance : this is modelled using a dummy variable 
(F1NORGA) indicating whether management gives a lot o f information about the financial posi­
tion of the organisation. Presumably if they do so then schemes are more likely to be present as 
workers will feel less likely to be tricked by entering into a scheme and will be more prepared to 
bear a risky income. If employers are risk averse then they will be more prepared to yield infor­
mation and enter into a risk sharing agreem ent There is also the idea advanced in the implicit 
contracts literature (see Hart(l 983)) that workers rate managers more highly if  information is 
given : thus sharing arrangements may be more easily introduced in a cooperative worker- 
management environment Hence FINORGA may proxy managerial competence or 'good 
management' and. in the union sector, the extent o f  cooperative industrial relations.
(c) Ownership : modelled as a dummy variable indicating whether the organisation of which the 
establishment is part is partially or wholly foreign owned. It seems evident that share ownership 
schemes would prove harder to run if  a company is foreign owned as communication o f a foreign 
share price to employees would prove difficult Similarly, if profit-centres are abroad the appeal 
of profit sharing schemes as generating employee identification with the company may prove less 
attractive. 1
(11) Industry variables.
The environment in which the establishment operates may also be of some importance in 
explaining whether or not sharing arrangements are likely to be functioning in a given workplace. 
Therefore to allow for the effect of recent demand conditions in the establishment's operating 
industry the following industry variable is included :
(a) Industry growth : proportionate growth in employment in the establishment's operating indus­
try from 1980 to 1984 (GROWTH).10
10 It might be argued that some kind of industry risk measure (e.g. the standard error o f employment 
growth over a number o f  yean) might be more appropriate. However dais limitations prevented calculation
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(iii) Establishment variables.
The data set yields a considerable amount of information on the characteristics of the estab­
lishments taking p a r t '  in the survey, a number of which are relevant in modelling the probability 
of operating a scheme.
(a) Establishment Size : modelled as the number of employees in the establishment (EMPLOY). 
If introduction o f  a  scheme is more an establishment based issue then one might expect this to 
dominate organisation size.
(b) Workforce characteristics : this is modelled by simply using the proportion of manual 
employees in the workforce (MPROP). This is included to see whether schemes are more likely 
to be introduced in plants with higher proportions of blue or white collar employees. A positive 
association would be expected if employers feel they can generate higher productivity from the 
manual workforce v ia these schemes. A negative coefficient might be expected if schemes are 
viewed in some sense as managerial perks for white collar workers.11
(c) Consultative comminees : the existence of consultative machinery may also act as a deter­
minant of the probability of operating a scheme and this is modelled by a dummy variable (JCC) 
which indicates w hether the plant has a  Joint Consultative Committee or n o t Like the financial 
information variable JCC may also pick up managerial efficiency effects : on top of this JCC can 
be viewed as a collective voice function in the presence o f unions and therefore one may expect a 
different correlation between JCC and the incidence o f sharing schemes among union and non­
union plants.
(d) Union variables : as described above two mutually exclusive union variables indicating weak 
and strong unions are used. A strong union variable is defined equal to unity i f  unions are recog­
nised in the w orkplace and there is a closed shop for at least some workers (CLOSED). The weak
volve ■ considerable fall in  sample 
11 Gregs and M achin(19U )
variables thaï m ight be of Interest are market 
ver only available for manufacturing industry 
i s in  ; as their interest is only tangential they
this issue in more detail and for the most
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counterpart equals one if unions are recognised and there are no closed shop arrangements at the 
establishment (UNION). The reason fo r modelling the union variables as recognition across any 
occupational group o f workers is because the introduction of these schemes is an issue for both 
manuals and non-manuals : this d iffers from the union measures from the same data source used 
in the previous Chapter as there it w as viewed that manual workers are o f more importance in 
talking about extracting a share o f econom ic rents. In that context the pay o f white collar workers 
is much more an overhead cost and less relevant in the collective bargaining process (see Cowl- 
in*<1982)).
6A  Determ inants of the Incidence o f  S hare  Ownership Schemes.
Probit estimates of the incidence o f  share ownership schemes in 1001 British private sector 
establishments are reported in Table 6 .2 . The results are stratified into sub-samples for work­
places with strong unions, weak unions and no union recognition. This split is supported statisti­
cally. the relevant Likelihood Ratio statistic being x*(20)"  34.31 as compared to a 3% critical 
value of 31.40. In order to compare the magnitude of the impact of different variables across sam­
ples and with the profit sharing and value added equations in the next two sections the estimated 
coefficients are also converted to probability equivalents and these are also reported in Table 
6 .2 .12 Diagnostic tests of the Probit equations are also set out in the Table : they indicate that the 
equations perform fairly well, especially the incidence equations for non-union plants.
In general the organisation variables are very important in explaining the incidence of share 
ownership schemes. This is observed across all three specifications in Table 6.2. The monotoni- 
cally increasing coefficients on the organisation size dummies show across all three samples that 
larger organisations are more likely to  have schemes. This points to the idea that there exist 1
11 For continuous variable» the probability effect* are the probability of operating a scheme for an eitab- 
lishment with mean characteristics compared to  ooe  with the variable o f interest set to zero. For the j *  ele- 
m eat to the X( vector there are calculared aa d P r  (S. -1  ]ldX„ -  P, ♦ (X . 'p )  «hare «  is the »tamtam normal 
density and are evaluated at the (weighted) m e an  o f  +(X /f)). For dichotomous variables the effects are the 
change in the probability o f  operating a schem e resulting from a unit change in the explanatory variable. For 
a dichotomous variable A, in the X ,- [ Y iA . ]  vector with coefficient X these are calculated as 
P r ( 5 r - I  I 4 - I ) - P r [ 5 , - I  M .-O )  -d H Y, A * X > - « O ', 'A ) .  AU other variable, rea ret re (waigbred) nrean 
values In calculating there effects
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TABLE 62
Unions and the Incidence of Share O w nership Schemes.
No unions recognised N o closed shop. Closed shop
unions recognised
Probit Probability Probit Probability Probit Probability
Estimates Effects Esnm m e. Effects Estimates Effects
----------- -1.773(0.252) 1.046(0.237) -2.147(0.541)
O rgaaiaa iioa  Variables
500S O S IZ E <  10000 0.718(0.273) 0.142 0.896(0.230) 0.324 1.428(0.478) 0.437
lOOOOSOSIZEOOOOO 1.444(0.332) 0.420 1.240(0.262) 0.464 1.507(0.498) 0.527
OSIZEiSOOOO 1.351(0.368) 0.463 1.318(0.290) 0.349 1.639(0.321) 0.580
F1NORGA 0.727(0.225) 0.154 0.425(0.156) 0.157 0.269(0.192) 0.083
FOREIGN -0.768(0.321) -0.086 -1.059(0.267) -0.295 -1.704(0.335) -0.351
In d u s try  V ariables
OROWTH -0.798(0.793) -0.119* 1.033(0.388) 0.300* 0.286(0.745) 0.081 *
E stablishm ent Variables
MPROP -0.856(0.350) -0.128 * •0.571(0.269) -0.162* 0.461(0.453) 0.130*
JC C 0.690(0.221) 0.138 0.162(0.151) 0.058 0.146(0.201) 0.045
E M PL O Y /lO O 0.039(0.035) 0.004* 0.013(0.012) 0.004* 0.006(0.009) 0.002*
W»«L -91.67 -201.97 -125.61
N 341 406 254
M ean of 0.176 0.378 0.315
dep. variable
Functional form 3.43(7.11) 10.04(7.81) 5.53(7.81)
H tteioskcdasticity 19.34(18 JO ) 20.30(18.30) 33.87(18.30)
Non-normality 2.84(5.99) 9.96(5.99) 3.47(5.99)
NOTES.
(i) The dependent variable is a 0-1 dummy indicating the existence o f  a share ow nership scheme.
(ii) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Oil) * denotes that a  probability effect is a mean effect for a continuous variable. All other reported probabilities are 
0-1 effects for dummy variables.
(hr) The tests for functional form, heteroskedasticiiy and normality are based on the pseudo residuals formed for limited 
dependent variable models as set out in Chesber and lrish( 1987): tee the text fo r more details.
(y) N»
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economies of scale in operating share schemes : that is. the costs per worker o f  setting up and 
monitoring a share ownership scheme are likely to be greater among small firms and this deters 
management from introducing them. Not least is the presence of legal obstacles w hich may give 
small firms difficulties in getting Inland Revenue approval to operate schemes under the condi­
tions o f the Finance Acts relating to performance linked pay. The extent to which the organisa­
tion is prepared to yield financial information to its employees is positively related to the 
incidence o f share ownership schemes. It is however only significant in the weak union and non­
union samples. This could be construed as reflecting some kind of mutual trust between strong 
unions and employers such that if a scheme is in operation this information is not necessary : in 
the situation where FINORGA is significant the effect can be seen either as proxying 'progressive 
management' or may reflect the notion that additional information is required to ensure that 
workers are more prepared to shoulder some of the risk associated with more variable wages. 
Belonging to a foreign owned organisation means that schemes are less likely to be present : in 
the closed shop sample establishments are 35% less likely to have a scheme if they belong to a 
foreign owned interest. This falls to -30% and -9% for the weaker union and non-union plants.
The introduction o f share ownership schemes is therefore very much linked to the charac­
teristics o f an establishment's parent organisation. Having said that, characteristics o f the estab­
lishment and its operating industry may also be of some importance. The industry employment 
growth variable does not really display any pattern although becomes significantly positive at the 
10% level in the weak union sample. Establishment variables are however of some relevance : for 
instance, establishments with a large non-manual component of their workforce are more likely to 
have share ownership schemes. This reflects the idea that non-manual wages are in general less 
flexible (due to a lack o f  overtime or bonus payments) and thus schemes may be introduced as a 
means o f gaining wage flexibility through a kind of 'manualisation' of the wages o f  non-manual 
labour. Also, if these schemes form a kind of managerial perk (because of the tax Incentives they 
offer) then they may be more prevalent among white collar workers. The coefficient on the Con­
sultative Committee variable JCC is insignificant in unionised establishments but is strongly 
positive among non-union plants : non-union establishments with a JCC are 14% more likely
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than non-union plants without such a function to have a share ownership scheme. In the non­
union sector JCC may be viewed as a proxy for progressive management which wants to obtain 
any desirable effects from consultation and cooperation but without union presence. This kind of 
management also appears to want share ownership schemes as part of their machinery. However, 
where unions and JCC's co-exist collective voice effects may be strong so that, relative to the 
non-union case, plants with JCC’s are less likely to have share ownership schemes (since the 
estimated coefficients are significantly lower in the union sector). Finally, plant size is of little 
importance and is clearly dominated by the size o f the parent organisation as a determinant of the 
existence or otherwise of share ownership schemes.
6 J . Determinants of the Incidence of Profit Sharing Schemes.
Parallel results to Table 6.2 with profit sharing replacing share ownership as the variable of 
interest are reported in Table 6.3. Again the decomposition into three sub-samples is supported on 
statistical grounds with a xH20) Likelihood Ratio statistic o f 33.28. Comparison with Table 6.2 
lends some support to the differential determinants story set out in the theoretical discussion.
For profit sharing the very strong organisation size effects found for share ownership are not 
observed. Only among non-union plants is being part of a large organisation positively and 
significantly related to operating a scheme. In the absence of collective voice functions and com­
munication channels provided by unions this could reflect that managers in large non-union firms 
are attracted to profit sharing schemes in the hope that they may offset problems of X-inefflciency 
and improve internal organisation procedures (via greater effort, more company loyalty and so 
on). Releasing a lot of information about the company's financial standing for the most part is 
positively related to the probability o f operating a profit sharing scheme. Again, as for share own­
ership, the very strong foreign ownership effects are present, the probabilities (in absolute terms) 
again increasing with union strength.
Industry employment growth has no effect on the likelihood of operating a profit sharing 
scheme. O f the establishment variables having more non-manual workers is positively related to
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TABLE 6.3
Union* and the Incidence of Profit Sharing Scheme».
No umom recognised No closed shop. Closed ■bop
Probtt
Esamaiei
Probability
Effects
Probit
Estimate*
Probit Probability
EffectsEffects
r « . » . -0.662(0.182) -0.270(0.208) -1.543(0.467)
O rgan a a tiu a  Variables
500SO S IZ E <  10000 0.277(0.217) 0.072 -0.085(0.203) -0.025 0.575(0.388) 0.140
l0000£O S lZ E < 30000 0.138(0.327) 0.036 -0.018(0.240) -0.005 0.158(0.433) 0.039
O SIZ E 250000 1.731(0.350) 0.599 0.387(0.262) 0.127 0.451(0.454) 0.123
FINORGA 0.122(0.216) 0.031 0.394(0.163) 0.122 0.385(0.208) 0.091
FOREIGN -0.493(0.280) -0.101 ■0.896(0.297) 0.198 -0.596(0.261) -0.112
Iaduatry V ariab le.
OROWTH 0.869(0.636) 0.186* 0.832(0.60«) 0.234* 0.185(0.773) 0.044*
la ta  b la h  m eat VariabUa
MPROP -1.356(0.318) -0.291 * -0.744(0.280) -0.209 * -0.373(0.466) -0.009*
JCC 0.116(0.210) 0.029 ■0.166(0.152) 0.050 0.201(0.216) 0.047
E M P L O Y /100 0.010(0.030) 0.002* 0.006(0.010) 0.002* 0.002(0.009) 0.001 *
*o*L -132.46 -201.18 -108.72
N 341 «06 254
Mean of 0.205 0.231 0.173
dep. variable
Functional form 5.98(7.81) 19.08(7.81) 25.45(7.81)
Heseroekedasncity 17.10(18.30) 25.43(18.30) 41.02(1830)
Non-normality 3.19(3.99) 19.06(3.99) 8.88(3.99)
NOTES.
(1) The dependent v v iab le  is a 0-1 dummy indicating the exuiencc of a profit ih anng  
(U) See notes (UHW) la  Table 6.2.
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the probability o f having a profit sharing scheme. This trend is a function of union strength as it 
disappears among plants with a closed shop. Unlike the share ownership equations the existence 
o f a Consultative Committee does not impinge on the probability of operating a scheme, regard­
less o f the extent o f union activity. Finally, as with share ownership, no discernible role emerges 
for plant size.
6.6. Determinants o f the Incidence o f Value Added Schemes.
Whilst one could argue that there are certain similarities between some o f  the results for 
profit sharing and share ownership the value added equations reported in Table 6.4 bear no rela­
tion to the other two incidence equations. Firstly, a sub-sample split into strong, weak and non­
union plants could not be supported on statistical grounds OcH20) -  25.20). Therefore a simple 
additive shift In the union variables (rather than the fully interactive models for the other two 
schemes) is reported in column (1) and in column (2) only those statistically significant interac­
tions with the union variables are included.13 Secondly, it proved difficult to identify significant 
determinants o f value added schemes. Having said that, none of the diagnostics exceeds the 5% 
critical value for either equation and this just might reflect that these schemes are so heterogene­
ous in nature that to isolate their determinants in a precise way using regression techniques is not 
possible. On the heterogeneity issue it is evident that the definition o f a value added scheme is 
going to differ in production plants compared to plants in the service sectof. For instance, how 
does one define value added in banking ? An industrial breakdown reported in Table A6.3 of the 
Data Appendix does however show that value added schemes feature across manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing alike. It might therefore be that respondents to the question treat value added 
schemes as a kind o f catch-all. After all, share ownership and profit sharing schemes are more *1
13 All the work is done by the 4 interactions in column (2 ) : a  X*<4) statistic o f 13.70 testing co lum n (2) 
against the null of column ( I)  is strongly significant. A test of the significance of the other 16 possible in 
u n c tio n s yields a statistic o f 9.50 which is insignificant at any reasonable level o f significance.
11 N o significant role was found for industry dummies in the specifications in Table 6.4 : inclusion of 
eight I-digit SIC dummies produced a Likelihood Ratio test statistic o f 13.91. compared to a 5 *  critical 
value o f  13.30 (see also footnote 16).
TABLE 6.4
U moosaad tbe Incidence o i Value Added Scheme».
Protoil * * * * * * Protou Probability
C— -1.235(0.142) • -1.260(0.160) •
50 0 4 O S IZ E < 10000 -0.045(0.144) 0 .009 0.018(0.149) 0 .003
10000SO SIZ E <30000 0.049(0.178) 0.009 0.105(0.184) 0.020
O S IZ E 150000 -0.175(0.210) 0.031 0.193(0217) 0 .032
FINORGA 0.226(0.123) 0.044 0.660(0.209) 0.136
FOREIGN -0.157(0.158) 0.028 0.129(0.163) 0 .022
Indue try  Variables
GROWTH -0.324(0.396) 0 .0 6 2 * 0.317(0.403) 0 .0 5 9 *
Katabliahinent V ariable.
MPROP 0.331(0.201) 0.063* 0284(0206) 0.072*
JCC 0.008(0 119) 0.001 0.022(0.121) 0.004
E M P L O Y /100 0.006(0.006) 0.001 * 0.091(0.051) 0 .0 1 7  *
UNION -0.308(0.131) 0 .056 0282(0.173) 0 .050
CLOSED 0.464(0.163) 0 .076 0 2 65 (0215 ) 0 .060
INTERACTIONS
UNION'FINORGA - 0.438(0266) 0 .066
CLOSED* FINORGA 0.928(0.309) 0 .110
U N lO N*EM PLOY /100 . 0.084(0.053) 0.016*
CLO SED -EM PLO Y /lO O * 0.108(0.052) 0.020*
togL -350.22 -34227
N 1001 1001
Mean of 0.116 0.116
dep. variable
Functional form 3.48(7.81) 228(7.81)
Heteroifcedaiuctty 20.09(21.00) 1321(2620)
Noo-normality 2.22(3.99) 159(5.99)
(i) The dependent variable u a O -l 
(U) See d m m  (ii)-(iv) 10 Table 6 .1
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easily defined, both from the measure on which they are based (share prices or accounting profits) 
and from official guidelines relating to the Finance Acts which address the issue o f performance 
linked p ay .14
Some limited insight is however given in the specifications in Table 6.4. Organisation and 
industry variables are mostly o f no importance in explaining the incidence of schemes linking 
pay to value added. The exception to this rule is the financial information variable which is 
significant and positive in the non-union sector. Its insignificance among unionised plants can be 
viewed as evidence for the idea that giving a lot o f information to unions may. relative to the 
non-union case, generate exploitation of the scheme. Some of the establishment specific vari­
ables are o f  more importance as. unlike for the other two schemes, plants with more manual 
employees are more likely to operate schemes. The overall effect of plant size is insignificant but 
the interactions show that larger unionised plants are more likely to have value added schemes 
than are non-union plants. Hence the plant size effect is neutral in the union sector but in non­
union situations there is some weak evidence that it is smaller plants which operate these 
schemes. This tends to compound the idea that introduction of these schemes is far more of an 
establishment based issue.
6.7. U nions and  the Incidence o r Sharing Schemes.
T he specifications in Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 lend some weight to the idea that the three 
schemes under consideration have different determinants. The main purpose of this analysis is 
however to consider the relationship between the incidence of sharing schemes and unionisation 
to see i f  any systematic pattern emerges.13 The theoretical discussion put forward the hypothesis 
that whilst these schemes may be more attractive to unionised employers if they feel they can be 
used to offset negative union effects on performance there are reasons for expecting this to differ 
with union power. More specifically if strong unions do not want these schemes in their *1
14 A lthough note here that there schemer ate a lto  very different across different companies : the formula 
used to  calculate the sharer often differ, ss  doer the measure of profits used (a hazy issue in itself) and the 
number of sharer issued and so on.
11 Gregg and Machin(19gg) discuss the different determinants nohon in more detail.
• 131 -
workplace they can use the strike threat to discourage management from introducing such 
schemes. Weak unions will obviously be less able to do so.
Average union non-union effects and associated probability effects calculated using the 
methods set out in Section 6.2 are reported in Table 6.3. The results for share ownership and 
profit sharing are broadly in line with one another : if unions are weak a scheme is more likely to 
be present. The weak union effects for these two schemes are positive and statistically significant, 
whilst the strong union effects are insignificantly different from zero. In probability terms, a 
unionised establishment which does not have a closed shop is. ceteris paribus. 13% or 10% more 
likely to have a share ownership or profit sharing scheme than an otherwise comparable (i.e. with 
mean characteristics) non-union establishment. The corresponding figures for a strong union are 
2% and -4% respectively.16 For value added schemes however both weak and strong union 
effects are negative and statistically significant Their respective probabilities suggest that union­
ised establishments with and without workers in a closed shop are 9% and 6% less likely to have 
a scheme. Thus management in unionised plants appear to favour share ownership or profit shar­
ing schemes.
One possible explanation for this is that unionised establishments often belong to large 
organisations who are simply trying to obtain the tax advantages associated with share ownership 
and profit sharing which are not available for value added schemes. Since tax relief is only avail­
able for profit sharing and share ownership schemes this can be appealed to gs a rationale for the 
results reported here. This view seems to tell part of the story. However, the results reported both 
in this and earlier Chapters suggest that additional factors are important Firstly, despite the emer­
gence o f some similar results in explaining the incidence of the tax incentive schemes, some 
noticeable differences are also present. The size of the union probability effects for share owner­
ship and profit sharing in Table 6.3 are also quite different Secondly, if unions are able to exploit
As a
-  1 3 2 -
TABLE 6.3
Weak and Strong Union Effects on the Incidence o f Flexible Pay Schemes.
SHARE OWNERSHIP PROFIT SHARING VALUE ADDED
3 f 3 f 3 f
Weak Union 0.376
(0.179)
0.126 0.339
(0.142)
0.097 -0.306
(0.140)
-0.062
Strong Union 0.103
(0.292)
0.017 -0.214
(0.23*)
-0.044 -0.480
(0.177)
-0.089
NOTES.
(i) These effects are calculated from the estimated models in Tables 6.2-6 4.
(II) Evaluated at weighted means, reported in the Data Appendix.
(III) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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the presence of tax incentives then one would not expect to observe a significant difference 
between plants with closed shops and those without : surely if these schemes were beneficial to 
both parties in the bargain then one would expect strong unions to also get in on the act.
A third point follows from the arguments that sharing arrangements can bring about 
improvements in the economic performance o f the firm. The evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 
pointed to lower profitability and financial performance in unionised situations. Hence, if 
management view unions as mainly reducing profits and share schemes as a way o f  reducing 
union strength by providing workers with an alternative interest in the firm they will be more 
motivated to introduce them. The positive correlation between union recognition (without a 
closed shop) and the presence of the two schemes linked to financial measures is supportive of 
the idea that lower performance levels in the union sector are part of the reason why these 
schemes are introduced. In this context, the difference in estimated effects between strong and 
weak unions can be rationalised in terms of the more credible threat possessed by stronger unions 
regarding what they could do to performance or union-management relations if a scheme were to 
be proposed for introduction against their wishes. This threat effect may be strong enough to 
offset the advantages managers perceive a scheme can offer and therefore deter management who 
may be attracted to schemes from being able to introduce them. Outside the confines of the 
closed shop this threat is likely to be less powerful and if the perceived benefits that managers 
attach to schemes still outweigh the costs, including the latent threat of the union, schemes can be 
introduced anyway. It should also be noted that although Blanchflower and Oswald( 1987b) are 
unable to detect a relationship between the existence of a share ownership or profit sharing 
scheme and higher financial performance this does not conflict with the findings reported here. 
Managers may introduce schemes in the hope of raising performance but that does not guarantee 
that this will work. Introduction is very much an ex-ante decision in which perceived net benefits 
are positive which may not give, for various reasons, the ex-post desired results. Also, as most of 
these schemes have only been introduced recently then enough time for them to desirably 
influence performance levels may not have yet elapsed.
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Fourthly, subject to the caveats regarding the quality of the data on value added schemes, 
the incentive for unionised managements to introduce schemes linked to value added seems to be 
less pressing. Related to this is the idea that management may be far less tempted to introduce 
value added schemes in the presence o f unions following the experience o f the 1930's and 1960's 
when unions were able to exploit similar schemes, such as payment by results systems, through 
their ability to regulate effort and to hold on to some degree of control in the workplace due to 
their power in the collective bargaining process. Thus it appears to be the case that management 
are reluctant to  introduce value added schemes for a fear of (at least partial) loss of control but 
that they are more confident of obtaining any desirable effects from the other two schemes whilst 
simultaneously retaining, or even strengthening, workplace control.
6.8. C oncluding Remarks.
Recent economic debate has concerned itself with the idea of whether alternative employee 
compensation systems can have an impact on employment stability, wage flexibility and 
economic performance. Despite the recent revival of interest the study o f these schemes and their 
implications for trade unions is by no means new. For instance, Dobb(1928) states that 'Some 
employers, in addition to. or instead of. ordinary systems of payment by results, favour a system 
known as profit-sharing with the aim o f stimulating a collective spirit among the workpeople 
favourable to greater output, and o f giving to the employees a financial interest in the success of 
the firm’ (Dobb(1928) p.62]. He goes on to discuss the incentive for managers to introduce profit 
sharing schemes in the presence of unions by stating that ’Not infrequently a further advantage is 
hoped for from the scheme in detaching the workers from a trade union and freeing the manage­
ment from the constriction of collective bargaining and possible strikes' [Dobb(1928) p.63). 
These ideas are not dissimilar to some o f those discussed in the modem literature on sharing 
arrangements and in this Chapter. So as to empirically test these notions, this Chapter uses dais 
from the nationally representative Workplace Industrial Relations Survey of 1984 to examine the 
relationship between union presence and the incidence of flexible payment schemes operating in 
British establishments. It attempts to determine whether unionised plants are more or less likely
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to have these schemes. Several interesting findings emerge from the analysis. Unionised plants 
are more likely to have schemes which link pay to financial measures but are less likely to have 
schemes which link pay to value added. Given that Chapter 3 found union effects on productivity 
to be neutral and that Chapters 4 and 5 found negative union effects on accounting profits and 
financial performance one possible explanation of these results is that managers in plants with 
unions present are more attracted to schemes linking pay to financial measures in the hope of 
offsetting these negative union effects. Data difficulties certainly prevent a definitive test o f this 
hypothesis. Indeed, as with most economic hypotheses several interpretations may be offered for 
the reported results. However, some evidence for the ideas discussed in Section 6.2 is found as 
the presence o f  schemes differs with union strength. In particular, amongst unionised plants these 
schemes are less likely to be present where a closed shop operates. What is also evident (and 
explored in more detail in Gregg and Machin(1988)) is that these schemes are not homogeneous 
substitutes and that different explanatory variables have different effects on -  the incidence of 
share ownership, profit sharing and value added schemes.
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Appendix : Diagnostic Tests for the Probit Model.
The log-likelihood for the Probit model is given by
log • < * , ? ) +  < 1 ^ )  log ( l - * « * . * ) ) (A6.1)
For the Probit model above the C hesher and lrish(1987) definition of residuals is the derivative of 
(A6.1) with respect to the constant in the ß vector and is given by
where A(.) -  +(.)/l-6(.), the hazard function for the standard normal distribution (+ is the standard 
normal density). Higher order moments are defined by Chesher and Irish as
i f "  -  <2 .  (X, ■$>>) <<»
/,»>. -<«,■(♦ or, •(>>)/<'>
Definition of these first four conditional moments m eans that various score tests can be car­
ried out. As with the tests for the Ordered Probit model reported in Chapter S they are all calcu­
lated as17
^ • r F i F ' F r ' F ' l  (A6.4)
where / is an N-dimensional vector o f  ones and F  is a m atrix with row order N. N being the sam­
ple size. Calculation of the tests simply involves ascertaining the score contributions made by 
each parameter and those set to zero under the null hypothesis and these form the columns of F . 
Three tests are reported in this Chapter :
17 See the Appendix to Chapter 5 or C hesher and Irtih (l9 l7 ) for m ore details.
■ -(l-<Si)* (X,*i)♦ 5, * < -* ,* ) (A6.2)
(A6.3)
- 1 3 7 -
(i) Functional form.
A i in the previous Chapter this can be constructed in the form of $ with the rows o f F  given as
(A6.3)
where q, is a vector containing the squared, cubed and quadrupled values o f so that the tests 
reported are x*(3) tests.
(ii) Heteroskedasticity .
For a test o f the null of homoskedastic errors the row s of F  are
Pi -  (// '% . iftoqt). (A6.6)
q, is treated as all the components of the X -vector and thus the test is in all cases a x^lO) test.
(iii) Non-Normality.
The rows o f F  in the usual xH2) test for skewness and/or kurtosis are given by
Pi (A6.7)
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CHAPTER 7.
Summary o f Main Results and Concluding Remarks.
Quantifying the impact that trade unions have on the economic performance of plants and 
firms in which they operate is by no means a straightforward exercise. The effects of unions will 
be likely to vary from one situation to another and are a function o f  a great many economic, 
social and political variables. Naturally an econometric study cannot analyse all these and only a 
sub-set o f these variables can be controlled for in any one piece of empirical work. This thesis 
has used econometric techniques to ascertain the impact of union presence on productivity, 
profitability and related it to the incidence of performance linked pay schemes operating in Brit­
ish workplaces in the early 1980’s. The main finding is that trade unions certainly exert a 
significant influence on the production operations, methods of worker payment and financial per­
formance o f plants and companies in Britain.
The main conclusion reached in Chapter 3 was that the union impact on productivity varies 
considerably with the characteristics of the firms where unions are present. Using an index of 
union presence based on several indicators of union strength, the average union non-union effect 
on labour productivity in a sample o f 52 engineering firms between 1978 and 1982 was estimated 
to be statistically insignificant However, in just over 40% of firms in the sample individual union 
effects were observed to be statistically important In particular, negative effects were found in 
relatively large firms whilst in small firms the union impact was largely innocuous. This confirms 
that different firms have different experiences regarding the way that unions affect the production 
process.
Chapters 4 and 5 provided complementary evidence from two independent data sources to 
show that trade unions reduce financial performance to a significant degree : in both cases the 
ability o f unions to extract a share o f economic rents thereby reducing profitability was observed 
to be more marked in situations where there exists a greater ability to earn monopoly profits. 
Hence, trade unions can be seen as a moderating influence which limits the ability of oligopolistic
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producers to cam excessive profits. Chapter 4 used accounting data at the level of the firm to 
reach this conclusion whilst Chapter 5 used qualitative information on financial performance 
from plant level data to obtain similar results. Given the debate regarding the appropriate way to 
measure profitability it is reassuring that the same qualitative conclusions emerge from two very 
different performance measures derived from two very different samples.
Having considered the union impact on profitability and productivity Chapter 6 addressed 
the relationship between the incidence of performance linked payment methods and union pres­
ence. The empirical work using plant level data from 1984 showed that unionised plants are on 
the whole more likely to operate share ownership and profit sharing schemes but that stronger 
unions are able to oppose re-definitions of payment methods so that in plants with closed shops 
these schemes are no more likely to be present than in non-union plants.
The empirical analysis reported here therefore finds that the presence of trade unions is in t­
rinsically linked to the way in which production is conducted and can significantly alter the per­
formance of plants and firms relative to the case in which they are not present. It is o f consider­
able interest that even in the 1980’s, where legislative measures and recession are often said to 
have weakened union power, significant effects have been observed. Evidence on wage differen­
tials also suggests that, where unions exist, the pay premiums they can achieve compared to non­
union situations have changed little through the early 1980's (see Stewart’s( 1987c) comparison o f 
estimates between 1980 and 1984). Rather than weakened union presence it  might therefore be 
that the 1980's has seen a concentration of union power in those areas where unions have tradi­
tionally been strong so that in these areas their economic effects remain important. Witness the 
growth in union merger activity that has occurred in the 1980’s, a union response often observed 
in times o f recession and an unfavourable legislative climate as a means of 're-grouping' so as to 
maintain strength (see Waddington(1987)). In the service industries however newly set-up firms 
are predominantly non-union and it has proved difficult for unions to make inroads into these 
industries. This highlights one potential shortcoming of the data used in this thesis as it mostly 
refers to manufacturing which has traditionally been a stronghold for union activity. It would be 
o f considerable interest to see how unions affect the performance of non-manufacturing firms
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although this is clearly beyond the scope o f the work presented here.
It should also be noted that as most of the work in this thesis is based on cross-section data 
it is static in nature and as such more dynamic issues, such as the impact of unions on produc­
tivity growth or the dynamics o f profitability, are not considered. Indeed, on this point, certain 
U.S. studies have found very different results regarding productivity growth compared with the 
impact on productivity levels derived from cross-section data (for an example see Hinch and 
Link(1984)). Consideration o f dynamic issues should be placed on the agenda for future research 
although at present the lack of longitudinal dau  on trade union activity at the micro-level pro­
vides a major constraint* 1
Also worthy of future consideration are several issues which lurk in the background of the 
analysis reported here. One such issue is how trade unions influence the investment strategies of 
firms : this clearly may play a part in explaining the union profit effects reported in Chapters 
4 and 5 o f this thesis. It may also shed some light on the longer term consequences of union 
activity. Related here, and also to the union impact on productivity, is the adoption of new tech­
nology, a subject which has generated controversy among industrial relations experts and 
economists alike as trade unions have often been pinpointed as acting as a barrier to the introduc­
tion of new technology at workplaces. Daniel(1987) provides descriptive evidence to counter this 
view although very little economic work has addressed this issue in any detail.2 The economic 
effects that profit sharing has in union and non-union situations also needs to be addressed more 
fully. Some of the work in Chapters 3 and 6 sheds some light on this although, given the large 
number o f British workplaces now operating sharing schemes, further work needs to be under­
taken.
The increased appeal o f encouraging employee involvement in the operations of the firm
1 A lthough Denny and Muellbauert 1988) have attempted to conduct such an exercise between 1980 and 
1984 using aggregate industry level value added d a u  supplemented by d a u  from the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys of those two years. Also, industry level work analysing this could be possible using Census 
o f  Production productivity d a u  in conjunction with union coverage d a u  from the 1973. 1978 and 1983 New 
Earnings Surveys.
1 Although a great body of Industrial relations research on the subject exists. For a theoretical economic 
model analyising the uptake of new technology and unions sec Tauman and Weiss(l9S7).
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running through Britain in the early 1980's also underlies a number of the results presented here. 
Whether this manifests itself in a cosmetic or genuine manner is an issue and one that is not 
resolved in the context of this thesis, which only considers one mild form of involvement, namely 
sharing arrangements for pay. Other forms such as quality circles and briefing groups are worthy 
o f consideration, especially in the presence of the more compliant industrial relations system 
characterising British collective bargaining in the 1980's (see Metcalf(1988)).
A general theme running through the Chapters of this thesis is that recognition of the insti­
tutional features of unions and the organisational features o f firms is of some importance in iso­
lating the union impact on performance. Hence, industrial relations and industrial organisation 
notions are considered complementary to the labour economics base from which the analysis sets 
o u t M uch has been made of the link between industrial relations and economics recently often 
emphasising the lack of communication between the two fields (see Oswald( 1987b). 
Steward 1986) and Tumbull(1988) for differing views on the subject). Nevertheless, again 
despite da ta  difficulties in this regard, the analysis reported here recognises this potentially 
important link.
F inally, in conclusion, it is worth re-iterating the contributions made by the work in this 
thesis. In an area where data difficulties are severe and where a firm theoretical underpinning is 
hard to form , this thesis has taken the issue of how union activity is related to performance and 
fitted econometric models using micro-economic data to analyse the way in which unions affect 
productivity, profitability and the incidence of performance linked pay schemes in Britain. A 
number o f  interesting conclusions have emerged and, as very little work has to dale analysed 
these issues in Britain, it is hoped that the work contained herein has contributed to a better 
understanding of the economic consequences of trade unionism in Britain in the early 1980's.
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APPENDIX L  
Description of Data Sources.
Chapter 3  : Data Description.
The data used in Chapter 3 is kindly provided by John Cable and Nick Wilson from ESRC 
project F0023021 on Work Organisation, Participation and Economic Performance in British 
firms. This is a detailed survey o f  firms operating in British engineering over the period 1978-82. 
The survey initially covered 87 firms located mainly in the West Midlands and West Yorkshire 
and reduces to 52 which have complete data over the five years. The nature of the data is such 
that information on performance related variables is available for all five years but that informa­
tion on the structural characteristics of the firm is only available as a single observation.
The measure of productivity used is value added per employee where value added is defined 
as sales less material costs and is deflated by a 2-digit industry level price index which varies 
annually (Source : Monthly Digest o f Statistics). The number of employees is the total number of 
employees (i.e. manual and non-manual employees) in the firm.
The data set is essentially self-contained so that the source for the variables is the same. The 
sample selection is simply to use the data on all 52 firms. The means of the independent variables 
used in the analysis are reported in Table A3.1. Descriptions are now given :
(a) Capital to labour ratio (K /L) : K is defined as fixed assets as reported in the company 
accounts. It is deflated by an annual price index (1980-1) for fixed assets (provided by Nick Wil­
son). L  is the total number of employees in the firm.
(b) Profit sharing bonus (BONUS) : the average percentage of gross pay which is paid as a profit 
sharing or value added bonus.
(c) Dominant mode of production : denoted by two dummy variables indicating whether the main 
method o f production is by job (JOB) or using flow lines (FLOW). The base group is production 
by batch.
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TABLE A3.1.
Note*.
(i) Variable description* are given in the text of the Data Appendix.
(ii) Significant differences between sub-groups of union presence are denoted by *, *• and 
for 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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(d) Skill ratio (SK ILL): the proportion of the manual workforce classified as skilled.
(e) Union density (U NION): the number of union members divided by total employment.
(f) Closed shop (CLOSED) : a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has any closed shop 
arrangements.
(g) Multiple unionism : denoted by two dummy variables indicating whether the film has more 
than one union for manual workers (NSHOP) or non-manual workers (NSTAJFF).
As remarked in Chapter 3 the sample comprises of a number of highly unionised firms and 
does not contain any information on union recognition. Therefore a union presence index was 
constructed using the four indicators UNION. CLOSED. NSHOP and NSTAFF. This Appendix 
gives more detail on its construction than does Chapter 3.
Let the four indicators be denoted v*(A -  1 to  4). An index can be defined V  -  ^ 4 *  v* where 
the weights are denoted 4«. Construction of these weights is the difficulty and is done by using 
the weights o f the first principal component of the variance covariance matrix o f the indicators 
*P » v*'v*. The data is not standardised as is sometimes the case and hence the covariance matrix 
is used in preference to the correlation matrix. This is because use of the correlation matrix 
imposes equal weights on each o f the components (i.e. all have unit variance) which, in this case, 
effectively defeats the purpose o f the exercise (see Chatfield and Collins(1980)). The first princi­
pal component o f ¥  is V -  ^ 4 *  v* and 4* is calculated as the (4x1) eigenvector o f T  correspond­
ing to its largest eigenvalue X,. V is therefore the linear function of the 4 indicators which has 
maximum variance. The variation accounted for by the first principal component can be defined 
XtfJJfe. Xt being the k *  eigenvalue of *P. To ensure that the index V is bounded by 0  and 1 it is 
scaled such that « 1. This measure of unionisation is therefore used in Chapter 3 to compare 
and contrast with the results using the closed shop dummy alone.
- 165-
C hap ter 4  : Data Description.
The data used in Chapter 4 is derived from the Datastream and Exstat databanks of com ­
pany accounts and linked to data obtained from independent surveys by myself and Sushil 
Wadhwani conducted in the summer of 1987. Thus the data description given here is split into 
two sections, each outlining the nature of the data and their sources and, where relevant, their 
method o f construction.
1. Com pany accounts data.
(i) Firm level variables.
(a) Profitability (n/S) :  defined as the ratio of trading profits to sales. Trading profits is defined as 
income including depreciation, interest expenses and taxation. The source of the trading profit 
margin is Datastream item 711.
(b) Capital intensity (K /S): defined as the ratio of net fixed assets to sales. Net fixed assets is item 
339 from Datastream. Sales is total sales/tumover and is item C31 from Exstat.
(c) Age proxy (YEARS) : number of years since first account appeared on the Exstat databank. 
Derived from item B2 on Exstat which gives the date of the '-first account
(d) Absolute size (SIZE): total sales in £million in 1984 prices.
(U) Industry level variables.
To introduce industry variables it was first necessary to allocate each firm to an operating 
industry. Hence the fact that a number of firms operate in several markets/industries complicates 
matters. Datastream gives a breakdown of sales by main product groups and this information was 
used to construct a set of weights to allow for diversification.1
For example, if a firm operates in 2 markets and makes 80% o f its sales in market 1 and 
20% in market 2 then the weights *>| -  0.8 and wj ■ 0.2 can be defined. Thus an industry variable
1 Each product group is generally allocated by Daiastream to a 2 or 3 digit SIC Industry. The Datastream
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X which takes values X t in market 1 and in market 2 can be allocated to this firm as 
O.8 X 1 + 0.2 * 2. More generally a firm operating in N industries would be allocated a value of X 
equal to £ w ,* , .2
The following industry level variables (with respective sources) were allocated to firms in 
this w ay :
(a) Industry sales : Source - Census of Production Summary Tables. 1984 and 1985.
This was used to construct the market share variable (MS) defined as firm sales/industry sales.
(b) Industry concentration (CONC) ■ proportion of industry sales accounted for by largest 5 firms 
in a given industry : Source - Census o f Production Summary Tables. 1984 and 1985.
(c) Industry cost disadvantage ratio (CX) -  ratio of sales per employee in small plants (<100 
employees) to sales per employee in larger plants (2  100 employees) in a given industry. Source : 
Census o f Production Summary Tables. 1984 and 1985. In the empirical work this is modelled as 
a dummy variable (CDR) defined equal to  one if  CX<0.87 (see Chapter 4).
(d) Industry growth (GROWTH) ■ (Industry sales in 1984/1985 - Industry sales in 1979/1980) 
divided by Industry sales in 1979/1980. Source : Census of Production Summary Tables. 1980, 
1984 and 1985.
(e) Import penetration (IMPS) »  Industry imports divided by Domestic sales where Domestic 
sales is (Industry sales+Industry imports-Industry exports). Source : Business Monitor Publica­
tion 'Import penetration and export sales ratios for manufacturing industry'.
(0  Export intensity (EXPS) = Industry exports divided by industry sales. Source : Business Moni­
tor Publication 'Import penetration and export sales ratios for manufacturing industry'.
(g) Industry union coverage (COVER) - proportion of male manual workers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements in 1985. Source : New Earnings Survey 1985.
* Slight practical problems emerged because som e firm»' tales figure* included intercom pany tales and 
what were termed other’ tales by D atattream. T hese were excluded in the conttrucnoo of weight* although 
total ta les figures including these components were used elsewhere.
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TABLE A4.1
Means o Variables Used in Chapter 4.
Vanible All Firms Unions Recognised
ns 0.094 0.091 0.108*
K/S 0.285 0.297 0.235**
MS 0.077 0.093 0.012—
YEARS 10.7*7 11.603 7.429—
SIZE 357.3 438.6 17.5—
CONC 0.362 0.353 0.398
CDR 0.572 0.556 0.643*
GROWTH 0.397 0.356 0.571—
IMPS 0.334 0.312 0.426—
EXPS 0.306 0.291 0.377—
COVER 0.642 0.662 0.558—
RECOG 0.807 1.000 0.000
ALLREC 0.538 0.667 0.000
SOMEREC 0.269 0.333 0.000
N 290 234 56
(i) Variable descriptions are given in the text of the Data Appendix.
(U) F or the variable, other than the union variables a significant difference between Arms with 
and without union recognition is denoted by • • • ,  ** and •  for 1%. 5% and 10% significance lev­
els respectively.
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2 . Survey data.
In the summer of 1987 questionnaires asking about union related issues were sent to 499 
firms identified as being in the Datastream databank in 1985 and whose activities were in 
manufacturing industry.3 T h e  actual questionnaire is in Appendix 2. The first wave o f question­
naires generated 71 responses and the second, sent out some three months after the first, elicited a 
further 34. This gave som e 105 usable questionnaires, most of which contained complete infor­
mation. More or less at the same time Sushil Wadhwani earned out a similar survey asking 
Datas cream companies questions about union status and pay bargaining. Certain questions coin­
cide from the two surveys.
The Information obtained from my survey was asked for two years (1985 and 1987) and 
yielded details for manual and non-manual workers on trade union recognition, the extent o f the 
closed shop, union membership and coverage by collective bargaining. Information was also 
asked regarding the num ber of shop stewards and on the incidence of combine committees. 
Finally some subjective material on any changes in the way the company deals with union related 
issues that occurred between 1985 and 1987 was also obtained.
The survey by W adhwani also asked questions for manual and non-manual employees and 
on union recognition and coverage, although as the focus was on pay bargaining, did not ask 
questions on the closed shop or other institutional arrangements. To gain in sample size some 
sacrifices therefore have to  be made regarding the detail o f union information available. Thus 
when the two surveys are pooled together the measure of union presence adopted is whether 
unions are recognised for collective bargaining purposes (RECOG). Additionally two mutually 
exclusive variables were defined : ALLREC -  1 if unions are recognised for manual and non- 
manual employees ; SOM EREC -  1 if unions are recognised only for one of these two groups.
1 This include* •  number o f  o il com panies *o strictly speaking the definition should cover tbe whole o f  the 
production industries.
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Sam ple Selection Criterion.
The following conditions were specified to  generate the sample used in Chapter 4 :
(i) Firms accounts must have been recorded on the Exstat or Datastream databanks for 1983- 
1983 inclusive.
(U) Firms must have no missing industry variables.
(iii) Recent additions to the sample were carefully smdnised to be not as a result o f takeover or 
merger activity (checked using information in th e  Stock Exchange Quarterly report).
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C hap ter 5 : Data Description.
Two Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys have been carried out in the early 1980’s 
under the supervision of the Economic and Social Research Council, the Department of Employ­
ment, the Policy Studies Institute and. in the case of the second survey, the Advisory Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service. The first survey was conducted in 1980 and the second in 1984. The two 
surveys are respectively surveys of 2040 and 2019 British establishments with 25 or more 
employees. The 1980 survey was based on the sampling frame o f  the 1977 Census of Employ­
ment and the 1984 survey on the 1981 Census of Employment. Large establishments were deli­
berately oversampled to guarantee their presence in the sample and a  weighting system existe to 
allow for this. In each survey, interviews were undertaken with a senior manager, worker 
representatives and. where appropriate, with a production works manager. The results presented 
in this thesis use data from interviews with the manager responsible fo r industrial relations. More 
details on the nature of the surveys not covered in this brief description can be found in Daniel 
and Millward(1983) for the 1980 survey and in Mill ward and S tevens( 1986) for the 1984 survey 
and for comparisons between 1980 and 1984.
In Chapter 5 the dependent variable used is the response to the question
H ow  would you assess the financia l performance o f  this works com pared  with other establish­
ments in the same industry ?  Would you say it was 
better than average 
below average 
o r  about average ?
In 1984 an additional question asked
I s  that a  lo t better (below) o r  a little better (below) ?
This generates three ordered categories for 1980 and five for 1984. The question was asked
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only for private sector establishments. The number of plants answering each category were : 
TABLE A5.1.
Number of Plants in Each Financial Performance Category 1980 and 1984.
1980 1984
AU Sample used 
in Chapter 5
AU Sample used 
in Chapter 5
Better than average 349(534) 299(206) 519(341) 237(180)
About average 340(335) 276(194) 485(534) 223(160)
Below average 83(66) 48(33) 88(77) 31(36)
Missing 292(297) - 293(222) -
No. of plants 1*64(1432) ____ 633(<32j 1383(1373) ____ 3IU 376)
Notes.
(i) Numbers in parentheses are weighted frequencies.
In the 1984 survey the 607 plants in the overall sample and the 288 plants in the sample 
used in Chapter 5 who answered above or below were then asked the follow up question. This 
gave the following frequencies
TABLE A3.2.
Responses to Additional Financial Performance Question 1984.
1984
AU Sample used 
in Chapter 5.
Lot better/below 278(309) 121(146)
Little better/below 314(298) 139(143)
Missing 13(10) 8(3)
_No. of piami______ ____ <” 7(618)____ _______ 388(316)____
Notes.
(i) Numbers in parentheses are weighted frequencies.
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The explanatory variables used in Chapter 5 are mostly drawn from the two surveys 
although as each establishment is also allocated to a 3-digit SIC industry this permits augmenta­
tion by certain industry level variables. As most industry level variables are only available for 
manufacturing the initial analysis confined itself to manufacturing. Brief descriptions of the vari­
ables used are now given. Their weighted means are reported in Table A5.3. for the two samples 
used in each year.
(i) Establishment level variables.
(a) Demand for the establishment's product This is a response to the question
O ver the past twelve months, would you say that demand fo r  the main products o r serv ices o f  this
establishm ent has been
Rising
Fa llin g
N either ?
The variable used to model favourable demand condidons (DRISE) is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the respondent said demand was rising. The base category was the other two categories.
(b) Capital investm ent In 1980 the following question was asked
In  the recent past, say the last 2-3 years, has cap ita l investment in the establishment been
Increasing
Fa lling
Stable ?
A variable (IRISE) was defined equal to one if  respondents answered increasing and zero other­
wise. This question was not asked on the basic management questionnaire in 1984.
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(c) Capacity utilisation - In 1984 managers were asked
tn  relation  to current plant and equipment, would you say that this establishment is  working
A t f it l!  capacity
Somewhat below f u l l  capacity
O r considerably below f u l l  capacity ?
A variable (FULLCAP) was defined equal to one if respondents answered that their plant was 
operating at hill capacity and zero otherwise.
(d) Market share : defined as M S-number o f employees/industry employment. A relative market 
share variable (HMS) was defined equal to one for the top 30% o f the MS distribution in 
manufacturing.
(e) Unionisation variables : the basic measure is a dummy variable (RECOG) equal to unity if 
unions are recognised for bargaining purposes for manual employees. The sequence used to ask 
the question on recognition in the 1980 and 1984 surveys involves asking the following two ques­
tions :
You say  that there are  —  manual employees here. A re  any o f  them members o f  a union ?
Yes
N o
N o ¡information available ■ company po licy  
D on ’ t  know  ?
If the answer is Yes.
A re any unions recognised by management f o r  negotiating pay  and conditions fo r  any sector or 
sections o f  the manual workforce in this establishment ?
Yes
N o ?
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TABLE A3.3
Notes.
(i) Variable descriptions are given in the text o f the Data Appendix.
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By design then any plants without manual workers are omitted from the questioning and are
treated as missing values. As such they are left out o f the empirical work in Chapter 3.
Information is given on the extent of closed shop arrangements and thus a second union variable
to be considered is a dummy variable (PRE) equal to one if any manual workers are in a pre-entry
closed shop. This is indicated by an affirmative answer to both the questions
D o  the manual workers at this establishment norm ally have to be members o f  a  union to have or
to  keep their jobs
Y e s . a ll
Y es. some
N o  ?
If  the answer is Yes. all or Yes. some
D o  recruits fo r  any o f  the jo b s  covered by th is closed shop arrangement, have to be union  
m em bers before skirting work ?
Y es. a ll 
Yes. some 
N o ?
(U) Industry level variables.
Each plant is allocated to a 3-digit operating industry. It can therefore be allocated industry aver­
age values of certain variables. The ones considered here are
(a) Price-cost margins (PCM) - defined as (Net output-Operadve wage biil-Net capital expendi­
ture) divided by Gross output. The source of each industry level variable is the 1980 or 1984 
Census of Production.
(b) Industrial concentration (CONC) - defined as the proportion of sales accounted for by the 3 
largest firms in a given industry. Source - 1980/1984 Census of Production.
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(c) Industry unionisation (COVER) - proportion of male manual employees in the 3-digit industry 
who are covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The source is the 1978 New Earnings 
Survey for 1980 and the 1985 New Earnings Survey for 1984.
Sample Selection Criterion.
The following conditions were specified to generate the sample used in Chapter 5 :
(i) Plants with missing values on the dependent or independent variables were deleted.
(ii) Analysis was confined to private sector establishments.
(iii) Most (although not all) o f the analysis was confined to plants operating in manufacturing (i.e. 
SIC codes 200-499).
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C hapter 6 : Data Description.
The Workplace Industrial Relations Survey o f 1984 is accessed for the empirical evaluation 
of the incidence o f sharing schemes in Chapter 6. In Chapter 6 the dependent variable used is the 
response to the question
Does (the company!organisation that owns) this establishment operate any o f  the follow ing  
schemes fo r  any o f  the employees here ?
A  share ownership o r  share option scheme ?
A  profit sharing scheme ?
A  value added bonus scheme ?
The question was asked for all establishments. The distribution of schemes across the sam­
ple is indicated as follows :
TABLE A6.1
Number of Plants with Sharing Arrangements in 1984
AU Sample used
Share ownership 344(263) 293(212)
Profit sharing 234(248) 216(197)
Value added 130(192) 116(144)
Missing 32(33)
No. of plants 2019(2000) . IPOIUO»»)
(i) Numbers in parentheses are weighted frequencies.
(ii) Share ownership schemes do not include those that are available for management levels only.
Three dummy variable indicating the existence or otherwise of a share ownership, profit 
sharing or value added scheme were then used as dependent variables in Chapter 6.
The 1984 Survey gives details on a number of characteristics of both the plant and the 
organisation which owns the plant. It also allocates each plant to a 3-digit industry. Thus the 
explanatory variables used were organisation, industry and establishment characteristics.
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Weighted means o f the variables are reported in Table A6.2. Descriptions o f the variables and 
their sources are now given.
(0  Organisation variables.
(a) Organisation size (O S/ZE) is available as a banded variable of the form of-k O SIZES oP  where 
a*- and a "  are respectively lower and upper cut-off points. A number of cut-off points are avail­
able : 100. 200. 500. 1000. 2000. 5000. 10000. 50000. 100000 employees. The lower limit is 25 
as the smallest establishment in the survey has 25 employees and the upper lim it is open-ended. 
For reasons of parsimony three dummies are defined, the cut-offs being 500. 10000 and 50000 
respectively. The base group is thus establishments in organisations with less than 500 employ­
ees.
(b) Release of financial information : a dummy variable (FINORGA) is created if  management 
gives a lot o f information to employees regarding the financial position o f the organisation. The 
exact question asked was
D oes management consult with employees o r their representatives about the finan cia l position o f  
yo u r organisation as a whole ?
Yes, a lot 
Yes, a  little
FINORGA was defined equal to one for the ’Yes, a lot' respondents and the relevant base is the 
other categories.
(c) Ownership : managers were asked the question
I s  the (parent) company U K  owned o r is  ownership outside the U K  ?
U K  owned!controlled
30/50 U K  and foreign  ownership
Owned!controlled outside U K
- 179-
TABLE A6.2
Weighted Means o f  Variables Used in Chapter 6.
All establishments No unions recognised No closed shop. Closed shop
unions recognised
500SO S L ZE < 10000 0.274 0.203 0.347 0.334
1OOOOSOS IZ E<50000 0.106 0.066 0.142 a  167
OS1ZE2SOOOO 0.083 0.043 0.128 0.124
FINORGA 0.233 0.138 0.313 0.314
FOREIGN 0.090 0.078 0.087 0.149
GROW TH ■0.039 -0.021 -0.053 -0.077
MPROP 0.306 0.460 0.511 0.669
JCC 0.246 0.173 0.288 0.409
EMPLOY 93.93 62.87 108.6 173.9
N om .
(i) V ariable descriptions are given in the text of the Data Appendix.
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TABLE A6.3
Industrial Distribution of Sharing Sch
No. o f  Plants Share Ownership Profit Sharing Value Added
A ll Industries 1001(1094) 0.293(0.212) 0216(0.197) 0.116(0.144)
Energy •(9) 0.250(0.386) 0.125(0-007) 0.000(0.000)
Mineral Extraction. Metal 105(74) 0276(0.103) 0295(0241) 0.133(0.156)
Manufacture A Chemical» 
Metal Goods, Engineering 230(12«) 0.337(0.132) 0.143(0.118) 0.122(0.106)
O ther Manufacturing 228(185) 0224(0.109) 0.132(0.137) 0.079(0.150)
Cooatrucooo 44(65) 0.182(0.147) 0203(0203) 0.250(0.249)
A Catering
225 (33» 0251(0.256) 0233(0.176) 0.138(0.193)
I  ran »port A » ( 5 9 ) 0.282(0.143) 0.179(0.112) 0.103(0.091)
Banking A 136(211) 0297(0.423) 0.434(0296) 0.088(0.086)
O ther Services 80(106) 0.130(0.117) 0.100(0.061) 0.075(0.061)
i i  th a t used in  (he etnp incal w o rt in  C hapter 6.
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A dummy variable (FOREIGN) was defined equal to one if the response is yes to either 50% or 
100% foreign ownership.
(U) Industry variables.
(a) Industry growth : each firm was allocated iu  3-digit industry employment level and a variable 
(GROWTH) was defined as the growth in industry level employment - (Industry employment in 
1984 - Industry employment in 1980) divided by Industry level employment in 1980.
(ill) Establishment level variables.
(a) Occupational composition o f workforce : a variable (MPROP) was defined as the proportion 
o f manual workers in the establishment The definition of manual or non-manual is as follows. 
Non-manual occupations are defined as managerial, professional or clerical jobs. These include 
jobs involving selling but exclude security service occupations. Those occupations not falling 
into the non-manual category are therefore treated as manual (Source of definition - ESRC Data 
Archive Documentation).
(b) Consultative committees : a variable (JCC) was defined equal to one for those plants which 
answered positively to the question
Apart from  Health and Safety Committees, do  you have any jo in t committees o f  managers and  
employees, prim arily concerned with consultation rather than negotiation ?
Yes
No.
(c) Establishment size : simply defined as the total number of employees in the establishment 
(EMPLOY).
(d) Unionisation variables : in this Chapter the basic union recognition variable refers to recogni­
tion among manual or non-manual employees. It is thus directly comparable to the measure used 
in Chapter 5 except that it is taken from both manual and non-manual parts of the questionnaire. 
If plants have recognition for any workers and no closed shop arrangements a dummy variable
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(UNION) i .  set equal to one. If plant. have d m *  shop arrangements for manual. or non- 
n u n u tí. .  dummy variable (CLOSED) is set lo unity. Thus the «levan, h u e  group for com ­
parison is plants which do not recognise either manual or non-manual unions.
Sample Selection Criterion.
The following conditions were specified to generate the sample used in Chapter 6 :
(i) Plants with missing values on the dependent or independent variables were deleted.
(ii) Analysis was confined to private sector establishments.
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APPENDIX 2.
Survey Questionnaire.
ENTERPRISE LEVEL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SURVEY
SECTION 1 
BACKGROUND
1. How many establishments with 23 or more employees does this enterprise have in the U.K. ?
Number in 1983 _______  Number in 1987 ______
2. Have there been any changes in the major business activities of the enterprise since 1980?
Y as______
N o _______
If yes give details and state when changes occurred __ _____________________ _
SECTION 2
UNION RECOGNITION : MANUAL WORKERS
3. How many manual workers are there in total (full and pan-time) within this enterprise?
Number in 1983 ______  Number in 1987______
4. What percentage (to the nearest 3%) of manual workers employed in the enterprise are 
members of a union?
----------percent o f the manual workforce were union members in 1983.
----------percent o f the manual workforce are union members in 1987.
3. What percentage o f  the manual workforce are paid wage rates which are set by collective bar­
gaining between unions and management ?
----------percent in 1983. ______ percent in 1987.
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6. Are any unions recognised for negotiating the pay and conditions of any of the manual workers 
at the establishments in the enterprise ?
In 1983 Y ea______  In 1987 Y es______
N o______  N o ______
If the answer is yes in question 6.
7. Are manual uiuoni recogrured for negotiation in ALL esubtithmenu in »hich there are 
manual workers or only in some 7
In 1983 AU______  In 1987 AU______
Som e______  S om e______
8. Is there a closed shop for any manual workers in any of the establishments of the enterprise?
In 1983 Yea______  In 1987 Y es______
N o______  N o ______
If the answer to 8 is Yes
9. Is there a closed shop in for the majority of manual workers in ALL the establishments o f  the 
enterprise ?
In 1983 Y es______  In 1987 Y es_____
N o______  N o _____
SECTION 3
UNION RECOGNITION : NON-MANUAL WORKERS
10. How many non-manual workers are there in total (full and part-time) within this enterprise?
Number in 1985 ______  Number in 1987______
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11. What percentage of non-manual workers (to the nearest 3%) employed in the enterprise are 
members of a union ?
----------percent of the non-manual workforce were union members in 1983.
----------percent of the non-manual workforce are union members in 1987.
12. What percentage of the non-manual workforce are paid wage rates which are set by collective 
bargaining between unions and management ?
----------percent in 1983. ______ percent in 1987.
13. Are any unions recognised for negotiating the pay and conditions of any o f the non-manual 
workers at the establishments in the enterprise 7
In 1983 Y es______  In 1987 Y es______
N o ______  N o______
If the answer to question 13 is yes.
14. Are non-manual unions recognised for negotiation in ALL establishments in which there are 
non-manual workers or only in some 7
In 1983 A ll______  In 1987 A ll______
S om e______  Som e______
13. Is there a closed shop for any non-manual workers in any o f the establishments of the enter­
prise 7
In 1983 Y es______  In 1987 Y es______
N o ______  N o______
If the answer to 13 is Yes
16. Is there a closed shop for the majority of non-manual work era in ALL the establishments of 
the enterprise ?
In 1983 Y es______  In 1987 Yes______
N o ______  N o______
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SECTION 4
ENTERPRISE UNIONISM
17. How many full time shop stewards are there in the establishments in this enterprise ?
Number in 1985 ______  Number in 1987______
18. Has there been any change since 1980 in the way in which the enterprise deals with unions for 
manual and/or non-manual workers ?
Y ea______
N o _______
If Yea
19. In what areas have these changes occurred ?
(a) Union recognition Year of change_______
(b) Shop steward facilities Year o f change_______
(c) Number o f  shop stewards Year o f change___
(d) Othere areas (describe and state year of change)__________________________
20. Do meetings occur between stewards/union representatives from different establishments 
within this enterprise ?
In 1985 Y ea______  In 1987 Y ea______
N o ______  N o ______
Thank you for your cooperation.
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ENTERPRISE LEVEL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SURVEY 
CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT
(i) The anonymity of the information provided by respondents will be preserved at all times.
(ii) Each questionnaire has a code number for administrative purposes although this number will 
be kept separate from the data and will remain confidential to the survey coordinators.
(iii) Questionnaires and data placed on the computer will not at any time include the names and 
addresses of respondents or their companies.
(iv) No individuals or companies will be identified or identifiable in any subsequent research con­
ducted on the data.
(v) Any published work utilising the survey information will not make any reference to cooperat­
ing companies.
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